tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-46155768520829711282023-12-29T19:32:47.662+00:00©-LAWOn this space I re-publish and archive some of the blog posts I have written for The IPKat and The 1709 Blog (starting 2016)Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.comBlogger257125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-8972509905748245692022-06-03T16:41:00.003+01:002022-06-03T16:41:59.159+01:00AG Szpunar advises CJEU not to extend direct liability for trade mark infringement to operators of online marketplaces<p><span style="text-align: justify;">Is the operator of an online marketplace (more specifically: a hybrid marketplace, which also provides logistics assistance to third-party sellers through a fulfilment programme) using third-party trade marks itself, in accordance with Article 9(2)</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R1001" style="text-align: justify;"><b>EUTMR</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">, when it displays, on its marketplace, advertisements of independent sellers’ goods that infringe such trade mark rights, which it also delivers to end customers? Is the perception of a reasonably well informed and reasonably observant internet user relevant when undertaking such an assessment?</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYYbAr39l41xUuI7Rpj0fYU47JZ2tfG06PaYCIq12l8YxnFNYIL_wX7mOo-CywhZG8_2gDANQ7TbmKyyiZE4mzTRWKUZdlIGEri9sPnlp4WxjkqVZ51Kyq3pPDSzDSxCOWts8NX5NR9gLJARfwiLtbvB1Ac6k_eJHe95-8DfWCaa8zoamyIes/s1024/catreplacehi.jpeg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="652" data-original-width="1024" height="204" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjYYbAr39l41xUuI7Rpj0fYU47JZ2tfG06PaYCIq12l8YxnFNYIL_wX7mOo-CywhZG8_2gDANQ7TbmKyyiZE4mzTRWKUZdlIGEri9sPnlp4WxjkqVZ51Kyq3pPDSzDSxCOWts8NX5NR9gLJARfwiLtbvB1Ac6k_eJHe95-8DfWCaa8zoamyIes/s320/catreplacehi.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Gigi was also awaiting her delivery ...</i></td></tr></tbody></table>These are the key issues on which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been requested to provide guidance. <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=241325&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3176565"><b>Joined cases <i>Louboutin/Amazon</i>, C-148/21 and C-184/21</b></a> are referrals for a preliminary ruling made in the context of highly similar proceedings pending before, respectively, Luxembourg’s Tribunal d’arrondissement (C-148/21) and Belgium’s Tribunal de l’entreprise francophone de Bruxelles (C-184/21).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yesterday, Advocate General (AG) Szpunar issued his <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=260206&pageIndex=0&doclang=IT&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3176565">Opinion</a> <span style="color: red;">[not yet available in English]</span></b> in which he advised the CJEU to rule that, at the conditions described by the referring courts, a marketplace operator would not be directly liable for trade mark infringement.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let’s see how the AG reasoned.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Preliminary remarks</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG began his Opinion noting how the topic of intermediary liability has always raised novel questions over time. This, he noted, is unsurprising considering the relevance of the internet to our societies and also the circumstance that the internet has been creating new intermediation models.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">From an IP perspective, it is “easily understandable” (“agevolmente comprensibile”) that rightholders seek to establish the liability of operators when counterfeits are being sold through their platforms, also because of the difficulties connected with the identification and localization of individual sellers.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This said, the interests of rightholders cannot be considered in isolation and cannot, on their own, justify a finding of liability of platform operators due to third-party infringements. Account should be taken of the circumstance that this could entail imposing a general monitoring obligation (contrary to Article 15 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031">Ecommerce Directive</a></b>) and make it generally more difficult to innovate online.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Notion of “use”</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the substance of the referrals, the AG noted that the notion of use is not defined in the EUTMR. It has been the CJEU, through its case law, that has provided guidance on how it is to be intended. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The notion of “use” thus requires an active behaviour/conduct and a direct or indirect control over the act constituting use. The rationale of all this is to allow the trade mark proprietor to prohibit any unauthorized use of their trade mark by a third party that is effectively able to stop such use and therefore comply with that prohibition. This is connected to the well-established principle according to which no one can be legally obliged to do the impossible.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With specific regard to intermediaries, the CJEU has held that an intermediary that renders a service in connection with the marketing of goods, including by providing the technical conditions necessary for the use of the sign, but that neither offers the goods nor puts them on the market itself does not use the relevant signs for its own commercial communication.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Referring to the judgments in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-236/08"><b><i>Google France</i></b></a>, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=it&num=C-324/09"><b><i>L’Oréal</i></b></a>, and <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-567/18"><b><i>Coty</i></b></a>, the AG considered (my own translation from Italian) that “as of today […] the requirement that use of the sign by an online intermediary needs to be within its own commercial communication has always led to exclude the existence of use by the intermediary itself”. He nonetheless conceded that it is not entirely clear which situations fall within the notion of use of a sign by an intermediary in the context of its own commercial communication.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All the above said, the AG noted that it is possible to identify the borders of such a notion by undertaking a closer inspection. </div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The relevance of the platform user</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The commercial communication of an undertaking encompasses all forms of communication aimed at promoting its own activity, products, or services. As such, it targets third parties in order to make them aware of its activities and establish a link between that subject and the sign at issue.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-pjgPmPXVUjOINmoMIbLfl9PooFosk8MEMUytPF5wPFLi7El-WJVb74qCBKKCAoE5nwU2FLEziRgQ2VO4aYS0ss_b4U5hUfGYk6ZPxfB2_ejpRPCrjiZHoOZar_Ro_hFXnuHgL2pcp2iC6DkN7c9aJgUm3DAELhec6R5xIVEEnAJibz39zKM/s200/download.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="200" data-original-width="200" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-pjgPmPXVUjOINmoMIbLfl9PooFosk8MEMUytPF5wPFLi7El-WJVb74qCBKKCAoE5nwU2FLEziRgQ2VO4aYS0ss_b4U5hUfGYk6ZPxfB2_ejpRPCrjiZHoOZar_Ro_hFXnuHgL2pcp2iC6DkN7c9aJgUm3DAELhec6R5xIVEEnAJibz39zKM/s1600/download.jpeg" width="200" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">.<i>.. A new pair of heels felt<br />like a must-have</i><br /><br /></td></tr></tbody></table>In line with the AG Opinion in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=221117&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3170469"><b><i>Coty</i></b></a>, AG Szpunar considered that whether there is use of a sign within an intermediary’s own commercial communication cannot but be appreciated from the perspective of the addressee of such a communication, that is the platform user.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Having established that, the next step would be to determine the attributes of such a user. According to the referring court, it should be a “reasonably well informed and reasonably observant internet user”. The AG substantially agreed, considering that the perception of such a user would be a “pertinent element” (“elemento pertinente”) to determine use of a sign in the own commercial communication of a platform operator.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Application of the principles to the present circumstances</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Applying the principles above to the present circumstances, the AG concluded that a platform operator like Amazon does <i>not</i> use Louboutin’s trade mark within the meaning of Article 9 EUTMR. As such, no direct/primary liability for trade mark infringement could be established.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Among other things, the AG considered that none of the peculiarities of the Amazon model as described by the referring courts would allow to ‘depart’ from the conclusions reached in a case like <i>L’Oréal.</i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All the above said, the AG did not rule out that liability could be established – on a secondary/indirect basis – in accordance with national law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">As I write in this <b><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4078987">article</a></b>, which was supported by one of the parties to these proceedings, the conclusion that there is no use in a trade mark sense of the Louboutin trade mark is correct and the CJEU should endorse it.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This said, I am not entirely persuaded about the relevance of the platform user’s perception to the determination of whether there is “use”. My view would be that such an assessment is to be conducted exclusively on an objective basis. The perception of the ‘average consumer’ would come into consideration at a subsequent stage, that is when deciding whether the use at issue is actually infringing.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let’s now wait for the CJEU ruling: stay tuned!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 3 June 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-38296246539020291102022-05-11T14:52:00.003+01:002022-05-11T14:52:28.329+01:00 What does the CJEU judgment in the Polish challenge to Article 17 (C-401/19) mean for the transposition and application of that provision?<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">On 26 April 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its long-awaited judgment in</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=258261&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5264829" style="text-align: justify;"><b><i>Poland v European Parliament and Council</i> (C-401/19)</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">. The Court held Article 17 of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a> </b><span style="text-align: justify;">compatible with freedom of expression and information under Article 11 of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf" style="text-align: justify;"><b>EU Charter of Fundamental Rights</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">. In so doing, it rejected the request of the Republic of Poland to annul said provision. The Court also noted how currently no valid alternatives appear to exist to the use of automatic recognition and filtering tools in order to comply with the obligations under Article 17(4)(b)-(c) (para 54).</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">The judgment considers that the liability regime established under Article 17(4) represents a restriction on freedom of expression/information (para 58). Nevertheless such a restriction is not undue. Internal safeguards are provided, of which six key ones are identified (see paras 85-98). Member States are required to consider such safeguards “when transposing Article 17” so to “take care to act on the basis of an interpretation of that provision which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the Charter” (para 99). The latter include not just the freedom guaranteed by Article 11, but also protection of rightholders’ intellectual property within the right to property (Article 17 of the Charter) and online content sharing services providers’ (OCSSPs) freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter). In all this, Article 52(1) of the Charter, including the general principle of proportionality, must be complied with.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All the above raises several issues, including two fundamental ones that will be discussed in what follows:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ol><li>The first is the mandate that the Court confers on national legislatures and authorities for a correct transposition and application of Article 17;</li><li>The second is how, in practice, automatic recognition and filtering tools are to be used by OCSSPs.</li></ol><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">1. How to ensure the correct transposition and application of Article 17</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBGKq5TCxsKbpafrju1qgQ9T9cOrYk5wMCHQQUXo1nWWPfHT0uChmcuMaF8uvU7L_m6hYIvvVP_s9g1SYleLkQASzaNLZIihfcpxthq9Fbaa4529PSiGhZVJY9_dxSqe-Ay408nW0pFQFq9yfLKAAghcUeStOvMWUZKHcp5ro5ZYnvo1JacHE/s640/d59eebd98b6ce6cf11f28ceea3827daa.jpeg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="480" data-original-width="640" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhBGKq5TCxsKbpafrju1qgQ9T9cOrYk5wMCHQQUXo1nWWPfHT0uChmcuMaF8uvU7L_m6hYIvvVP_s9g1SYleLkQASzaNLZIihfcpxthq9Fbaa4529PSiGhZVJY9_dxSqe-Ay408nW0pFQFq9yfLKAAghcUeStOvMWUZKHcp5ro5ZYnvo1JacHE/s320/d59eebd98b6ce6cf11f28ceea3827daa.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>How to solve the national transposition problem?<br /><br /></i></td></tr></tbody></table>As I observed in my <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2022/04/article-17-of-dsm-directive-is-valid.html"><b>post</b></a> a few days ago, the imposition, on the side of Member States, of an obligation for OCSSPs to carry out a generalized, ex ante blocking of content, while reserving the reinstating thereof solely to the complaint and redress mechanism phase, would be incompatible with the roadmap that the Court provided (para 85).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In all this, some commentators have <a href="http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2022/04/28/cjeu-upholds-article-17-but-not-in-the-form-most-member-states-imagined/"><b>argued</b></a> that (1) minimalistic national transpositions of Article 17 (that is 'copy-and-paste' solutions) would be also unacceptable and that, instead, national models providing for statutory exemptions or ‘presumed’ lawful uses, as it is the case of German and Austrian laws, should be preferred. Neither suggestion is correct.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">In favour of minimalistic transpositions</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">A national transposition of Article 17 that reproduced the EU text would not only be the ‘safest’ option from the point of view of compliance with EU law but would also best comply with the highly prescriptive wording of that provision.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Unlike other provisions of the DSM Directive, Article 17 does not leave Member States an option to choose whether to do something in the first place (cf, eg, Article 12) or how to do it (cf, eg, Article 18(2)).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With the sole and limited exception of Article 17(9), first and second subparagraphs, which allows national legislature to undertake some fine-tuning, the rest of the provision sets very specific obligations relating to concepts – including: communication/making available to the public, best efforts, quotation, parody, pastiche etc – that in no way refer to national law. This means that such concepts are autonomous concepts of EU and must, as a result, receive uniform interpretation and application across the EU.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As I discuss <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article-abstract/16/3/265/6157786?redirectedFrom=fulltext"><b>here</b></a>, it is true that Article 288(3) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E288"><b>TFEU</b></a> allows in principle national authorities to determine the form and methods needed to achieve the result mandated by a certain EU directive. Nevertheless, the choice between different national transposition techniques is not always at the discretion of individual Member States. Article 17 requires a transposition that is as close as possible to the EU text (that is: a minimalistic/copy-and-paste approach). In all its level of detail, Article 17 is indeed more akin to a provision that could be found in an EU regulation than in a directive. In turn, it should be transposed in such a way that its normative content – including its safeguards – is not altered. This also serves to guarantee the uniform application of EU law and the respect of the principle of equality.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://www.communia-association.org/2022/04/26/case-c-401-19-cjeu-limits-the-use-of-automated-filters-and-protects-user-rights-at-upload/"><b>argument</b></a> that minimalistic transpositions of Article 17 would be incompatible with the CJEU ruling is untenable. The Court expressly acknowledged that Article 17 contains appropriate safeguards. The same cannot but be also true for national transpositions that reproduced the wording of the Directive in full.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In sum: what the CJEU judgment mandates is – for Member States – not to alter the content of Article 17 (more on that further below) and – for national courts and authorities – to interpret the resulting provisions in such a way that compliance with the CJEU ruling is ensured. This conclusion follows from para 99 of the judgment.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Against adding what is not in the EU text</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">National transpositions of Article 17 that incorporated requirements and conditions that are not to be found in the DSM Directive would alter the equilibrium reached by EU legislature, while also impairing the fundamental objective underlying the adoption of the DSM Directive as a whole, that is: the creation of a digital <i>single</i> market.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Like national transpositions providing for generalized ex ante blocking obligations, national transpositions introducing (i) generalized obligations to only block content ex post and/or (ii) envisaging statutory exclusions or ‘presumed’ lawful uses are contrary to EU law (see the discussion <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/02/five-considerations-for-transposition.html"><b>here</b></a>).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As such, suggestions that solutions like the German and Austrian ones should be endorsed and inspire other national legislatures, including those that are yet to complete their own transpositions of the Directive, are inappropriate.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Not only do such solutions stem from an undue interpretation of EU law and the nature of the rights subject to Article 17 (not a different, special or even sui generis right of communication/making available to the public right but, instead, the same right as found in other EU legislation): they also significantly impair the harmonizing efforts of the EU legislature and the requirement of proportionality supporting the interpretation and application of Article 17(4).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Considering earlier CJEU case law that has resulted in a finding of incompatibility with EU law of transpositions of earlier directives – notably the InfoSoc Directive – in several Member States (just to mention but a few examples: certain <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-435/12"><b>Dutch</b></a>, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-572/13"><b>Belgian</b></a>, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-470/14"><b>Spanish</b></a>, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-110/15"><b>Italian</b></a>, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=c-301/15&td=ALL"><b>French</b></a>, and <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-469/17"><b>German</b></a> copyright provisions have been held in breach of EU law), if there is a model not to follow is one that removes or adds to an EU directive without any mandate in this sense. Article 17 does not confer any such mandate.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">2. How automatic recognition and filtering tools are to be used in practice</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiruiIiLO-o1ChCi0XZSYFtnnaMzHVucNWA04gURYN-W9s8YoYCuNvYZzGL_PHHtbI1KRxtR0nnk2Volxej_yPsdMOrtaYe62Wg4_3ACYrKGWnP3SXAm3PXHRzuPHPejlsBeanR_Q7ZIGB6005ar07VwA3c_ZALo8J2-AZGhbrhZuPXrc2Wuuc/s640/sddefault.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="480" data-original-width="640" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiruiIiLO-o1ChCi0XZSYFtnnaMzHVucNWA04gURYN-W9s8YoYCuNvYZzGL_PHHtbI1KRxtR0nnk2Volxej_yPsdMOrtaYe62Wg4_3ACYrKGWnP3SXAm3PXHRzuPHPejlsBeanR_Q7ZIGB6005ar07VwA3c_ZALo8J2-AZGhbrhZuPXrc2Wuuc/w400-h300/sddefault.jpeg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The IPKat's <b><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJMJMKVoruA&ab_channel=TheNewYorker">favourite filter</a><br /><br /></b></i></td></tr></tbody></table>Agreeing with the Republic of Poland and substantially with the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021DC0288"><b>EC Guidance to Article 17</b></a> too, the CJEU acknowledged that, to comply with Article 17(4)(b)-(c), the use of automatic recognition and filtering tools is unavoidable and necessary.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To ensure that such tools comply with EU law, account must be taken of the principles enshrined in Article 52(1) of the Charter, including proportionality, and of the objective that a fair balance of rights and interests is struck between different rights and interests (paras 63-66).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Such a principled framework – which is flexible <i>by design</i> because it needs to accommodate developing industry practices and available technologies (para 73) binds not only Member States but also serves to assess the “actual measures” that OCSSPs will adopt in order to comply with their obligations under Article 17(4)(b)-(c) (paras 71-73).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Importantly, the CJEU refers to an obligation of result not only insofar as compliance with ‘user rights’ (exceptions and limitations in Article 17(7): paras 78 and 87) is concerned, but also when it comes to striking a fair balance between said rights, protection of intellectual property, and respect of OCSSPs’ freedom to conduct a business (para 75; see also para 83). As such, it is incorrect to suggest that the only ‘result’ that is to be achieved or even that matters under Article 17 is compliance with Article 17(7).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What OCSSPs are required to do is to adopt “strictly targeted” measures (para 81), which may “distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content” (para 86), also bearing in mind that “in some cases availability of unauthorised content can only be avoided upon notification of rightholders” (para 91). The notion of adequacy is key and reflective of the principled framework detailed above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In practice, this does not mean that the only tools that OCSSPs can adopt are those that are 100% error-free. If that was the case, then there would be no fair balance of rights and interests and compliance with Article 17(4)(b)-(c) could not be achieved. Instead, what is required is that, where an (alleged) error occurs, a complaint and redress mechanism like the one in Article 17(9) is readily available.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let’s take YouTube’s Content-ID as an example of an automatic recognition and filtering tool. The recent <a href="https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/access-all-balanced-ecosystem-and-powerful-tools/"><b>YouTube Transparency Report</b></a> highlights that less than 1% of the claims made in the first half of 2021 was disputed. Of these, 60%+ was resolved in favour of the uploader. Does this mean that Content-ID fails the test set by the CJEU because of a limited number of false positives? No. It means that the tool has a (slight) margin of error. Considering its overall numbers, this is nonetheless a system that adequately balances protection of intellectual property with user freedoms.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All the above is also in line with the case law of the CJEU itself, which has never suggested that only a 100% rate is acceptable.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Just think of <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&T,F&num=c-610-15"><b><i>Ziggo</i></b></a> (the Pirate Bay case): in his Opinion, Advocate General (AG) Szpunar noted that the rightholder organization taking action against The Pirate Bay (TPB) had submitted that 90%+ files that could be accessed through that platform would be unlawful. This means that 10% or so of the content on TPB could be lawful. Yet, this did not prevent the AG from advising the Court to hold that the platform operators would be themselves liable for copyright infringement and that access to such a platform should be blocked: “In such circumstances […] depriving internet users of access to information, by blocking the TPB site, would be proportionate to the significance and seriousness of the copyright infringements committed on that site.” (para 76 of the Opinion). The CJEU agreed.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The same approach was adopted, more recently, in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-682/18"><b><i>YouTube/Cyando</i></b></a>. The CJEU noted that it might be the case (subject to the referring court confirming it) that 90-96% of the files hosted on cyberlocker Uploaded would be unlawful. Such a finding would contribute to establishing the direct liability of its platform operators. Again, no 100% rate of infringing content is required.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, the test that the CJEU adopted in C-401/19 reminds one of that in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-314/12"><b><i>UPC Telekabel</i></b></a> see para 63 in that case) in relation to website blocking injunctions. Like in that case, for Article 17 the use of automatic recognition and filtering tools is allowed insofar as “(i) they do not unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully accessing the information available and (ii) that they have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services […] from accessing the subject-matter that has been made available to them in breach of the intellectual property right.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Over the next several years, Article 17 will be likely the subject of referrals to the CJEU. For the time being, the guidance provided in the judgment on 26 April last indicates that, first, Article 17’s complex and delicate internal architecture must not be altered – in one sense or another – in the national transposition and application phase, so to ensure that the safeguards that the Court has identified can be complied with.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Second, the use of automatic recognition and filtering tools is unavoidable and necessary to protect copyright, albeit that it is subject to the principles of adequacy and proportionality. In this regard, the Court adopted a flexible test that, in the future, will serve to carry out an examination “in relation to the provisions adopted by the Member States for the purposes of transposing that directive or of the measures determined by [OCSSPs] in order to comply with that regime” (para 71).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 11 May 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-48127626314993209942022-04-09T07:56:00.000+01:002022-04-09T07:56:03.334+01:00The Louboutin/Amazon cases (C-148/21 and C-184/21) and primary liability under EU trade mark law<p></p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV8BOY-WiVvYrAKHdpxB9bdGWm0NftwRpArOguFwSl-5gh9LKc5hFvWbAdlJsC97eWrl7zPUnwES1_pirGncFquYM581x_GXYtoljopfZzezHjc6XS4rN_u4zOpkODF2Sm0stRmdnvi8MDzGSPfy5SAu3rHs_PjAayP0eFG7QnNSqVxn0OoYM/s720/c66fe035a67772c9451c44695484a1c4.jpeg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="720" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV8BOY-WiVvYrAKHdpxB9bdGWm0NftwRpArOguFwSl-5gh9LKc5hFvWbAdlJsC97eWrl7zPUnwES1_pirGncFquYM581x_GXYtoljopfZzezHjc6XS4rN_u4zOpkODF2Sm0stRmdnvi8MDzGSPfy5SAu3rHs_PjAayP0eFG7QnNSqVxn0OoYM/s320/c66fe035a67772c9451c44695484a1c4.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Merpel will be also spending the weekend<br />shopping for (stiletto heel) shoes</i><br /><br /></td></tr></tbody></table> <span style="text-align: justify;">Last year The IPKat</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/05/can-amazon-be-directly-liable-for-trade.html" style="text-align: justify;"><b>reported</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">on a new referral to the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) from Luxembourg’s Tribunal d’arrondissement, asking whether the operator of a hybrid marketplace could be considered directly liable for trade mark infringement due to the presence of third-party listings of infringing goods on its platform.</span><p></p><div style="text-align: justify;">That referral (<a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-148/21&language=en"><b>C-148/21</b></a>) has now been joined to another one (<a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?lgrec=fr&td=%3BALL&language=en&num=C-184/21&jur=C"><b>C-184/21</b></a>) made in separate but highly similar proceedings pending between the same parties (Louboutin and Amazon) before the Tribunal de l’entreprise francophone de Bruxelles.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In a nutshell, these joined cases are asking the CJEU to determine whether and, if so, at what conditions the operator of an online marketplace may be found liable under Article 9(2) of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1506417891296&uri=CELEX:32017R1001"><b>EU Trade Mark Regulation 2017/1001</b></a> (EUTMR) for the display of advertisements and the delivery of infringing goods that are offered for sale and placed on the market upon the initiative and under the control of independent sellers that avail themselves of that operator’s services.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I have now written a longer article on these referrals, which will be published later this year by<i> European Intellectual Property Review</i> and can be in the meantime read on SSRN <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4078987"><b>here</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The broader relevance of the referrals</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The importance of these referrals to trade mark law and, more generally, IP cannot be overstated.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The answer to the questions whether the operator of an online marketplace like the one described by the referring courts may be held directly liable for trade mark infringement because of advertisements of third-party infringing goods displayed on such a marketplace and delivery thereof to end customers will define who can be held liable for trade mark infringement and on what basis (primary/direct or secondary/indirect).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU might also clarify whether the approach recently adopted under copyright law with regard to the right of communication to the public and the liability of internet platforms is to be applied to other areas of IP.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any event, it would be inappropriate to draw any superficial parallel between the situations at issue in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-682/18"><b><i>YouTube</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/06/cjeu-rules-on-platform-liability-under.html">here</a>]</span></b> and the one at stake in <i>Louboutin/Amazon</i>: while the former required the CJEU to determine liability under copyright law as arising from the breach of duties of care of platform operators (YouTube and Uploaded) relating to specific user uploads, the latter relates to the question whether direct liability under trade mark law could arise not because of specific acts or omissions of a platform operator, but rather because of the economic model behind the hybrid marketplace at issue in the background proceedings.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The trade mark framework</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as trade mark law is concerned, Article 9(3) EUTMR refers to a non-exhaustive list of situations which are to be regarded as trade mark use. What they have in common is the direct undertaking of those acts, that is – in the words of the CJEU – a <i>comportement actif</i>, which consists of affixing the sign, advertising under it, etc.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This said, a distinction is to be made between, on the one hand, independent sellers who advertise for sale and sell goods on which a third-party trade mark is affixed using the services of the operator of an online marketplace and, on the other hand, the operator itself:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Insofar as the sellers are concerned, there is no doubt that they use such a trade mark in accordance with Article 9(3) EUTMR. Their ultimate objective is to realize the full value underlying the economic operation that consists of offering goods for sale and placing them on the market.</li><li>Turning to the operator of the online marketplace and the type of liability which could be imposed on it because of such third-party sellers’ own uses of a registered trade mark without authorization, a distinction is to be made between primary (or direct) liability and secondary (or indirect) liability: while the former is formally harmonized at the EU level, the latter is not.</li></ul><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU has already had the opportunity to consider whether certain information society service providers (ISSPs), including online marketplaces, could be regarded as directly liable for trade mark infringement and so far refused to extend the scope of primary liability for trade mark infringement to acts undertaken by ISSPs, which might contribute to trade mark infringements committed by users of their services.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the broader IP context, as mentioned, situations falling under the scope of secondary liability have been brought, <i>at certain conditions</i>, within the application of primary liability rules solely in relation to copyright and, more specifically, the exclusive right of communication/making available to the public.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To sum up: the distinction between different types of liability for IP infringements is still very much alive and well. Such a distinction and the core principles of the safe harbour regime (including for hosting providers) are also being maintained in the proposed EU Digital Services Act, currently undergoing trilogue negotiations.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The referred questions</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">It is against the broader context delineated above that the CJEU will need to undertake its assessment of Louboutin/Amazon. The analysis will now turn to the consideration of the specific issues on which the national courts have sought guidance from the CJEU.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Whether the operator of an online marketplace uses a third-party trade mark itself when it displays advertisements of independent sellers’ listings</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">In light of consolidated CJEU case law, to determine whether there is use of a trade mark when the relevant sign is used in advertising and, therefore, a potential infringement where such use is unauthorized, two conditions need to be satisfied: first, it is necessary that a person exercises an active behaviour/conduct (<i>comportement actif</i>) and exerts a direct or indirect control over the act constituting use; second, such a situation must entail that the use takes place under that person’s own initiative and in their own name, that is: as their own commercial communication.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiaq0OEYmWy4J_RKlfhn3mlgcYsdaJF1J8dGymLPb2eFNUor36zNbHURk7g-bqNdB2yexHYMd4IBk2JqGhtKPiBRaXbtv_URhn8pUg0qZPrqD-AkkCSQcMM10cfQtbf5CZQ9QqgOuJu6IxuMETP2nN0CEM_aloVFo10M3EsMt6mCfjN-jXJ5AA/s576/christian-louboutin-lion-paw-shoes.webp" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="403" data-original-width="576" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiaq0OEYmWy4J_RKlfhn3mlgcYsdaJF1J8dGymLPb2eFNUor36zNbHURk7g-bqNdB2yexHYMd4IBk2JqGhtKPiBRaXbtv_URhn8pUg0qZPrqD-AkkCSQcMM10cfQtbf5CZQ9QqgOuJu6IxuMETP2nN0CEM_aloVFo10M3EsMt6mCfjN-jXJ5AA/s320/christian-louboutin-lion-paw-shoes.webp" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The IPKat Team's favourite Louboutins ever<br /></i><br /></td></tr></tbody></table>While there is no doubt, as stated, that sellers who use an online marketplace to offer for sale and place on the market infringing goods fulfil both requirements above, such a conclusion cannot be automatically extended to the marketplace operator.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What is required under Article 9(2) EUTMR is that the activities referred to therein are carried out by a person themselves and for themselves, not as aid/support to third-party uses. The rationale of that provision is to allow the trade mark proprietor to prohibit any unauthorized use of their trade mark by a third party that is effectively able to stop such use and therefore comply with that prohibition.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It follows that the operator of an online marketplace shall be regarded as using a third-party trade mark itself if the advertisements that it hosts of independent sellers’ goods are something over which that operator has direct/indirect control and qualify as its own commercial communication.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Applying the guidance above to the factual circumstances as presented by the referring courts, an operator like the one described by such courts would not be using a third-party trade mark itself when it displays advertisements, including sponsored ones that serve to enhance the visibility of sellers’ own advertisements, relating to independent sellers’ listings on the online marketplace that it operates.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Whether the perception of internet users/consumers is relevant to determining whether there is use of a trade mark</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The referring courts have asked the CJEU if “the perception of a reasonably well informed and reasonably observant internet user” is relevant to determining whether there is use of a trade mark by the operator itself in the context of advertisements of independent sellers’ goods on the online marketplace that it operates.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Established case law indicates that the infringement test requires, first, to decide whether there is use of a trade mark in the course of trade. <i>If</i> that is the case, the next step is to assess whether the use is liable to have an adverse effect on the trade mark’s functions. It is solely during this second phase that the perception of the relevant internet users/consumers is to be taken into account, for example to determine whether the use at hand creates a risk of confusion/association on the side of such consumers.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">On the contrary, determination of whether there is use of a trade mark must be carried out on an objective basis. In other words: the perception of internet users and consumers is irrelevant to the first prong of the infringement analysis.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It follows that the referred question relating to the relevance of the perception of internet users/consumers must also be answered in the negative.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Whether the operator of an online marketplace uses a trade mark itself when it delivers goods to end customers at the request of independent sellers</h4><div style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-567/18"><b>Existing CJEU case law</b></a> already provides an answer – in the negative – to the question whether the same marketplace operator that is at issue in <i>Louboutin/Amazon</i> is to be regarded as using a third-party trade mark itself when it stores infringing goods at the request and on behalf of independent sellers who intend to offer such goods or put them on the market.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Since the operator of an online marketplace does not use a third-party trade mark itself – whether when it displays advertisements on behalf of such sellers (in accordance with what has been stated above), stores infringing goods on behalf of third-party sellers or transports them – the question whether it uses such a trade mark when it delivers such goods to end customers must be also answered in the negative.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the circumstances described by the referring courts, at the request of sellers themselves, the marketplace operator assists them in fulfilling the commercial operation that consists of putting goods on the market. It is not the operator that uses the third-party trade mark affixed on such goods. As a result, the question whether the operator of an online marketplace, like the one described by the referring courts, uses a trade mark itself when its delivers third-party goods to end customers, also needs to be answered in the negative.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Louboutin/Amazon</i> calls upon the CJEU to determine what the foundational requirement for establishing prima facie trade mark infringement – that is: use of a trade mark – entails and how far the borders of primary liability can be pushed, including on the internet.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">These joined cases also present an opportunity to the Court to reflect on whether the boundaries between harmonized primary/direct and unharmonized secondary/indirect liability under trade mark law should be blurred up to the point that the former is to encompass situations which ordinarily would fall within the remit of the latter.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With specific regard to the questions raised by the referring courts, the CJEU should answer all of them in the negative: the operator of an online marketplace like the one considered by the referring courts does not in itself use the trade mark in relation to advertisements and delivery of infringing goods that are offered for sale and placed on the market by unrelated third-party sellers who avail themselves of the services of such a marketplace. As such, Article 9(2) EUTMR does not find application in a situation like the one described by the referring courts in Luxembourg and Belgium.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All the above is without prejudice to the circumstance that the operator of a hybrid marketplace would qualify for the application of Article 9(2) EUTMR in relation to the goods that it directly offers for sale and places on the market (that is, its own listings in accordance with the hybrid marketplace model), as well as the circumstance that liability might be established on a secondary basis in relation to third-party listings. The latter would be however a matter of national, not EU, law. Hence, it would be for the referring courts, not the CJEU, to undertake such an assessment.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For those interested, the full text article can be read on SSRN <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4078987"><b>here</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 9 April 2022]</span></i></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-75539517667302966052022-04-06T12:49:00.002+01:002022-04-06T12:49:25.323+01:00CJEU rules that private copying also applies in the cloud and warns against thinking that everything is communication to the public<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">A few days ago the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered its</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-433/20" style="text-align: justify;"><b>judgment in C-433/20 <i>Austro-Mechana</i></b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">, ruling that the notion of reproduction ‘on any medium’ extends to the cloud and, therefore, that private copying under Article 5(2)(b) of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:en:HTML" style="text-align: justify;"><b>InfoSoc Directive</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">also applies in that context.</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGJMdRSLvyJV1Ll66x8Kv5hJWlvan1IZJhiSDD45i2o_6ajeOielY3JLKoEErciM4ClTxw1MmEbdnkX5XZLTYND1FB8xEjUYNJin875l3n7hyyY-Zqkh4eikUclqYYz89W50lCD3jTvL1XywinTaRr2ZncplzOKdA49H3JyOdhLuDYufgvZ3A/s320/264173506025202.jpeg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="320" data-original-width="320" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGJMdRSLvyJV1Ll66x8Kv5hJWlvan1IZJhiSDD45i2o_6ajeOielY3JLKoEErciM4ClTxw1MmEbdnkX5XZLTYND1FB8xEjUYNJin875l3n7hyyY-Zqkh4eikUclqYYz89W50lCD3jTvL1XywinTaRr2ZncplzOKdA49H3JyOdhLuDYufgvZ3A/s1600/264173506025202.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Kat cloud ...</i></td></tr></tbody></table>The judgment is in line with last year’s <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=246488&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=749899"><b>Opinion</b></a> of Advocate General (AG) Hogan <b><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/09/ag-hogan-advises-cjeu-to-rule-that.html">here</a>]</span></b> and clarifies the treatment of private copying in the context of cloud computing, this being something that had been previously asked to the Court (in the context of the <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-265/16"><b><i>VCAST</i></b></a> referral: <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-vcast-decision-how-to-turn-private.html"><b>here</b></a>), but which the CJEU did not expressly address, preferring instead to focus on the qualification of providers of cloud-based storage facilities that give access to protected content to users based in territories for which no licence is in place.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">This referral from Austria was made in the context of litigation between copyright collecting society Austro-Mechana and cloud storage service provider Strato concerning the remuneration for private copying allegedly due by the latter.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Strato submitted that no remuneration was due since (1) it had already paid the required fee in Germany, where its servers are hosted and (2) users had also already paid the required compensation when purchasing the terminal equipment necessary to upload content to the cloud.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Following a dismissal of the action at first instance, an appeal was filed to the Higher Regional Court of Vienna. That court considered that, indeed, the earlier CJEU ruling in <i>VCAST</i> had not exhausted the question of private copying in the cloud. As such a referral to the CJEU appeared warranted to clarify:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Whether the private copying exception and, with that, the fair compensation requirement apply in the context of reproductions made using cloud computing;</li><li>Whether it is compatible with EU law to have a national law that excludes providers of cloud-based storage services from the obligation to pay the fair compensation referred to in Article 5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU answered ‘yes’ to both questions above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The judgment</h3><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Whether the private copying exception applies in the cloud</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The Court noted at the outset that private copying relates to the right of reproduction which, in turn, is to receive broad interpretation also because of the InfoSoc Directive’s objective of guaranteeing a high level of protection of copyright.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Then the Court considered that the uploading of content to the cloud entails the undertaking of an act of reproduction (the same goes when that content is downloaded). As such, private copying under Article 5(2)(b) would find application in relation to the undertaking of such acts of reproduction, also because the concept of ‘any medium’ – this being an autonomous concept of EU law that is to receive uniform application across the EU – refers to “all media on which a protected work may be reproduced, including servers such as those used in cloud computing.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This conclusion is also consistent with the consideration that the wording of Article 5(2)(b) is, on purpose, technologically neutral.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Court also warranted that not everything is to be regarded as just and solely an act of communication to the public (🥲): the saving of a copy in the cloud is not the same thing as communicating such copy to the public. In this sense, one should not think that rulings like VCAST and <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=221807&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1"><b><i>Tom Kabinet</i></b></a><b> [<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/12/breaking-cjeu-rules-that-provision-of.html">here</a>]</b> mean that the distinction between reproduction and communication to the public on the internet has been blurred up to the point that it no longer exists:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">any communication that would result from the sharing of a work by the user of a cloudstorage service would constitute an act of exploitation that is distinct from the reproduction act referredto in Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29, which may come within the scope of Article 3(1) of thatdirective, if the conditions for the application of that provision are satisfied.</div></blockquote><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Whether Member States can exclude providers of cloud-based storage services from the payment of fair compensation for private copying</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the second question, the CJEU reflected on the rationale of the fair compensation requirement, that is to compensate rightholders for the harm suffered because of the unauthorized reproduction of their protected content (recitals 35 and 38 of the InfoSoc Directive).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While Member States are required to implement a system of fair compensation that compensates rightholders for the harm referred to above, they also enjoy broad discretion “to determine, inter alia, who must pay that compensation and to establish the form, detailed arrangements for collection and the level of that compensation”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, the compensation is owed by the private person who undertakes the reproduction of protected content – in the present circumstances, the private user of the cloud computing service.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is only because of practical difficulties in identifying such private users and on consideration that the harm caused by each private use could be – when considered in isolation– minimal that Member States can introduce a private copying levy system “for the purposes of financing fair compensation chargeable not to the private persons concerned, but to those who have digital reproduction equipment, devices and media and who, on that basis, in law or in fact, make that equipment available to private users or provide copying services for them.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Agreeing with AG Hogan, the Court concluded that:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">in so far as the uploading and downloading of copyright-protected content during the use of storage services in the context of cloud computing maybe classified as a single process for the purposes of private copying, it is open to the Member States, in the light of the broad discretion which they enjoy […] to put in place a system in which fair compensation is paid solely in respect of the devices or media which form a necessary part of that process, provided that such compensation may reasonably be regarded as reflecting the possible harm to the copyright holder.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">In that context, while it is open to the Member States to take account, when setting the private copying levy, of the fact that certain devices and media may be used for the purpose of private copying in connection with cloud computing, they must ensure that the levy thus paid, in so far as it affects several devices and media in that single process, does not exceed the possible harm to the rightholders as resulting from the act in question.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The judgment is in line with the (abundant) CJEU case law on private copying and the outcome, as such, is unsurprising.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The most notable part of the ruling is, therefore, the part in which the CJEU warns against conflating questions of reproduction and communication to the public: one thing is reproduction, another is communication.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJJgrml2jDfAXDvQfU9rL0ffinQPOKBuMbyNSPOFr0I9pqt-o9nDP7cDVuJUjQbsRJOLL1Sc20MQdQymDO2oU--JzlHURuO80q3WkVMzGAl6emOkQT0bfwlifaFUPbXDRlZA5G4E3ZKTObAe2ga8P85IqAJisE_zxgekvIZzr9cukv8MSlVVw/s2388/Untitled_Artwork.jpg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1668" data-original-width="2388" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJJgrml2jDfAXDvQfU9rL0ffinQPOKBuMbyNSPOFr0I9pqt-o9nDP7cDVuJUjQbsRJOLL1Sc20MQdQymDO2oU--JzlHURuO80q3WkVMzGAl6emOkQT0bfwlifaFUPbXDRlZA5G4E3ZKTObAe2ga8P85IqAJisE_zxgekvIZzr9cukv8MSlVVw/s320/Untitled_Artwork.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><div style="text-align: center;"><i>... and the IPKat on a cloud</i></div><i><div style="text-align: center;"><i>(artwork by Riana Harvey)</i></div></i><br /></td></tr></tbody></table>Over the past few years, a tendency has indeed emerged to consider communication to the public as a one-size-fits-all type of right. A recent example in this sense is Article 17 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a> </b>itself.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Article 17(2) provides that the authorization obtained by online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) shall cover acts carried out by the OCSSP itself and acts of users of its service. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Based on how Article 17(2) is formulated, the authorization that OCSSPs are required to seek from concerned rightholders shall encompass at least the activities described in Article 17(1) – that is the storage (this being inherent to the notion of OCSSP) and communication to the public of works and/or making available to the public of protected subject-matter. The authorization that an OCSSP is to seek from relevant rightholders shall cover acts of its users that fall under the scope of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive insofar as such users do not act on a commercial basis or where their activity does not generate significant revenues.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The doing of restricted acts other than those under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, e.g., acts of reproduction engaged in uploading processes, are not expressly considered by Article 17(2). This said, in order not to deprive Article 17(2) of its <i>effet utile</i>, the authorization obtained by an OCSSP must also cover the acts of reproduction performed by users when they upload the content that an OCSSP subsequently stores and makes available to the public, insofar as such acts are functional and propaedeutic to the doing of the acts under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU judgment in <i>Austra-Mechana</i> is, in conclusion, a welcome reminder indeed that not everything is communication to the public and that different acts may fall under the scope of application of different exclusive rights. Simple but ... seemingly not a given!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 6 April 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-37559114070777492262022-03-13T18:08:00.005+00:002022-03-13T18:08:55.818+00:00Italian Supreme Court says that the quotation exception in copyright law only applies to partial reproductions of works, never to works in their entirety<p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjEGvOJCcxp2xa1u3UEgyFIXQ45pQnGoSu4vRX9asYIu0Y0bKN0y3jB29AuIgQE18BH2r-n7Cfm6jDRQnJ_6YFbDleu1-j63ppbzRiVw2jGGCZ5xSKUD7S08HWMPplJG8edwUeYtc3U4vWEgX8ujffG4iN3CvjaU0WRkuOdLdlHX63p3WrcrLs=s880" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="643" data-original-width="880" height="293" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjEGvOJCcxp2xa1u3UEgyFIXQ45pQnGoSu4vRX9asYIu0Y0bKN0y3jB29AuIgQE18BH2r-n7Cfm6jDRQnJ_6YFbDleu1-j63ppbzRiVw2jGGCZ5xSKUD7S08HWMPplJG8edwUeYtc3U4vWEgX8ujffG4iN3CvjaU0WRkuOdLdlHX63p3WrcrLs=w400-h293" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Kat-<b><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Persistence_of_Memory#:~:text=The%20iconography%20may%20refer%20to,the%20eyes%20of%20the%20dreamer.">quotation</a></b></i></td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;">There is little doubt that one of the most (if not the most) significant exceptions in copyright law is the one relating to quotation, criticism or review.</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">Despite it being admittedly a ‘right to quote’ from the perspective of Article 10(1) of the <b><a href="https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/">Berne Convention</a></b>, under EU law quotation is one of the <i>traditionally</i> optional exceptions found inter alia in Article 5 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029">InfoSoc Directive</a></b>, specifically Article 5(3)(d). This is a provision which, according to the CJEU (<a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?&num=C-145/10"><b><i>Painer</i></b></a>), has the same material scope of its Berne counterpart.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While <a href="https://copyrightexceptions.eu/#info53d"><b>not all Member States</b></a> took advantage of the possibility under Article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc Directive, with the transposition of Article 17 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a></b> into national laws, all Member States shall be required to introduce exceptions allowing quotation, criticism and review, at least insofar as Article 17-related activities are concerned. All this is testimony to the importance of this copyright exception.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Also considering the overarching limits of the three-step test (Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive), how far can an unauthorized quotation, criticism, or review go?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">According to the Italian Supreme Court, not as far as allowing one to reproduce a work in its entirety.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This, in a nutshell, is the conclusion that this Court reached in a recent decision (<b><a href="https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2022/02/22/raccolta-di-opere-in-uno-studio-metodologico-violazione-del-diritto-d-autore">Cassazione civile, Sez I, No 4038/2022</a></b>) concerning the unauthorized reproduction of thousands (24,000) of paintings of a <a href="https://www.pontiart.com/en/mario-schifano"><b>well-known Italian artist</b></a> in the context of an archiving project aimed at producing a catalogue of records held by a foundation initially established with the goal of maintaining and protecting the works of the now deceased artist.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Following the 2003 departure of the late artist’s surviving partner from the foundation and the establishment of a new entity entrusted with the ownership and management of the copyrights in the artist’s works, such new entity sued the already mentioned foundation for copyright infringement due to the release, in 2008, of a 6-volume book carrying the results of the project referred to above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In 2014, the Milan Court of First Instance dismissed the action in its entirety.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Further to an appeal, in 2017 the Court of Appeal of Milan partly sided with the artist’s estate, but found that the unauthorized reproduction of the artist’s works in the context of the project and the book would not be unlawful. Among other things, that court (surprisingly) reasoned that no infringement would have occurred, since the number of works reproduced were not the totality of the artist’s own production and in any case such reproductions would be incompatible with the artistic enjoyment of the works (translated: the reproduction of images of artworks in a book would not be the same thing as actually viewing the artworks, eg, in a gallery or museum ... 😵).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A final appeal to the Italian Supreme Court followed. It is important to recall that such appeals only concern the correct interpretation of legislative provisions. In this specific instance, the key question for the Corte di Cassazione related to the interpretation of <a href="http://www.interlex.it/testi/l41_633.htm#70"><b>Article 70 of the Italian Copyright Act</b></a>, specifically its paragraph 1 (English translation courtesy of <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/it/it211en.pdf"><b>WIPO</b></a>):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>The abridgment, quotation or reproduction of fragments or parts of a work and their communication to the public for the purpose of criticism or discussion, shall be permitted within the limits justified for such purposes, provided such acts do not conflict with the commercial exploitation of the work; if they are made for teaching or research, the use must have the sole purpose of illustration, and non-commercial purposes.</blockquote></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The decision</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The Supreme Court began by noting that, in accordance with inter alia <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=72482&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1504083"><b><i>Infopaq</i> ([56])</b></a>, exceptions need to be interpreted strictly since they are a derogation from the general principle that an author has the exclusive right to exploit their work in any form. It then immediately (and correctly) rejected both arguments of the Court of Appeal referred to above, finding them devoid of any legal merit.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In accordance with Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention and the requirement that the extent of the reproduction “does not exceed that justified by the purpose” of the quotation, the abridgment, quotation or reproduction of fragments or parts of a work must be <i>instrumental</i> to the purpose of criticism or discussion. This, in turn, requires that the reproduction at issue does not exceed such a purpose. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal failed to conduct any assessment of whether the reproduction of works in their entirety would be justified by the alleged research purpose.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Supreme Court provided the following interpretative guidance for the Court of Appeal to apply now that the case is back there (my own translation from Italian):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>The reproduction of an artwork, if done of such a work in its entirety instead of it being limited to details thereof, does not qualify for the application of any [copyright] exception; to invoke successfully a copyright exception, a reproduction must be instrumental to purposes of criticism or review, or purposes of illustration for teaching [or] scientific research and must not compete with the economic exploitation of a work, which is reserved to its rightholder; such a right encompasses both the making of physical copies that are identical to the original, but also any other type of reproduction that can enter the market for reproductions, including small-scale photographic reproductions.</blockquote></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Read in combination with Article 5(5), Article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc Directive, from which Article 70 of the Italian Copyright Act is derived in its current wording, permits quotations for purposes such as (but not limited to) criticism or review insofar as a number of cumulative conditions are satisfied.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">First, the quotation must relate to a work or other subject matter which has already been lawfully made available to the public. Secondly, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source (including the author’s name) is to be indicated. Thirdly, the use at hand must be in accordance with fair practice and to the extent required by the specific purpose.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In <b><i><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-476/17">Pelham</a> </i><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-pelham-decision-only-recognizable.html">here</a>]</span></b>, the CJEU considered that the concept of ‘quotation’ must be understood with reference to its usual meaning in everyday language:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>the essential characteristics of a quotation are the use, by a user other than the copyright holder, of a work or, more generally, of an extract from a work for the purposes of illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion or of allowing an intellectual comparison between that work and the assertions of that user, since the user of a protected work wishing to rely on the quotation exception must therefore have the intention of entering into ‘dialogue’ with that work.</blockquote></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh-DjgLoIphm531LhMsk_MfYoak6WiYcZ8pWYrtimqUKSN-AKOVbiR_2mnulEMHHLkltUp_OQKOIlhOEKZgHxwoD5nyTrZykBnAxDZiBJXJA6AHVRMaqFhZ0DjITlAOYWEY6XKs7D1J93BRGnd5JLKVZA7ycEylgUmSDgc_4lHEXxhba2BCfJA=s1600" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="1600" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEh-DjgLoIphm531LhMsk_MfYoak6WiYcZ8pWYrtimqUKSN-AKOVbiR_2mnulEMHHLkltUp_OQKOIlhOEKZgHxwoD5nyTrZykBnAxDZiBJXJA6AHVRMaqFhZ0DjITlAOYWEY6XKs7D1J93BRGnd5JLKVZA7ycEylgUmSDgc_4lHEXxhba2BCfJA=s320" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Permissible quotation:<br />only of a work in part<br />or also of a work in its entirety?</i></td></tr></tbody></table>Despite that Article 5(3)(d) does not expressly mandate that the quotation be necessarily accompanied by comment or criticism, that provision intends “to preclude the exclusive right of reproduction conferred on authors from preventing the publication, by means of quotation accompanied by comments or criticism, of extracts from a work already available to the public” (<i>Painer</i>, [120]).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">From all the above it follows that the unauthorized reproduction of a protected work may qualify for the application of the quotation exception provided that the use at hand is for the purposes of illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion or of allowing an intellectual comparison between that work and the assertions of that user. In other words, the user must have the intention of entering into a ‘dialogue’ with the earlier work. This is a crucial point that the Italian Supreme Court correctly incorporated in its reasoning.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But does the law prohibit the reproduction of a work as a whole in each and every case? The answer is no. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There may be situations in which, indeed, a work needs to be reproduced in its entirety to establish the 'dialogue' referred to by the CJEU. As such, the holding of the Supreme Court that no full reproduction can ever be allowed is too trenchant and contrary to the required case-by-case assessment, as well as the principle – increasingly visible in CJEU case law itself – according to which exceptions are not just to be interpreted strictly, but are also to be interpreted in such a way that their effectiveness is guaranteed.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In conclusion: what matters is not how much has been reproduced, but rather whether the reproduction at hand is justified by the purpose of criticizing or reviewing (entering into a 'dialogue' with) the earlier work that has been reproduced.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 13 March 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-68653429471490189852022-03-10T13:31:00.003+00:002022-03-10T13:31:41.473+00:00How do you protect an iconic handbag? Milan court considers IP rights vesting in Longchamp’s Le Pliage<p><span style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjX1DBIDLlCJwhSFO7_M57VvFKjCUmGaJev8YTOEDghc3MJ12OqU0juzIoiZ-GA5BSm9vgMj1siiOhrk91GnEpU9xLgU7udoyr3HcR8BYUnT7uz9VpNpCNCUe6pCBh1lv9xbmO0lj68c2hdDsqVL-0EC9z50efdcjeWl_vc6Y5P_kYdX444yVg=s500" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="500" data-original-width="500" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjX1DBIDLlCJwhSFO7_M57VvFKjCUmGaJev8YTOEDghc3MJ12OqU0juzIoiZ-GA5BSm9vgMj1siiOhrk91GnEpU9xLgU7udoyr3HcR8BYUnT7uz9VpNpCNCUe6pCBh1lv9xbmO0lj68c2hdDsqVL-0EC9z50efdcjeWl_vc6Y5P_kYdX444yVg=s320" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The IPKat's favourite </i>Le Pliage</td></tr></tbody></table></span></p><div style="text-align: left;">When you have a handbag design bestseller with over 54 million copies sold around the world since its creation in 1993, the question concerning the IP rights vesting in it is not just an academic one.</div><p></p><div style="text-align: left;">All this was at the centre of a recent decision of the Milan Court of First Instance (<b><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MxK8hzrZnXIxtcuoErFO4czy0f9gZXoM/view?usp=sharing">decision 10280/2021</a></b>). The case concerned Longchamp’s <a href="https://www.longchamp.com/se/en/le-pliage/003/"><b><i>Le Pliage</i> “cult” bag</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Milan court accepted to enforce Longchamp’s 3D EU trade marks (EUTMs) protecting the shape of <i>Le Pliage</i>, but <i>refused</i> to acknowledge that copyright protection could also vest in such a design.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: left;">In 2019, Longchamp initiated proceedings for trade mark and copyright infringement, as well as unfair competition, against a company making and selling a bag design closely resembling that of <i>Le Pliage</i>, specifically <i>Le Pliage 1623 Nylon</i>.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The characterizing elements of <i>Le Pliage</i>, according to Longchamp, would be the original combination of:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li style="text-align: left;">The trapezoid shape of the bag;</li><li style="text-align: left;">The slightly circular leather element between the handles of the bag, which covers part of the zipper;</li><li style="text-align: left;">The stitching on the front of the bag, which serves to highlight the contour of its internal pocket;</li><li style="text-align: left;">The tubular handles which end with circular elements on each side of the bag;</li><li style="text-align: left;">The small leather tabs at the sides of the zipper;</li><li style="text-align: left;">The contrast between the colours and materials (leather and nylon) used.</li></ul><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div></div><div style="text-align: left;">Longchamp owns EUTM registrations for the shape of <i>Le Pliage</i> (Nos <a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/013928528"><b>013928528</b></a> and <a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/014461958"><b>014461958</b></a>).</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Besides enforcing said registrations, Longchamp also argued that the shape mark would enjoy protection in accordance with Article 6<i>bis</i> of the Paris Convention and be protected by copyright under <a href="http://www.interlex.it/testi/l41_633.htm#2"><b>Article 2, No 10 of the Italian Copyright Act</b></a>. In relation to the latter, it should be noted that the wording of the Italian Act allows for designs to receive copyright protection only insofar as they display creative character (<i>carattere creativo</i>) and artistic value (<i>valore artistico</i>).</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">The decision</h3><div style="text-align: left;">Noting that it would be “necessary, first of all, to determine the protection actually available to the products at issue”, the Milan Court only accepted some of the claims advanced by Longchamp.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Insofar as the trade mark registrations are concerned, the Court held that the presumption of validity thereof in accordance with Article 127 <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017R1001">EUTMR</a></b> would find application.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Turning to copyright, referring to an earlier decision of the same court (decision 5443/2017), the Milan judges rejected any such claim: although the design of <i>Le Pliage</i> could be considered original, it would display no artistic value. Traditionally, such a value could be demonstrated through objective factors such as:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li style="text-align: left;">Recognition of aesthetic and artistic qualities by specialist cultural and institutional establishments;</li><li style="text-align: left;">Display in exhibitions or museums;</li><li style="text-align: left;">Publication in specialist press;</li><li style="text-align: left;">Awards received;</li><li style="text-align: left;">Market value that exceeds the functionality of the design;</li><li style="text-align: left;">Creation of the design by a well-known artist.</li></ul><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div></div><div style="text-align: left;">According to the Court, the claimant had failed to provide any evidence of the above.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Court finally established unfair competition due to slavish imitation in accordance with Article 2598 No 1 <b><a href="https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2013/04/17/della-disciplina-della-concorrenza-e-dei-consorzi">Italian Civil Code</a></b>.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgenI1-UnFuNZEmLNFMra9XVxX6hOk3acqIC4cx34lITNzbkTFY8WLP9LBm1QLzaMq3wneMWXVpA75tC08dcowGntG1ThRUNkwfwHmyAECOZfiOB2V779PRrCBeMGCNK3Lbk7iHCqJlN3Tyb-kqTuF4Au6iOgTZ4rkFT7g9-5aXOzQY_d29M3k=s1344" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="556" data-original-width="1344" height="264" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgenI1-UnFuNZEmLNFMra9XVxX6hOk3acqIC4cx34lITNzbkTFY8WLP9LBm1QLzaMq3wneMWXVpA75tC08dcowGntG1ThRUNkwfwHmyAECOZfiOB2V779PRrCBeMGCNK3Lbk7iHCqJlN3Tyb-kqTuF4Au6iOgTZ4rkFT7g9-5aXOzQY_d29M3k=w640-h264" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Longchamp's Le Pliage 1623 Nylon (left) and the defendant's product (right)</i></td></tr></tbody></table><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: left;">The <i>Longchamp</i> case adds to a series of decisions in which the question of the type(s) of IP protection available to shapes was key.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Only a few weeks ago, The IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2022/01/eu-general-court-upholds-finding-of.html"><b>reported</b></a> on the most recent <i>Moon Boot</i> trade mark decision, highlighting a situation which is the reverse of what happened in <i>Longchamp</i>: while in <i>Longchamp</i> the shape mark registrations were not questioned but copyright protection was refused, in <i>Moon Boot</i> the shape mark registrations were held partially invalid despite previous recognition of copyright protection in the shape of the famous after-ski boots by Italian courts.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">In sum: <i>Longchamp</i> confirms the old <i>adagio</i> that, while a shape (or, more generally, an object) can be protected by different IP rights, the actual availability of each and every right needs to be assessed on its own merits.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">In addition, from a more specific (and concerned) copyright perspective, the decision does not question at all the validity of the traditional Italian approach to evaluating copyright subsistence in industrial designs. </div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">It is highly unlikely, if at all conceivable, that the wording of the Italian Copyright Act may still be regarded as compatible with EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases like <i><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-168/09"><b>Flos</b></a></i> (a referral from the Milan Court itself!) and, more explicitly, <b><i><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-683/17">Cofemel</a> </i><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=cofemel">here</a>]</span></b>.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">In <i>Flos</i>, the CJEU held that EU law prohibits Member States from denying copyright protection to designs that meet the requirements for copyright protection - including designs other than registered ones (subject to Article 17 of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A31998L0071"><b>Design Directive</b></a>) - and suggested that Member States cannot set any particular requirements as to how protection is achieved. </div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">In other words: if a design is eligible for protection under the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:en:HTML">InfoSoc Directive</a></b> and is, as such, original in the sense clarified by the CJEU - then Member States cannot deny such protection. Such reading of the <i>Flos</i> case is the one that the then Advocate General Jääskinen proposed in <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=121152&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=722121"><b><i>Titus Donner</i></b></a>: "the judgment in <i>Flos</i> indicates that the items here in issue, although unprotected under Italian copyright law during the relevant period, were entitled to protection under EU copyright law".</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><i>Cofemel</i> has closed once and for all the question of what requirements can be imposed for copyright protection to arise in respect of designs: what is needed is that the design at hand is an original work. Nothing less and nothing more. Requiring that a design still displays creative character and artistic value is not only out of fashion, but also – on a more serious note – out-of-sync with EU law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 10 March 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-21696401417805918022022-02-17T21:50:00.006+00:002022-02-17T21:50:52.413+00:00US Copyright Office refuses to register AI-generated work, finding that "human authorship is a prerequisite to copyright protection"<p><span style="text-align: justify;">Can a work entirely created by a machine be protected by copyright?</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">On Valentine’s Day, the US Copyright Office (Review Board) <a href="https://www.blogger.com/#"><b>answered</b></a> this question with a heartbreaking ‘no’, holding that “copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” that “are founded in the creative powers of the [human] mind”” and consequently refusing to register the two-dimensional artwork 'A Recent Entrance to Paradise' below (the ‘Work’):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; margin: 0cm; text-align: justify;"></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjKZpqJxzYSYWvU6TqYBdVsYrkN1UUUGXILHsnt-Yf8CkC6MMVoIXCnrxh8f0jnpUU4hJWwsYzA2R1aJNc_61U-rlHaqjREPHZkU8eYqDtgYoSdCrKwxD1o14Rd_mHSlgp-eMjOvYVpMNNMWeXN3b9LTbPAHOOOk1w7QMG-b-wEDxCsHnfEwjA=s774" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="580" data-original-width="774" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjKZpqJxzYSYWvU6TqYBdVsYrkN1UUUGXILHsnt-Yf8CkC6MMVoIXCnrxh8f0jnpUU4hJWwsYzA2R1aJNc_61U-rlHaqjREPHZkU8eYqDtgYoSdCrKwxD1o14Rd_mHSlgp-eMjOvYVpMNNMWeXN3b9LTbPAHOOOk1w7QMG-b-wEDxCsHnfEwjA=w640-h480" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption"><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; text-align: justify;"><i>Creativity Machine's A Recent Entrance to Paradise</i></span></div></td></tr></tbody></table><p></p><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div><div style="text-align: justify;">In 2018, Stephen Thaler (if the name rings an <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=thaler"><b>AI inventor-bell</b></a> then you’re hearing it right) applied to register a copyright claim in the Work, indicating “Creativity Machine” as the author and Thaler as the owner of such machine.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The application stated that the Work had been autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine. Registration was sought as a work-for-hire to the owner of the Creativity Machine.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In 2019, the Copyright Office rejected the application, holding that human authorship is necessary to support a copyright claim.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This conclusion is in line with what is expressly stated in the <a href="https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/"><b>Compendium of Practices</b></a> (p. 21-22):</div><blockquote style="text-align: justify;">[T]he Office will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author. The crucial question is “whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer [or other device] merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of authorship in the work (literary, artistic, or musical expression or elements of selection, arrangement, etc.) were actually conceived and executed not by man but by a machine.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS BY THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 5 (1966).</blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Thaler then requested a reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the human authorship requirement would be contrary to the US Constitution and be unsupported by either statute or case law. Such a request was once again unsuccessful.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A second request for reconsideration followed, also submitting that the Copyright Office “is currently relying upon non-binding judicial opinions from the <b><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKj1cMz3yfI&ab_channel=HBO">Gilded Age</a></b> to answer the question of whether [computer-generated works] can be protected.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The Review Board’s decision</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The Review Board was, once again, unimpressed. It held that “human authorship is a prerequisite to copyright protection in the United States and that the Work therefore cannot be registered.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The phrase ‘original works of authorship’ under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/102"><b>§102(a) of the Act</b></a> sets limits to what can be protected by copyright. As early as in <b><i><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/111/53/">Sarony</a> </i></b>(a seminal case concerning copyright protection of photographs), the US Supreme Court referred to authors as human.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div><div style="text-align: justify;">This approach was reiterated in other Supreme Court’s precedents like <i><b><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/201/">Mazer</a> </b></i>and <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/412/546/"><i><b>Goldstein</b></i></a>, and has been also consistently adopted by lower courts.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While no case has been yet decided on the specific issue of AI-creativity, guidance from the line of cases above indicates that works entirely created by machines do not access copyright protection. Such a conclusion is also consistent with the majority of <b><a href="https://www.uspto.gov/sites/%20default/files/documents/USPTO_AI-Report_2020-10-07.pdf">responses</a> </b>that the USPTO received in its consultation on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhel5dyD6hs2dP8wA0V96Q_5ZJwCfPT3ZLmvxANhesZRShQIVCIUBcE80i3Th3Z1zUhKfgdiZbH_dBXf0O6Dr-1O1MGkXLHhwD3AdUSCQnvXF-4DBEdFpLZ3Cw8zroSmFQg9jRdF0zq-SJDunIZbxiRwVvGbJQ-TwhdSIHjLpi_K-_pweo7AGo=s1000" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="625" data-original-width="1000" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhel5dyD6hs2dP8wA0V96Q_5ZJwCfPT3ZLmvxANhesZRShQIVCIUBcE80i3Th3Z1zUhKfgdiZbH_dBXf0O6Dr-1O1MGkXLHhwD3AdUSCQnvXF-4DBEdFpLZ3Cw8zroSmFQg9jRdF0zq-SJDunIZbxiRwVvGbJQ-TwhdSIHjLpi_K-_pweo7AGo=w400-h250" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i><b><a href="https://futurism.com/cat-doesnt-exist-ai">AI-generated Kats</a></b></i></td></tr></tbody></table>The Review also rejected Thaler’s argument that AI can be an author under copyright law because the work made for hire doctrine allows for “non-human, artificial persons such as companies” to be authors. First, held the Board, a machine cannot enter into any binding legal contract. Secondly, the doctrine is about ownership, not existence of a valid copyright.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The decision appears appropriate, also in light of international law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While the <a href="https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/"><b>Berne Convention</b></a> does not define who can be regarded as an author, from its text and historical context, it appears that only natural persons who created the work can be regarded as authors. In particular, although Berne does not explicitly set an originality requirement, this already existed in national copyright laws at the time of drafting the Convention. According to <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/cjla16&div=8&id=&page="><b>Ricketson</b></a>, it was clearly understood that this was also a requirement for the purposes of protection under the Convention, and inherent in the phrase ‘literary and artistic works’ in Article 2. The condition that a literary and artistic work possesses a sufficient (how much, however, the Convention does not say) degree of originality postulates "the need for the author to be a human being and for there to be some intellectual contribution above and beyond that of simple effort (‘sweat of the brow’) or what may be called mere ‘value in exchange’.’”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any case, the above does not mean that there are no situations in which also works created by non-human authors can qualify for protection, a notable (and controversial) example being <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/9"><b>section 9(3) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Looking at authorship from an EU perspective, Article 1(5) of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A31993L0083"><b>Sat-Cab Directive</b></a> states that, for cinematographic or audiovisual works, the principal director shall be considered as its author or one of its authors, leaving Member States free to provide for others to be considered as co-authors. Article 2(1) of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0024">Software Directive</a> </b>provides that the author of a computer program shall be the natural person or group of natural persons who has created the program or, where the legislation of the Member State permits, the legal person designated as the rightholder by that legislation. Article 4(1) of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML"><b>Database Directive</b></a> admits the possibility that the author of a database can be, not just the natural person or group of natural persons who created the base, but also—where the legislation of the Member States so permits—the legal person designated as the rightholder by that legislation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any case, the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32006L0116"><b>Term Directive</b></a> refers the calculation of the term of protection of copyright to the life of authors as ‘physical persons’. In addition, the preamble to the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj"><b>DSM Directive</b></a> specifies that the authors and performers that shall be able to rely on the provisions on contracts therein shall only be natural persons, thus excluding from the scope of application non-human authors and performers.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet specifically tackled the question of who or what an author is. Nonetheless, it appears that its own understanding of originality – as a notion that presupposes a <i>personal</i> touch (<b><i><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?&num=C-145/10">Painer</a></i></b>) and the making of <i>free</i> and <i>creative</i> choices (most recently, <b><i><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-833/18">Brompton</a></i></b>) – is indeed premised on the idea that authors in a copyright sense need to be human.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">But the question that all romantics after Valentine's Day might ask is whether the last word on non-human authorship has been spoken yet. As it is the case of all real love stories, probably not. Thus: stay tuned for the next AI+IP development …</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 17 February 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-56560377155832379812022-01-25T07:03:00.001+00:002022-02-12T12:53:31.039+00:00EU General Court upholds finding of partial invalidity of the Moon Boot shape trade mark<div style="text-align: justify;">Can something be simultaneously iconic and lack distinctiveness under trade mark law? </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Last week, the General Court (GC) answered this question in the affirmative in its <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?lgrec=fr&td=%3BALL&language=en&num=T-483/20&jur=T"><b>decision in T-483/20 <i>Tecnica Group</i></b></a>, concerning trade mark protection of the shape of an icon of Italian fashion design and history: the Moon Boots.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Inspired by the boots worn by Neil Amstrong to walk on the surface of the Moon in 1969, the Moon Boots were the <a href="https://www.mywhere.it/68220/moon-boot-storia-del-brand-luna.html"><b>first, dedicated after ski footwear</b></a>. Since then, over 20 million pairs have been sold. The Moon Boots have been also displayed in world-class museums like the MoMa and the Louvre.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">In 2011, Tecnica applied to register the 3D sign below, corresponding to the shape of its Moon Boots after ski footwear, as an EU trade mark (EUTM) for goods in classes 18, 20, and 25. Registration (<a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/eSearch/#details/trademarks/010168441"><b>No 10 168 441</b></a>) was granted the following year.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span><a name='more'></a></span><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgomyxFdMKoTT0LIQfJdvS5zTfAmmQiZX7YBwI_FtkMfX5_7eb4yEhG2NoTKpIiO1AyZx0stwhv_GqOlDyKIg9ZTKhlBOqufoMVSAe0zf7ttKgCuf5p0pEJBd_r3Q1eV9INp5lYmvbh0PBMCI9e0YmiJD2JXc7UUsswh-aUZ-EHtBxIkPD8MdY=s1749" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1657" data-original-width="1749" height="303" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgomyxFdMKoTT0LIQfJdvS5zTfAmmQiZX7YBwI_FtkMfX5_7eb4yEhG2NoTKpIiO1AyZx0stwhv_GqOlDyKIg9ZTKhlBOqufoMVSAe0zf7ttKgCuf5p0pEJBd_r3Q1eV9INp5lYmvbh0PBMCI9e0YmiJD2JXc7UUsswh-aUZ-EHtBxIkPD8MdY=s320" width="320" /></a></div><p><br /></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Following proceedings before the courts of Venice in Italy, through which German company Zeiteneu had unsuccessfully sought to obtain a declaration of non-infringement of the Moon Boot shape EUTM, that company filed an application with the EUIPO to obtain a declaration of invalidity of the Moon Boot shape mark, in accordance with what are now Article 59(1)(a) and 7(1)(b)-(e) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1506417891296&uri=CELEX:32017R1001"><b>EUTMR</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Following a partial declaration of invalidity (lack of distinctiveness for class 25 goods) by the EUIPO Cancellation Division, which was upheld by the First Board of Appeal (BoA), a further appeal was filed by Tecnica before the GC.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The GC decision</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Having reviewed and dismissed the pleas based on procedural aspects – including the lack of <i>res judicata</i> value of the Venice courts’ decisions on the EUIPO, given that those courts had not been tasked with deciding on the validity of the Moon Boot trade mark but rather only on the question whether Zeiteneu infringed it -, the GC turned to the assessment of distinctiveness of the Moon Boot trade mark for class 25 goods.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In this regard, the Court recalled well-established principles, including the one according to which – for 3D marks and, more generally, less ‘conventional’ signs – the degree of distinctiveness required to obtain (or maintain) registration is in principle no different than that of other, more ‘conventional’ signs.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In practice, however, “<i>the average consumer’s perception is not necessarily the same in the case of a three-dimensional mark, which consists of the appearance of the product itself, as it is in the case of a word or figurative mark, which consists of a sign unrelated to the appearance of the goods it denotes</i>” (para 86). Put it differently: “<i>Average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of goods on the basis of their shape or the shape of their packaging in the absence of any graphic or word element, and it could prove more difficult to establish distinctive character in relation to such a three-dimensional mark than in relation to a word or figurative mark</i>” (para 87)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In practice, all the above means that “<i>only a three-dimensional mark, consisting of the appearance of the product itself, which departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector</i>” (para 88) shall be regarded as possessing distinctiveness and be, as a result, registrable.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the present case, the Court considered at the outset that – for class 25 goods and contrary to what Tecnica had submitted – the relevant consumers would be the general public in all the EU Member States. As such, relevant consumers would have an average level of attention.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhwA5kabbo8CHlWx0fWfoX2urEo4r9Z9YhA3Xp30PDvi8twm6rym00iP29in3vsVBuTrRXTqg0cKOmzMppRSMX1yEZ_UYCAPbNwAWe3Owg7oN1V0VCXdJjUuPrhnTpkuApq3n8Y-XYMQ4Q5cjcmweHDHWkq3f7CIoyhqkIIBfPyA69YtbggUW4=s263" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="192" data-original-width="263" height="192" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhwA5kabbo8CHlWx0fWfoX2urEo4r9Z9YhA3Xp30PDvi8twm6rym00iP29in3vsVBuTrRXTqg0cKOmzMppRSMX1yEZ_UYCAPbNwAWe3Owg7oN1V0VCXdJjUuPrhnTpkuApq3n8Y-XYMQ4Q5cjcmweHDHWkq3f7CIoyhqkIIBfPyA69YtbggUW4" width="263" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Merpel is always more keen<br />on the after ski<br />rather than the skiing part<br />of her holidays in the Alps</i></td></tr></tbody></table>The Court then moved on to consider whether the overall impression conveyed by the shape of the Moon Boots departs significantly from the norms and customs of the sector, that is the after ski footwear sector. It <i>inter alia</i> noted that the circumstance that a mark has an overall shape that is similar to variants of the product, which are usually available on the market, does not permit the finding that the mark, as a whole, departs significantly from the customary shapes in the sector.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, the Court agreed with the BoA that “<i>the shape of the contested mark corresponds to the common shape of after-ski boots, which generally consist of a high shaft, often in a light synthetic material, with soles and laces.</i>” (para 98) As such, it would lack distinctiveness, at least for Class 25 goods.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Readers might recall that, last summer, The IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/07/general-court-rules-that-shape-of.html"><b>reported</b></a> on the then fresh <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244146&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2116112"><b>GC decision</b></a> relating the Guerlain’s Rouge G lipstick shape mark and regarded it as offering some hope for those seeking to register less conventional signs. In that case, in fact, the Court found that the shape at issue satisfied the significant departure test and could be therefore registered. Last week’s <i>Moon Boot</i> decision brought us back to (a non-distinctive) reality, adding to the (long) list of (in)success stories.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Another interesting aspect of the <i>Moon Boot </i>saga is that, while the trade mark registration has been regarded as partly invalid, Italian courts have, on different occasions (including in the context of the aforementioned Venice decisions), found that the iconic after ski footwear is deserving of copyright protection. Most recently, this is what the Milan Court of First Instance held (Trib. Milano, <i>Tecnica Group S.p.A. v Diana S.r.l.</i>, decision No 493/2021, 25 January 2021) in a copyright infringement case – decided nearly a year ago – that Tecnica successfully brought against the maker of <b><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiara_Ferragni">Chiara Ferragni</a></b>-branded after ski boots. In any case, the requirements for trade mark registration and copyright are and remain obviously distinct. Last week's GC decision also provides an indirect reminder in this sense.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><span style="color: red;"><i>[Originally published on The IPKat on 24 January 2022]</i></span></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-3406003733859764582021-12-27T14:44:00.000+00:002021-12-27T14:44:12.711+00:00UKIPO unveils report highlighting influence of social media influencers (also) on the purchase of counterfeits<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Last week, the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) released an intriguing</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-media-influencers-and-counterfeit-goods" style="text-align: justify;"><b>report</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> measuring and analyzing (apparently for the first time) the influence that social media influencers exert on consumers</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><i style="text-align: justify;">also</i><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">when it comes to purchasing counterfeits.</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjHujMdUiMrl4Kw-3x8UtTsy6yDxV-aBW1CNkF34KaST5q5w74OtTCOJQxM5Fs7gtrHwWMpcdXjdxTU_OfnJMtBwH5hLE60QJBu2AATdmuncege154JEMvIZ9ht_3_dPTYtRhT2NapN_cwjnyau4ZDwVZ60ZpepDBn8a9eyqLNnA7z4JjsnAAs=s1212" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1212" data-original-width="854" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjHujMdUiMrl4Kw-3x8UtTsy6yDxV-aBW1CNkF34KaST5q5w74OtTCOJQxM5Fs7gtrHwWMpcdXjdxTU_OfnJMtBwH5hLE60QJBu2AATdmuncege154JEMvIZ9ht_3_dPTYtRhT2NapN_cwjnyau4ZDwVZ60ZpepDBn8a9eyqLNnA7z4JjsnAAs=s320" width="225" /></a></div>This kind of research is timely, also considering – among other things – recent initiatives in which brand owners and Amazon joined forces to bring judicial proceedings – <a href="https://www.thestreet.com/investing/amazon-settles-case-with-influencers-that-sold-luxury-knockoffs-using-its-online-store"><b>now settled out of court</b></a> – in the USA against influencers over the advertising, promotion and facilitation of sale of counterfeits on the latter’s platform through the influencers’ own accounts on Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok, as well as their own websites.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The findings</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The UKIPO’s findings are based on a quantitative survey of 1,000 female (studies suggest that influencer marketing is “<i>highly gendered</i>”) consumers in the UK, aged 16 to 60 and who use social media at least once per week.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In addition, the notion of ‘counterfeit’ was taken to refer to “<i>items that look identical to a genuine product with or without the official branding/logo, but are not made by the brand and may be of lower quality, for example, a handbag of identical design to a “Chanel” with or without the Chanel logo</i>.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While the majority (70%) of those who have knowingly purchased a counterfeit (17% of the surveyed consumers) are aged 16 to 33, 13% of the surveyed persons have their purchasing behaviour relating to counterfeits influenced by social media endorsements and 10% are prompted to buy counterfeits by social media endorsements. The most popular product categories for counterfeit shopping are fashion, accessories, jewellery, and beauty.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">There are 4 main reasons why younger consumers tend to follow influencers’ recommendations more than older consumers: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Younger adults would be more susceptible to the influence of trusted others; </li><li>They would be less likely to perceive the risks associated with buying counterfeits; </li><li>They would tend to have a higher risk appetite; and </li><li>They would be more likely to construct rationalizations which justify the purchasing behaviour. </li></ul><div>In relation to the latter, the report concludes that influencers play a key role in constructing rationalizations that neutralize “<i>any residual concerns about personal risks, broader societal harms and perceptions of deviance</i>”.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The empirical angle</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">As stated, the UKIPO report makes for a timely addition to the growing body of literature, case law, and policy initiatives relating to online consumption behaviours and IP.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">If we consider at the outset the reasons why consumers access and purchase unlawful content/products, there are several of them. Before presenting such reasons, however, it is important to differentiate between objects that infringe patents and design rights and objects that infringe copyrights and trade mark rights.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In relation to the former, <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/the-economic-impact-of-counterfeiting-and-piracy_9789264045521-en"><b>studies</b></a> suggest that consumers tend to be indifferent about or unaware of the infringing nature of such products, all this implying that the demand for these items is likely to be supported by the same reasons as the demand for non-infringing ones. In relation to the latter, instead, it is important to focus in particular on the secondary market, where consumers <i>knowingly</i> choose to purchase an infringing product, rather than on the primary market, where consumers are deceived and believe that their purchase is of a lawful object. In such secondary market, three main factors have been identified as driving the demand for counterfeits and pirated content:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>The characteristics of such products/content, including the price and quality thereof;</li><li>The individual consumer, including their economic situation and/or concerns regarding the purchase and consumption of counterfeits and pirated content;</li><li>The institutional environment in which the demander operates, eg, the risk of discovery in jurisdictions where penalties for demanders exist, or the availability and ease of acquisition of counterfeit and pirated products.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The drivers identified above have been confirmed in several studies, including in relation to online piracy. With particular regard to the driver consisting of the individual consumer and their economic situation, <a href="https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Global-Online-Piracy-Study.pdf"><b>empirical evidence</b></a> suggests that online piracy correlates remarkably strongly with a lack of purchasing power. The same appears to be true, at least in certain cases, for the purchase of counterfeits.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The UKIPO report confirms, with particular regard to the impact of influencer marketing, the main findings described above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjx3VNkOkoz6hffUuYmKPdG7E1Hh4bONhUcSsOsBLqd0eteWwYOeVbeLgep2HOIcl8LYDF4DL_YTzBBEC64ahycW9PK5vr5mazLCyYbuh0wUD1iC-1sK2EqzDcI8vZ-s_IaMm9UsBPTuLUccLSbwYtpNGUmWFUgU8marlrn3DVf0SzZYU4uuHg=s1200" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjx3VNkOkoz6hffUuYmKPdG7E1Hh4bONhUcSsOsBLqd0eteWwYOeVbeLgep2HOIcl8LYDF4DL_YTzBBEC64ahycW9PK5vr5mazLCyYbuh0wUD1iC-1sK2EqzDcI8vZ-s_IaMm9UsBPTuLUccLSbwYtpNGUmWFUgU8marlrn3DVf0SzZYU4uuHg=s320" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>If you wish to find out who they are, <b><a href="https://medium.com/socialbook/top-10-cat-influencers-on-instagram-f1aa120be10a">click here</a></b></i></td></tr></tbody></table>The legal angle</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">While solutions that might be employed against influencers that advertise and promote the sale of unlawful products may be available under advertising law and regulation, consumer protection, and – at least in certain situations – unfair competition, the current IP framework in Europe also provides tools that might be relied upon.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For example, the EU trade mark framework specifically refers the unauthorized use of a trade mark in advertising (Articles 9(3)(e) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R1001&from=EN"><b>EUTMR</b></a> and 10(3)(e) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015L2436&from=EN"><b>EUTMD</b></a>) and the unauthorized offering of goods carrying a trade mark (Articles 9(3)(b) EUTMR and 10(3)(b) EUTMD) as prima facie infringing.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Similarly, the EU design framework refers to the unauthorized offering of products in which the design is incorporated or to which it is applied as a potential infringement (Articles 19(1) <a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/law_and_practice/cdr_legal_basis/62002_cv_en.pdf"><b>CDR</b></a> and 12(1) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31998L0071&from=EN"><b>Design Directive</b></a>).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to copyright, <i>formally</i> one could still distinguish between (EU-harmonized) primary/direct and (non-harmonized) secondary/indirect/accessory liability. Nevertheless, taking into account the progressive and expansive construction of inter alia the right of communication to the public under Article 3 of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029"><b>InfoSoc Directive</b></a> by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), an argument could be plausibly made that an influencer promoting the sale of copyright-infringing products could be performing themselves an act of communication to the public. Similarly, it could be argued that – at least in certain situations – an influencer also performs an act of distribution under Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive when promoting the sale of copyright-infringing content: in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-516/13&td=ALL"><b><i>Dimensione Direct Sales</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/05/breaking-cjeu-says-that-distribution.html">here</a>]</span></b>, for example, the CJEU held that the advertising for sale of infringing products (in that case: designer furniture) falls within the scope of application of Article 4, and that is so irrespective of whether there has been any actual distribution of the infringing products themselves.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiCZXl9oKqbcbEJlKIbqguHYsSmXmufk9cyXTL3bY5WRK7LLJH5w3Ss9cGnKqoLUtc5cUZQsFAdCug5_nJmUD-9ZmgDBCAHSa_tea7wEmKOk52MI2tLW4PTrnUMx7Nq00sAvJzAYbGj5ijYfeiBJBdEQnJ5w9nz6waqpMPQGbuc5vYId-M1-88=s683" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="595" data-original-width="683" height="279" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiCZXl9oKqbcbEJlKIbqguHYsSmXmufk9cyXTL3bY5WRK7LLJH5w3Ss9cGnKqoLUtc5cUZQsFAdCug5_nJmUD-9ZmgDBCAHSa_tea7wEmKOk52MI2tLW4PTrnUMx7Nq00sAvJzAYbGj5ijYfeiBJBdEQnJ5w9nz6waqpMPQGbuc5vYId-M1-88=s320" width="320" /></a></div>The policy discourse<br /></h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, it is also worth recalling that in Europe an increasing pressure is being put on online platforms to do more to tackle the making available/sale of infringing content/products.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While historically internet intermediaries have been, at certain conditions, eligible for the application of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031"><b>Ecommerce Directive</b></a>’s safe harbours (see inter alia the still seminal CJEU 2011 <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-324/09"><b><i>L’Oréal</i></b></a> decision), this has not prevented the development of voluntary measures aimed at establishing a cooperation between them and rightholders. Voluntary codes of conduct for internet service providers have been also adopted in several EU Member States. Furthermore, over the past few years, the European Commission unveiled a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/intellectual-property/enforcement/memorandum-understanding-sale-counterfeit-goods-internet_en"><b>Memorandum of Understanding on the sale of counterfeits on the internet</b></a> and a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-illegal-content-online-towards-enhanced-responsibility-online-platforms"><b>number of soft law instruments</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">More recently, the EU legislature adopted the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj"><b>DSM Directive</b></a>, whose Article 17 is premised on the direct responsibility of certain internet platforms for the making available of user-uploaded copyright content and the unavailability of the Ecommerce Directive’s hosting safe harbour for such platforms in relation to activities falling within the scope of application of that provision.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">More or less in parallel with such policy and legislative developments, the CJEU has also ruled on the direct copyright liability of internet platforms at certain conditions (<a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&T,F&num=c-610-15"><b><i>Ziggo</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/07/what-can-possible-implications-of-cjeu.html">here</a>]</span></b>, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-682/18"><i><b>YouTube/Cyando</b></i></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/06/cjeu-rules-on-platform-liability-under.html">here</a>]</span></b>). Currently, a case (<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/05/can-amazon-be-directly-liable-for-trade.html"><b><i>Louboutin</i></b></a>) is pending before the Court, in which the key issue is whether Amazon could be held directly liable for trade mark infringement over its fulfilment program.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, towards the end of last year, the European Commission unveiled its <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN"><b>proposal for a Digital Services Act</b></a> (DSA), which has now progressed to the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/11/25/what-is-illegal-offline-should-be-illegal-online-council-agrees-on-position-on-the-digital-services-act/"><b>Council</b></a> and the European Parliament and is expected to be adopted sometime next year, further to the conclusion of trilogue negotiations. One of the key provisions is the ‘Good Samaritan’ clause, which seeks to encourage internet intermediaries to take proactive measures without the risk of losing the safe harbour protection.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">In conclusion: influencers, beware!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 27 December 2022]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-41600963762828875372021-11-07T08:31:00.005+00:002021-11-11T08:45:59.089+00:00 Italy has transposed the DSM Directive<p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHg7ZSEQWANzfkEgxv3O4uiiAfUBZdxx81CLgc_Er6s2ldKY2G7jHcahKpwzfDLhBLxISTy1EFmXn9Mp3RcypuXyaeFSw6h_qyuhaPmb0s5gu1bR3ciuw9C0UULPq5fSnsqlzMtHT6RNnA/s1200/EIOEO81XYAAFj4H.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="900" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHg7ZSEQWANzfkEgxv3O4uiiAfUBZdxx81CLgc_Er6s2ldKY2G7jHcahKpwzfDLhBLxISTy1EFmXn9Mp3RcypuXyaeFSw6h_qyuhaPmb0s5gu1bR3ciuw9C0UULPq5fSnsqlzMtHT6RNnA/s320/EIOEO81XYAAFj4H.jpeg" width="240" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Merpel celebrated<br />Halloween in Florence</i></td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;">Together with Spain</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/11/guest-post-at-last-spain-transposes-dsm.html">here</a>]</span></b><span style="text-align: justify;">, this week it has been Italy’s turn to transpose the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a> </b><span style="text-align: justify;">into its own law. Next week, the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/140F_8VOzL2njKTKZfVTBwTrM0VpPMrQR/view?usp=sharing">Legislative Decree</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">approved by the Council of Ministers will be published on the Italian Official Journal (</span><i style="text-align: justify;">Gazzetta Ufficiale</i><span style="text-align: justify;">).</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">During the summer, The IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/08/towards-national-transpositions-of-dsm.html"><b>discussed</b></a> the content of some of the most ‘interesting’ draft provisions that Italy was considering adopting to implement the Directive into its own law. The final text of the Italian Legislative Decree does not substantially depart from that draft legislation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let’s take a closer look at of some of the provisions – online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs), text and data mining (TDM), press publishers’ right – eventually adopted and see what mark the new Italian provisions may deserve from the perspective of compliance with their EU counterparts – respectively: Articles 17, 3-4, and 15 of the Directive.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Transposition of Article 17</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Starting with the transposition of Article 17, the new Article 102-<i>sexies</i> of the Italian Copyright Act provides that OCSSPs are required to obtain an authorization, for example a licence, from rightholders directly or through collective rights management organizations.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Article 102-<i>septies</i> transposes Article 17(4). The only point of divergence from the Directive is that, also for (a), reference is made to high standards of professional diligence.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, with regard to Article 17(9) of the Directive and lacking any specific indication regarding ex ante/ex post blocking in the EU text, the Italian legislature has opted (Article 102-<i>decies</i>) for the ex ante blocking of content pending a complaint. The <b><a href="https://www.agcom.it/">Italian Communication Authority (AGCOM)</a></b> is tasked with both issuing guidelines regarding the complaint and redress mechanism and deciding appeals against OCSSPs’ decisions rendered further to a complaint. The right to bring judicial proceedings is unaffected.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><u>Mark: <b>Pass</b></u></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">TDM provisions</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as the Italian transpositions of Articles 3 and 4 are concerned, the following are deserving of mention.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For the exception in favour of research organizations and cultural heritage institutions, the new Article 70-<i>ter</i> covers not only the undertaking of acts of reproduction for TDM purposes, but also the communication to the public of the outcome of the research, if expressed through new digital works.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For the Article 4 exception or limitation, like the draft text, it is problematic that no mention is made of the reservation having to be made “in an appropriate manner”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><u>Mark: <b>Back to the drawing board</b></u></div><div style="text-align: right;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Italian press publishers’ right</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as the transposition of Article 15 of the Directive is concerned, the Italian solution has been the subject of heated discussions in the country.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The draft Italian provision was drafted in such a way that an obligation would subsist – on the side of both information society service providers (ISSPs) and press publishers – to negotiate a licensing agreement. The draft text also referred to a ‘fair compensation’ (<i>equo compenso</i>) to which press publishers would be entitled and the possibility for AGCOM to determine the amount of such fair compensation in the event that no agreement was reached between the parties.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Following the unveiling of the draft transposition text, last September, even the <b><a href="https://www.agcm.it/">Italian Competition Authority (AGCM)</a></b> issued a highly critical <a href="https://www.agcm.it/dotcmsdoc/bollettini/2021/38-21.pdf"><b>opinion</b></a>, holding that a system in which public authorities like AGCOM are involved would be not just contrary to EU law but also such as to represent an undue restriction of private parties’ contractual freedom.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Well, the final text of the Italian press publishers’ right (Article 43-<i>bis</i>) does provide that AGCOM shall not just issue a regulation containing the criteria to determine the fair compensation due to press publishers, but – lacking an agreement between the parties and standing the right to start judicial proceedings – shall be also competent to determine the fair compensation due in specific cases.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Another paradoxical aspect is that, pending the negotiations for the conclusion of a licence, ISSPs shall not limit the visibility of press publishers’ content in their search results.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So much for introducing a new right!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Not only would press publishers in Italy be unable to decide whether to grant a licence in the first place, but use of their press publications – that is: subject matter that is valuable especially because of the timely nature of their content – would occur irrespective of the conclusion of any licence.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A final peculiarity to note is that, unlike the Directive, the Italian text also introduces a statutory definition of ‘very short extract’.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is expected that – sooner rather than later – litigation will arise on this new provision and the Court of Justice of the European Union will be asked to rule on the (in)compatibility of it with EU law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><u>Mark: <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@christine_gem/video/7010928711893667078?lang=en"><b>Literally traumatizing</b></a></u></div><div style="text-align: right;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">Originally published on The IPKat on 7 November 2021</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-60418270818157500962021-09-26T10:43:00.007+01:002021-09-26T10:43:54.690+01:00AG Hogan advises CJEU to rule that private copying exception also applies in the cloud but that an additional private copying levy might be unavailable<p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBI7U2-BObDmoqwBUxmVEuSfZstfePbq1bQiO-x4HthY_eMPO6HNIBKA87Hgs9oLwGxA5kASIgyYorbi3-hEBxrFxWWLI3XrYZYJIsHRodUpVBwdzSZVlztWr24elVPmbTry6oPnjeWV2e/s1133/264173506025202.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1133" data-original-width="1133" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBI7U2-BObDmoqwBUxmVEuSfZstfePbq1bQiO-x4HthY_eMPO6HNIBKA87Hgs9oLwGxA5kASIgyYorbi3-hEBxrFxWWLI3XrYZYJIsHRodUpVBwdzSZVlztWr24elVPmbTry6oPnjeWV2e/s320/264173506025202.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Kat cloud</i></td></tr></tbody></table> <span style="text-align: justify;">Does the private copying exception and, with it, the fair compensation requirement under Article 5(2)(b) of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029">InfoSoc Directive</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">apply to reproductions carried out by using cloud-based recording services? If so, can rightholders request the providers of such a service to impose a levy even if their customers (natural persons) have already paid one when purchasing the devices (eg, computers, smartphones, tablets) subsequently used to undertake acts of reproduction covered by that provision?</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">These, in essence, are the issues that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been called upon to decide in <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=234641&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=2083579"><i>Austro-Mechana</i>, C-433/20</a></b>, a pending referral from Austria.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">IPKat readers interested in all things private copying (who’s not …) will be aware that private copying in the cloud is not an entirely novel issue for the CJEU.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A few years ago, in fact, in <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=197264&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=860603"><i>VCAST</i>, C-265/16</a></b> <b><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-vcast-decision-how-to-turn-private.html">here</a>] </span></b>the Court was asked questions relating to reproductions made through cloud-based recording services. Eventually, in that referral from Italy the focus shifted to consideration of the very lawfulness of VCAST’s services in the first place: in lieu of reproduction aspects, the CJEU developed an analysis focused on the interplay between the territoriality of copyright and propaedeutic activities to customers’ acts of reproduction, notably VCAST’s own unlicensed acts of communication/making available to the public. Ultimately, the CJEU ruled that, lacking a licence to communicate/make available to the public TV programmes outside of the relevant territory (in that case: Italy), the provider of a cloud-based recording service would be in itself infringing copyright and related rights.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In <i>Austro-Mechana</i>, the question is once again one of private copying in the cloud. More specifically: does the expression “on any medium” in Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive also include reproductions made on the servers of a cloud computing service? If so, what payment (if any) is due to the concerned rightholder?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Earlier this week, Advocate General (AG) Hogan delivered his <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=246488&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2083579"><b>Opinion</b></a>, in which – unsurprisingly – he answered the first question in the affirmative and advised the Court to rule that, in relation to the second question, a separate/additional fair compensation (eg, a levy) may not be payable if the a Member State has already opted to apply a levy system in respect of the devices/media through which the cloud-based service is accessed and the natural person is able to undertake the reproduction at issue.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let’s see a bit more in detail how AG Hogan reasoned.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Applicability of private copying to cloud-based reproductions</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">In relation to the question whether private copying applies to reproductions in the cloud, the AG referred to earlier CJEU case law to determine the freedom that Member States enjoy if they decide to transpose Article 5(2)(b) into their own laws.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While recalling that AG Sharpston in <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-457/11"><i>VG Wort</i>, C-457/11 to 460/11</a></b> supported the conclusion that Member States may opt to have a narrower private copying exception than what is allowed at the EU level, he also noted that in <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-463/12"><i>Copydan Båndkopi</i>, C-463/12</a></b> the CJEU held that Member States are prohibited from unduly discriminating between different economic operators and users.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All this means that, yes, “Member States do enjoy broad discretion in respect of the manner in which they avail of the Article 5(2)(b) exception in their national laws”. However, they “cannot legislate for this purpose in a manner which would contradict or would be otherwise at variance with the underlying purpose of Directive 2001/29 itself. It would, for example, be important to stress that Member States who elect to avail of the Article 5(2)(b) exception must do so in a technologically neutral fashion.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While there is a principle of strict interpretation of copyright exceptions, the InfoSoc Directive also seeks to tackle technological advancement and thus avoid that copyright rules become obsolete (see recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In light of both a literal and teleological interpretation of Article 5(2)(b), it follows that its language, which refers to reproductions “on any medium”, does not allow Member States to unduly discriminate between different types of goods and services:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>[T]he exception [in Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive] is not restricted to reproductions on physical media or substrate or, indeed, in an analogue or non-digital form. The exception thus covers, inter alia, reproductions <b><span style="color: red;">[from lawful sources only: see <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-435/12"><i>Aci Adam</i>, C-435/12</a>]</span></b> in both analogue and digital form and, reproductions on a physical substrate such as paper or CDs/DVDs or in a somewhat more intangible media/substrate such as in the case in the main proceedings storage space or capacity made available in the cloud by an internet service provider. <b><span style="color: red;">[para 35]</span></b></blockquote></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDO467Y_0hMb8uJmGC-Gunsla9wcRGzgVLtKQaI37XfiuOvZ06YLlsybHRBrrYguMuY73zFgTCFGWUC1GcognWl2crHx7uUqB7iWrSlw-RHCC91aatlj9-DEfFGnURxu_C0juSD_DSYaQ_/s620/JusticeGerardHogan.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="413" data-original-width="620" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDO467Y_0hMb8uJmGC-Gunsla9wcRGzgVLtKQaI37XfiuOvZ06YLlsybHRBrrYguMuY73zFgTCFGWUC1GcognWl2crHx7uUqB7iWrSlw-RHCC91aatlj9-DEfFGnURxu_C0juSD_DSYaQ_/s320/JusticeGerardHogan.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>AG Hogan</i></td></tr></tbody></table>It follows that the private copying exception may extend to a situation like the one at issue in the background proceedings. In any case, as it is already clear from <i>VCAST</i>, such an exception does only cover acts of reproduction made at the conditions indicated in Article 5(2)(b) and does not extend to the doing of other acts restricted by copyright, including communication/making available to the public of protected content.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Fair compensation: what for?</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG turned to consideration of the second question (payment of fair compensation) and explained how this question resulted from uncertainties relating to the interpretation of the wording of the Austrian private copying exception.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Having recalled the principles first established in <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=83635&doclang=en"><i>Padawan</i>, C-467/08</a></b>, the AG emphasized that:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Member States “enjoy broad discretion in regard to the parameters” of fair compensation under national law;</li><li>Although current systems of compensation are “necessarily imprecise”, fairness of the compensation entails that rightholder are not over or under compensated for the harm suffered due to the unauthorized reproduction of their content;</li><li>Recital 35 in the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive inter alia indicates that, where rightholders have already received payment “in some other form, for instance, as part of a licence levy”, no specific or separate payment may be due;</li><li>The three-step test in Article 5(5) also serves to identify what compensation is to be regarded as being fair.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Consumers who access a cloud-based recording service have already paid a levy to undertake acts of private copying when they purchased devices and media (in Austria, however, only the latter come with a levy) with copying and storage capacity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">So the question becomes: would a separate, additional levy be justified? </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG warned against determinations made without sufficient empirical evidence of further harm and concluded that <b><span style="color: red;">[paras 72-73]</span></b>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">[A] separate levy or fee is not payable in respect of the reproduction by a natural person for their own personal purposes based on cloud computing services provided by a third party provided that the levies paid in respect of devices/media in the Member State in question also reflects the harm caused to the rightholder by such reproduction. If a Member State has, in fact, elected to provide for a levy system in respect of devices/media, the referring court is in principle entitled to assume that this in itself constitutes ‘fair compensation’ in the sense of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, unless the rightholder (or their representative) can clearly demonstrate that such payment would in the circumstances of the case at hand be inadequate.</div><div style="text-align: justify;">This assessment – which requires considerable economic expertise and a knowledge of a range of industries – is one which must be carried out at national level by the referring court.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG Opinion in this case reaches a sensible conclusion, which is in line with (abundant) CJEU private copying jurisprudence. It is likely that the CJEU will follow the core of his analysis and recommendations.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">AG Hogan’s final remarks regarding the need to provide robust evidence of harm are also nothing new (let’s for instance think of the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_80"><b>Vitorino Report</b></a>). They nonetheless represent a welcome reminder. Too often compensation levels for private copying (or lack thereof: let’s for instance think about the <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2015/07/green-j-quashes-uk-private-copying.html"><b>UK private copying exception</b></a> and its fate) have been and still are determined without the required degree of transparency (for consumers) and consistency across different sectors and territories.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[first published on The IPKat on 26 September 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-18290178204110400502021-09-01T07:21:00.003+01:002021-09-12T20:09:26.021+01:00Online conference announcement: 'The Making of EU Copyright'<p> <a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi5SQ45f2FKK2d4BEggBudrOHw2lyq3TxEA94oWXS6O09ZyTZhZIP8jKojkiSR8AEVaM6cEB7hD7m8J9e868Q23bjix0FPocCZylTWsIv6ef62rJLsKX7xO7teoXF0K-dAwt9DSwRhU9iaX/s451/Picture+1.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" data-original-height="265" data-original-width="451" height="376" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi5SQ45f2FKK2d4BEggBudrOHw2lyq3TxEA94oWXS6O09ZyTZhZIP8jKojkiSR8AEVaM6cEB7hD7m8J9e868Q23bjix0FPocCZylTWsIv6ef62rJLsKX7xO7teoXF0K-dAwt9DSwRhU9iaX/w640-h376/Picture+1.png" width="640" /></a></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br />2021 is a momentous year for EU copyright law: it is the 30th anniversary since the adoption of the first ever copyright directive (the Software Directive 1991/250) and the 20th since the passing of the seminal InfoSoc Directive 2001/29. By 7 June this year, individual Member States should have also completed their own national processes for the transposition of the Digital Single Market Directive 2019/790.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Besides legislative action, what copyright law is today at both the EU and national levels owes significantly to the case law developed over time by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In several and notable instances, the Court has added flesh to the structure of thin legislative provisions, addressed technological advancement, and contributed substantially to the establishment of a Single Market for copyright content and copyright-based services.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To celebrate the publication of<b> <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/copyright-in-the-digital-single-market-9780198858591?cc=gb&lang=en&"><i>Copyright in the Digital Single Market. Article-by-Article Commentary to the Provisions of Directive 2019/790</i></a></b> (Oxford University Press), the <a href="https://www.ifim.se/"><b>Institute for Intellectual Property and Market Law (IFIM)</b></a> at Stockholm University is delighted to host an online conference devoted to discussing <i><b><a href="https://www.eventbrite.se/e/the-making-of-eu-copyright-tickets-168230424729">The Making of EU Copyright</a></b></i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With a stellar cast of speakers, the discussion will develop into three main directions: the role and legacy of CJEU case law for EU and national copyright systems, the rationale and effects of EU harmonization, and the impact that the rules contained in the Digital Single Market Directive 2019/790 will be having on EU and national laws and practice.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">*** </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><b>Speakers (in alphabetical order)</b></h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li><a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-court/court-of-appeal-home/coa-biogs/"><b>Richard Arnold</b></a>, Lord Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal of England and Wales</li><li><a href="https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/organization/-/organization/CNECT/COM_CRF_5127"><b>Marco Giorello</b></a>, Head of the Copyright Unit (CNECT.I.2), European Commission</li><li><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/rc4_170596/en/"><b>Marko Ilešič</b></a>, Judge, Court of Justice of the European Union</li><li><a href="https://www.su.se/english/profiles/elro0365-1.442578"><b>Eleonora Rosati</b></a>, Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Stockholm University</li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catherine_Stihler"><b>Catherine Stihler</b></a>, Chief Executive Officer, Creative Commons</li><li><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/rc4_170743/en/"><b>Maciej Szpunar</b></a>, First Advocate General, Court of Justice of the European Union</li></ul></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><b>Chair</b></h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li><a href="https://www.su.se/english/profiles/jrose-1.183812"><b>Jan Rosén</b></a>, Professor of Private Law, Stockholm University</li></ul><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">***</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><b>Programme</b></h3><div style="text-align: justify;">- Welcome (<a href="https://www.su.se/profiles/jonno-1.185513"><b>Jonas Nordell</b></a>, Professor of Private Law, Stockholm University, and Chair of the IFIM Board)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Introduction (Jan Rosén)</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">- The role, action, and legacy of CJEU copyright case law</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Advising the Court (Maciej Szpunar)</li><li>Reaching a decision (Marko Ilešič)</li><li>The perspective of a national judge (Richard Arnold)</li><li>Q&As</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">- Copyright harmonization: from policy to law and practice</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Copyright policy at the European Commission (Marco Giorello)</li><li>Shaping the Digital Single Market Directive 2019/790 (Catherine Stihler)</li><li>The place and effects of the Digital Single Market Directive 2019/790 (Eleonora Rosati)</li><li>Q&As and conclusion</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">***</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Attendance is free but registration is required. Registered participants will be emailed the joining instructions the day before the conference.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To register, please <a href="https://www.eventbrite.se/e/the-making-of-eu-copyright-tickets-168230424729"><b>click here</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Join us!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 1 September 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-23591572459683684492021-08-24T16:33:00.001+01:002021-08-30T11:47:14.107+01:00Towards the national transpositions of the DSM Directive: various techniques to ... do as you please<p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlBc4BUU00VjCsZ4gpM6ApiBufO-dUMV89fudsq1eqO5e-riUp6xfpAWtzkUYQJn33SEu6isCBBuUF2yikjdd5hE3CZAceyQBHjX2b1zCAfbmM4AQaaq2ghC1x_Gyh-O55l6ZIr2U-yfvx/s600/cat-beach-shutterstock_68769460.jpg.optimal.jpg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="400" data-original-width="600" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlBc4BUU00VjCsZ4gpM6ApiBufO-dUMV89fudsq1eqO5e-riUp6xfpAWtzkUYQJn33SEu6isCBBuUF2yikjdd5hE3CZAceyQBHjX2b1zCAfbmM4AQaaq2ghC1x_Gyh-O55l6ZIr2U-yfvx/s320/cat-beach-shutterstock_68769460.jpg.optimal.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Beach + sunbathing + copyright<br />= the perfect summer</i></td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;">As readers with an interest in EU copyright are well aware, EU Member States had time until 7 June to</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> transpose the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019L0790&from=EN" style="text-align: justify;"><b>DSM Directive 2019/790</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=DSM+Directive">here</a>]</span></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">into their own national laws.</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">With a few exceptions <b><span style="color: red;">[see Communia tracker <a href="https://www.notion.so/DSM-Directive-Implementation-Tracker-361cfae48e814440b353b32692bba879">here</a>]</span></b>, because of a number of reasons - ranging from COVID to the delayed <b><a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/guidance-article-17-directive-2019790-copyright-digital-single-market">Article 17 Commission's guidance</a></b> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/06/commission-unveils-article-17-guidance.html">here</a>]</span></b> to some important pending rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the majority of EU Member States missed this deadline.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This said, based on what is already available, it is apparent that the provisions that the EU legislature adopted in 2019 to establish a ‘Digital Single Market’ will be implemented in different – if not altogether creative – ways across the EU.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is true that there are provisions in the Directive that leave Member States significant discretion. Such discretion ranges from the very option to do something in the first place to shaping the actual content of rights and rules. An example of the former is the possibility, under Article 12, to provide for collective licensing with an extended effect. Examples of the latter are the articles on authors’ and performers’ contracts (Articles 18 to 23).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This said, there are also provisions in the Directive that do not openly envisage such broad discretion.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Yet, where draft or adopted transposition laws have been issued, also in respect of those, Member States have been moving in different directions. This, in part, is due to the objective ambiguity of some of the Directive’s provisions or part thereof. In more significant part, however, this attitude is linked to a misplaced idea of great freedom enjoyed by national legislatures.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I will consider the Italian case to illustrate all this, in particular the latter aspect.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">On 5 August 2021 the Italian Council of Ministers, upon proposal from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Culture, adopted the <a href="http://documenti.camera.it/apps/nuovosito/attigoverno/Schedalavori/getTesto.ashx?file=0295.pdf&leg=XVIII#pagemode=none"><b>draft Legislative Decree</b></a> that would transpose the Directive into Italian law. The remaining of the legislative process is likely to be a formality. The Legislative Decree is expected to be formally adopted shortly after the end of the summer recess/early Autumn 2021.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Most of the Italian draft law closely resembles the text of the Directive, but there are notable exceptions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The proposed Italian press publishers’ right</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">One of most visible examples of the above is the proposed Italian transposition of Article 15 (the press publishers’ right.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It should be noted at the outset that, under Italian copyright law as pre-dating the Directive, press publishers were already in a better position than some of their EU counterparts. The Italian Copyright Act, in fact, already <b><a href="http://www.interlex.it/testi/l41_633.htm#38">provided</a> </b>that the publisher of a collective work, as is a newspaper, enjoys the right to exploit such work.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This said, the proposed Italian press publishers’ right looks rather different from Article 15 of the Directive. Correctly, <a href="https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/diritto-d-autore-direttiva-ue-e-soluzione-italiana-AEVR7Tb"><b>some commentators have considered</b></a> the proposed Italian approach out-of-sync with what the Directive allows.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">‘Very short extracts’</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">As a first point, Article 43-<i>bis</i> of the Italian Copyright Act would provide a statutory definition of ‘very short extracts’ (that is extracts of a press publication that are outside the scope of protection of the right): any part of a press publication which does not remove the need for consultation of the press publication in its entirety would be regarded as ‘very short’.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Such definition does not feature in the text of the Directive. Whether something is or not a very short extract should be left to a case-by-case assessment. The European Commission correctly reasoned along these lines, though with reference to Article 17.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Obligation to negotiate licences</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">As a second, and possibly more concerning, point the draft Italian provision would introduce an obligation – on the side of both information society service providers (ISSPs) and press publishers – to negotiate a licensing agreement.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It seems that the intention here is to avoid replicating situations already occurred in some Member States (notably Germany and France), that is that dominant providers require press publishers to waive their right to be indexed in their services.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Standing this rationale, the ultimate result might be however paradoxical: press publishers would not enjoy a preventive right to authorize the use of their press publications; instead, they would be required to negotiate a licence with relevant ISSPs and the use of press publications could take place irrespective of whether a licence has been concluded.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHEu3rCmr8uSs1Ks7EuBTeA91RjWHg56gG-_EoxsdhpYjQpypsogWDqkKpJwXBILZgt9gzPn3-2MpgKmyxVSrcozTTAthMWzTZRqrFJ7f3I0DyA5zkdRZoDnURSdItnuhyphenhyphenYLoL42ryZrpA/s512/unnamed.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="512" data-original-width="337" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgHEu3rCmr8uSs1Ks7EuBTeA91RjWHg56gG-_EoxsdhpYjQpypsogWDqkKpJwXBILZgt9gzPn3-2MpgKmyxVSrcozTTAthMWzTZRqrFJ7f3I0DyA5zkdRZoDnURSdItnuhyphenhyphenYLoL42ryZrpA/s320/unnamed.jpeg" width="211" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Typical Italian summer</i></td></tr></tbody></table>The draft Italian law speaks, in fact, of a ‘fair compensation’ (<i>equo compenso</i>) to which press publishers would be entitled and the possibility for the <b><a href="https://www.agcom.it/">Italian Communication Authority AGCOM</a></b> (whose copyright-related competences will be significantly increased further to the transposition of the Directive) to determine the amount of such fair compensation in the event that no agreement is reached between the parties.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In addition, during the negotiation of a licence, ISSPs shall not limit the visibility of their press publications. The unjustified limitation of such content visibility could be considered contrary to the obligation to negotiate a contract in good faith under the Italian Civil Code. While such obligation applies to both rightholders and ISSPs, it is also to be considered that the very content of press publications – that is news – holds most of its value in the immediate aftermath of its release. How the proposed prohibition to limit content visibility would thus protect press publishers is unclear.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The proposed obligations of OCSSPs</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as the Italian transposition of Article 17 is concerned, in line with the Italian language version of the Directive, the draft law (Article 102-<i>septies</i>) refers to the concept of ‘best efforts’ as ‘massimi sforzi’ <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/05/dsm-directive-series-5-does-dsm.html">here</a>]</span></b>. To be fair: if there is an issue of meaning (it might be argued that <i>massimi sforzi</i> is not a literal translation of 'best efforts'), that is not something that has arisen now; it rather dates back to when the various language versions of the Directive were finalized.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">What is more surprising is the part of the draft law that would transpose Article 17(7). The Directive provides that:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and rightholders shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including where such works or other subject matter are covered by an exception or limitation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The proposed Italian provision (Article 102-<i>nonies</i>) states that such cooperation “is without prejudice” (<i>non pregiudica</i>) to the availability of lawful content.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The linguistic choice is interesting.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Directive’s wording establishes a precise obligation of result (<i>non deve impedire</i>), while the draft Italian law seems to suggest a milder duty (if a duty at all), in the sense that the availability of exceptions and limitations under Article 17(7) is not <i>per se</i> compromised by the cooperation between rightholders and online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, unlike other Member States, the Italian solution is to allow <i>ex ante</i> blocking of lawful content: Article 102-<i>decies</i> expressly provides that. The Directive is silent on the issue of <i>ex ante </i>/ <i>ex post</i> blocking, so a solution adopting <i>ex ante</i> blocking is not necessarily unavailable to Member States, provided that other requirements are also fulfilled (including that the complaint and redress mechanism is expeditious).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Text and data mining: reservation not necessarily appropriate<br /></h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrPbwyTCZn6VtXBTi7ejtrc85U_-KhZtJLbz2Ax1k7ldXxStkDtvOiXUcrnvq-ZWW6ZEiSF6lP5rqoDpEjWAF6c1cAyG6BPrC1Y2GbV4nCRIFriNZjEc2bluv3mw2E76zCxLPyDlM_iaty/s560/the-proper-way-to-pick-up-and-hold-a-cat.jpeg" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="315" data-original-width="560" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhrPbwyTCZn6VtXBTi7ejtrc85U_-KhZtJLbz2Ax1k7ldXxStkDtvOiXUcrnvq-ZWW6ZEiSF6lP5rqoDpEjWAF6c1cAyG6BPrC1Y2GbV4nCRIFriNZjEc2bluv3mw2E76zCxLPyDlM_iaty/s320/the-proper-way-to-pick-up-and-hold-a-cat.jpeg" width="320" /></a></div>The Directive introduces two text and data mining (TDM) exceptions: one aimed at research organizations and cultural heritage institutions (Article 3) and one without particular restrictions in terms of beneficiaries (Article 4).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Unlike Article 3, the exception or limitation under Article shall not be available where rightholders have expressly reserved the use of their works and other protected subject matter “in an appropriate manner”. Recital 18 in the Directive distinguishes between two different scenarios:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>In the case of content that has been made publicly available online, it should only be considered appropriate to reserve the rights in Article 4(1) by the use of machine-readable means, including metadata and terms and conditions of a website or a service. In any event, other uses shall not be affected by the reservation of rights for the purposes of TDM;</li><li>In other cases, it appears that it might be appropriate to reserve the rights by other means, such as contractual agreements or a unilateral declaration. However, as I also wrote <b><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3907820">here</a></b>, in light of the recent CJEU judgment in <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=238661&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4182944"><i>VG Bild-Kunst</i> </a><span style="color: red;">[<a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/08/not-yet-tired-of-linking-and-copyright.html">here</a>] </span></b>it appears preferable to adopt a corrected reading of the provision, in the sense that reservation by rightholders shall be only possible if done by adopting effective technological measures within the meaning of Article 6(1) and (3) of the InfoSoc Directive.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The proposed Italian provision does not do any of the above. The draft Article 70-<i>quarter</i> simply allows rightholders to “expressly reserve” the use of their works or protected subject matter, without the need for such reservation to be done “in an appropriate manner”. This is not a faithful reproduction of the language of the Directive, nor of the scope of the exception/limitation under its Article 4.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Conclusion</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Those discussed above are just some examples that illustrate, not just that the devil is indeed always in the details, but also that there may be different techniques to shape or – more appropriately – re-shape the content of rules adopted at the EU level. They include:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Adding layers that do not exist at the EU level and are actually likely to be contrary to what EU law allows Member States to do (for example, the proposed transposition of Article 15);</li><li>Using language that diverges from that of the same language version of the Directive (for example, the proposed transposition of Article 17(7));</li><li>Omitting to transpose substantial parts of a provision (for example, the reservation modalities under Article 4).</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Are national legislatures entirely to blame for this? In fairness, not.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">After all, it is the very instrument chosen at the EU level to realise a Digital Single Market for copyright and related rights – that is an EU directive instead of a regulation – that lends its side to these tricks, threats and opportunities (depending on the side you’re on!) during the national transposition phase.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 24 August 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-71047851755344635792021-08-19T10:42:00.004+01:002021-08-19T10:42:36.256+01:00Not yet tired of linking and copyright? More on the CJEU decision in VG-Bild Kunst<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Earlier this year, The IPKat</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/03/cjeu-rules-that-linking-can-be.html" style="text-align: justify;"><b>reported</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">on the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=238661&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4182944"><i>VG Bild-Kunst</i>, C-392/19</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;">, an important case concerning contractual restrictions to linking under EU copyright law (on that occasion, I also updated my linking table: see</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/03/linking-after-vg-bild-kunst-in-table.html" style="text-align: justify;"><b>here</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">).</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgC8H_kGM9JLK2eXM-L3MSaD4veDU9IkSAlxr63cO_CdoPlqZaL0r6iZzkO3BKXZWZmkfSTLtoDYGH4_jCTI9GhEj6dQkZ0lnsb3reEgKCJPQ5c4qyTsL0_5ojva4eb1OjdvGhiW8lwwO9y/s320/Screenshot+2021-03-09+at+12.17.11.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="187" data-original-width="320" height="187" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgC8H_kGM9JLK2eXM-L3MSaD4veDU9IkSAlxr63cO_CdoPlqZaL0r6iZzkO3BKXZWZmkfSTLtoDYGH4_jCTI9GhEj6dQkZ0lnsb3reEgKCJPQ5c4qyTsL0_5ojva4eb1OjdvGhiW8lwwO9y/s0/Screenshot+2021-03-09+at+12.17.11.png" width="320" /></a></div>The CJEU explicitly ruled – for the first time – that linking to a copyright work lawfully published on a third-party website may be restricted through contract and not solely through technical restrictions on access (for instance, a paywall). To this end, however, the concerned rightholder is required to adopt or mandate the adoption of effective technological measures. Lacking these, an unauthorised act of linking shall not be infringing.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The judgment has important implications for the construction of the right of communication to the public in the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029">InfoSoc Directive</a></b> and its application to online scenarios, as well as for the interpretation of provisions in other EU copyright directives, including the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a></b>. It also raises questions regarding the compatibility of the Court’s reasoning with key tenets of copyright law, such as the no formalities rule in the <b><a href="https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/">Berne Convention</a></b>, and the prohibition of exhaustion of this economic right.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Readers interested in this area of copyright may find a more extensive analysis of the implications of the decision in this recent contribution of mine entitled <i>Linking and Copyright in the Shade of VG Bild-Kunst</i> and <b><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3907820">available - for the time being - on SSRN</a></b>. Later this year, it will be published by <i><b><a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/Journals/Common+Market+Law+Review/2">Common Market Law Review</a></b></i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Any comments are of course welcome!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 19 August 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-15011331286651527322021-07-15T15:54:00.000+01:002021-07-15T15:54:03.071+01:00AG Øe advises CJEU to rule that Article 17 is COMPATIBLE with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and should not be annulled<p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtbmp_Om93qHAMJpKIbn_jW7k8sU0wFPrw5RZO2Ij6R_boqRlvYcoJImRqUJ_5BOcWggCHI9b9TBvpdEPijSj0aItMX4tg4QNkx5D3eb0TgcrYBNg6_eD9ZtHLyGX8XJ01VkmuM-3VgUy1/s275/download.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="184" data-original-width="275" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgtbmp_Om93qHAMJpKIbn_jW7k8sU0wFPrw5RZO2Ij6R_boqRlvYcoJImRqUJ_5BOcWggCHI9b9TBvpdEPijSj0aItMX4tg4QNkx5D3eb0TgcrYBNg6_eD9ZtHLyGX8XJ01VkmuM-3VgUy1/s0/download.jpeg" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>AG Saugmandsgaard Øe</i></td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;">Is Article 17 of</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019L0790&from=EN" style="text-align: justify;"><b>Directive 2019/790</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">(DSMD) compatible with the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN" style="text-align: justify;"><b>EU Charter of Fundamental Rights</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">, notably its Article 11 and the principle of freedom of expression and information?</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">According to Poland, the answer should be in the negative. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Indeed, shortly after the adoption of the Directive in 2019, this country lodged a complaint (<a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216823&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2395080"><b>C-401/19</b></a>) before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), seeking the partial or - as a subsidiary claim - complete annulment of the provision.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This morning, Advocate General (AG) Saugmandsgaard Øe released his <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?docid=244201&text=&dir=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=req&pageIndex=0&cid=2395080"><b>Opinion</b></a>, advising the Court to rule that Article 17 is compatible with the Charter and should not be annulled. All this is true insofar as the monitoring obligations of online content sharing service providers (OCSSPs) are circumscribed by sufficient safeguards, which the provision itself contains, so to minimize the impact of the resulting filtering activities on users’ freedom of expression and information.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As it will be discussed below, this conclusion was to be expected, also considering last year’s <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228712&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2396771"><b>Opinion</b></a> in <i>YouTube</i>, C-682/18 and C-683/18 <b><span style="color: red;">[IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-ag-opinion-in-youtubecyando.html">here</a>] </span></b>by the same AG.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Preliminary remarks and postscriptum</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG noted at the outset 3 key things: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>First, he maintained what he had expressed in last year’s <i>YouTube</i> Opinion, that is that the regime in Article 17 is a “new liability regime”; </li><li>Secondly, he submitted that Article 17 imposes on OCSSPs obligations to monitor which “as a general rule, take the form of filtering”; </li><li>Thirdly, the alleged undue interference with the Charter should be assessed in light of the guidance provided by the CJEU in its earlier decisions in <i><b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62010CJ0070">Scarlet</a></b></i>, <i><b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2443438">SABAM</a></b></i>, and <i><b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-18/18">Glawischnig-Piesczek</a></b></i>.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Opinion also contains a postscriptum, meant to react to the CJEU <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243241&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3516716"><i>YouTube</i> decision</a></b> <b><span style="color: red;">[IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/06/cjeu-rules-on-platform-liability-under.html">here</a>]</span></b> and the publication of the <b><a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/guidance-article-17-directive-2019790-copyright-digital-single-market">Commission Article 17 Guidance</a></b> <b><span style="color: red;">[IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/06/commission-unveils-article-17-guidance.html">here</a>]</span></b>, both of which took place after the Opinion had been finalized. With regard to the former, the AG considered his analysis compatible with that ruling. Turning to the latter, he criticized the considerations made therein with regard to earmarked content.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Having reviewed the rationale and history of Article 17, the AG undertook an analysis of the very admissibility of the action lodged by Poland. He agreed with the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the French government that Poland’s request for partial annulment of Article 17 should be declared inadmissible by the Court. He considered that the only option available to the CJEU is to either save or annul Article 17 in its entirety. He also noted that the removal of Article 17 from the body of the DSMD would not affect the other provisions therein, considering the multiple rationales supporting that piece of legislation.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All this said, the AG turned to the substantive assessment of the action.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJyyrQeXn4WJ_zuonNenLOsXsfuY1x-2ucFn0_bLh0gRdmrKZLOVMHlZ-gQKVR-ftuEKYDAb0NkHDyDwCqpmlIaJ7F6ey7O8yAiYn0VKQvTDz8tJcPaNKuZMthoGR1S488uXsDyHeoEjrH/s1280/maxresdefault.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1280" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJyyrQeXn4WJ_zuonNenLOsXsfuY1x-2ucFn0_bLh0gRdmrKZLOVMHlZ-gQKVR-ftuEKYDAb0NkHDyDwCqpmlIaJ7F6ey7O8yAiYn0VKQvTDz8tJcPaNKuZMthoGR1S488uXsDyHeoEjrH/s320/maxresdefault.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Censored</i></td></tr></tbody></table>Substantive analysis</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG divided his analysis into 3 parts: first, he considered the scope of Article 17; secondly, he tackled the limitation to the exercise of freedom of expression/information; finally, he addressed the question of compatibility between Article 17 and Article 11 of the Charter.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Scope of the provision</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG considered the meaning of letters (b) and (c) in Article 17(4) and concluded that OCSSPs are under an obligation to engage in preventative monitoring, in accordance with what may be expected from a diligent operator and in compliance with the principle of proportionality.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">He also noted that filtering may be done in different ways. Automatic content recognition (ACR) tools are based on different techniques, <i>inter alia</i> including hashing, watermarking and fingerprinting. This said, the Directive is technologically agnostic, as it does not refer to any specific filtering technology. However, the AG agreed with Poland that in many cases ACR tools will be used.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Interference with freedom of expression/information</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG considered that freedom of expression/information (but also freedom of the arts in some cases) “is undeniably relevant in the present case” and that Article 17 does interfere with it. Such interference is attributable to EU legislature.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">He noted that Article 11 of the Charter corresponds – in both meaning and scope – to Article 10 <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf"><b>ECHR</b></a>. It follows that the EU provision must be interpreted in light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As it is the case for Article 10 ECHR, also the right under Article 11 of the Charter is not absolute: limitations on its exercise are permissible insofar as, in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter, (1) they are provided for by law, (2) respect the essence of the right in Article 11, and (3) are in accordance with the principle of proportionality, as is also required under Article 17(5).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">According to the AG, Article 17 complies with all requirements above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Furthermore, the monitoring obligations under Article 17(4) are to be regarded as being specific in nature, not general. As such, they are not contrary to Article 15 of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031"><b>Ecommerce Directive</b></a>. In this regard, the AG considered that the position of the CJEU has undergone an evolution over time, which appears “justified”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Safeguards and user rights</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG also considered that Article 17(7)-(9) contains “meaningful safeguards to protect the users of sharing services against measures involving the improper or arbitrary blocking of their content.” With particular regard to Article 17(7), the AG submitted that – through that – EU legislature has not simply mandated Member States to implement certain copyright exceptions in their own laws, but has “expressly recognised that users of sharing services have subjective rights under copyright law. Those users now have the right, which is enforceable against the providers of those services and rightholders, to make legitimate use, on those services, of protected subject matter, including the <i>right</i> to rely on exceptions and limitations to copyright and related rights.” Such acknowledgement, continued the AG, would reflect CJEU case law itself.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as Article 17(7) is concerned, the AG submitted that contractual override is prohibited in respect of those exceptions and that that paragraph imposes an obligation of result on OCSSPs:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>The limit of permissible filtering and blocking measures is therefore clearly defined: they <i>must not have the objective or the effect of preventing such legitimate uses</i>. That provision therefore helps to counteract the tendency of those providers to be ‘overzealous’ and, therefore, to circumscribe the extent of the interference with freedom of expression so that it is limited to the dissemination of content which infringes copyright rules.</blockquote></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;"><i>Ex ante</i>/<i>ex post </i>blocking</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG also weighed in on the <i>vexata quaestio</i> of <i>ex ante</i>/<i>ex post</i> blocking: based on a literal, systematic and historical analysis of Article 17, the AG agreed with the Parliament, Council and Commission that legitimate uses under Article 17(7) should be taken into account <i>ex ante</i> by OCSSPs. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It follows that the complaint and redress mechanism under Article 17(9) would constitute “an additional and final safeguard for situations where, despite the obligation in paragraph 7, those providers nevertheless block such legitimate content mistakenly.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This conclusion would also comply the requirements of making best efforts and behaving with professional diligence: “Since those providers find themselves in a bilateral professional position vis-à-vis users and rightholders, they must act ‘diligently’ in relation to both categories.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG felt strongly about this point, as he invited “the Court to confirm unequivocally in its forthcoming judgment that this is the correct interpretation of Article 17.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">He also considered that, to minimize the risk of overblocking, an OCSSP “should only be required to filter and block information which has first been established by a court as being illegal or, otherwise, information the unlawfulness of which is <i>obvious from the outset</i>, that is to say, it is <i>manifest</i>, without, inter alia, the need for contextualisation.”</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In light of <i>Glawischnig-Piesczek</i>, the filtering measures which OCSSPs are required to use must “be limited to content which is ‘identical’ or ‘equivalent’ to works and other protected subject matter identified by rightholders.” Vice versa, the uploads should proceed “in all ambiguous situations – short extracts from works included in longer content, ‘transformative’ works, and so forth – in which, in particular, the application of exceptions and limitations to copyright is reasonably conceivable”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">As stated in the opening, the substantive conclusion that Article 17 is – indeed – compatible with the Charter is not at all surprising. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In fact, it is – rather explicitly – what AG Øe suggested a year ago in his <i>YouTube</i> Opinion. He acknowledged that it is for EU legislature to create new balance between different rights and interests. While refusing that Article 17 would have retroactive application (and, so, the argument that it would be a mere clarification of the law as it pre-existed the Directive), he also noted that the regime introduced therein seeks to take into account different rights and interests.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This, substantially, is what he reiterated in today’s Opinion.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Also considering the language employed by the CJEU in last month’s <i>YouTube</i> ruling<b><span style="color: red;"> [you can access the recording of the Joint IPKat/IFIM/BLACA rapid response event <a href="https://t.co/yRIAZGnZEL?amp=1">here</a>]</span></b>, it is to be expected that the Court, at least on the key issue of compatibility between Article 17 and the Charter, will follow his AG.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 15 July 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-48698378511833606522021-07-14T21:43:00.000+01:002021-07-14T21:43:00.747+01:00General Court rules that shape of Guerlain's Rouge G lipstick case can be registered as a trade mark<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Can the shape of a lipstick case function as an indicator of commercial origin? The answer is yes when such case is the iconic and immediately recognizable (at least to lipstick lovers!) one of</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://www.guerlain.com/uk/en-uk/p/rouge-g-de-guerlain-the-satin-matte-lipstick-shades-S000001.html" style="font-weight: bold; text-align: justify;">Rouge G de Guerlain</a><span style="text-align: justify;">:</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7PUFxwT6lGYliE7SET_z6V8umMrEm0cpYoB6u6QA4STqX0r2MJj7LMf-lCYvYqEEXuVGD-r5NLeNL8Z8L2qjHSzcGkbn3mbplKJVrslUE6qrHVkIKaiFUQJcCpLcnbdWGyvwm2aChOzjr/s416/Screenshot+2021-07-14+at+17.50.34.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="413" data-original-width="416" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj7PUFxwT6lGYliE7SET_z6V8umMrEm0cpYoB6u6QA4STqX0r2MJj7LMf-lCYvYqEEXuVGD-r5NLeNL8Z8L2qjHSzcGkbn3mbplKJVrslUE6qrHVkIKaiFUQJcCpLcnbdWGyvwm2aChOzjr/s320/Screenshot+2021-07-14+at+17.50.34.png" width="320" /></a></div><div>Today, also the General Court did agree in its judgment in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244146&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2116112"><b>T-488/20 <i>Guerlain</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[currently only available in French]</span></b>.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The judgment (correctly) reverses the earlier, contrary decision of the EUIPO First Board of Appeal (<b><a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/copla/trademark/data/017958667/download/CLW/APL/2020/FR/20200602_R2292_2019-1.pdf?app=caselaw&casenum=R2292/2019-1&trTypeDoc=NA">2292/2019-1</a></b>).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">In 2018, Guerlain applied to register the 3D sign represented above (left-hand side) for “lipsticks” in Class 3.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The EUIPO examiner rejected the application considering that the sign would lack distinctive character, in accordance with Article 7(1)(b) <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R1001&from=EN">EUTMR</a></b>. The subsidiary claim of the applicant under Article 7(3) EUTMR (acquired distinctiveness) could be examined once the decision became final.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Guerlain unsuccessfully appealed. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The EUIPO Board considered that the shape applied for would not depart significantly from the norms or customs of the sector, as it has become (routinely) required for trade mark applications relating to less conventional signs (eg, patterns, shapes, position marks). According to the Board, the applicant’s sign was a mere variation on the shapes of lipstick cases normally available on the market.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhVPDpNodOQ9qcpDiFiSfl0yjoxAgL2CM3j7KjCS9-Subl0CrPlTfAk3En7G_UXevhTXPX9xtCM3bWVTmB_ueMYgSYj5NYRbpnHMt5DWEVLhqoiGZzgwY_lAr2jzT_59g_rm5jsZ2WRsfUn/s781/46ca229fdb4119fc21cc0391f509cf69.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="781" data-original-width="581" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhVPDpNodOQ9qcpDiFiSfl0yjoxAgL2CM3j7KjCS9-Subl0CrPlTfAk3En7G_UXevhTXPX9xtCM3bWVTmB_ueMYgSYj5NYRbpnHMt5DWEVLhqoiGZzgwY_lAr2jzT_59g_rm5jsZ2WRsfUn/s320/46ca229fdb4119fc21cc0391f509cf69.jpeg" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The IPKat Team's favourite shades</i></td></tr></tbody></table>A further appeal to the General Court followed.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The decision</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The Court noted at the outset that the concept of distinctiveness is different from that of novelty or originality: the fact that the specialist press regarded the applicant’s sign as "revolutionary" is not relevant for assessing distinctiveness. What (case) law requires is that a 3D sign consisting of the shape of a product diverges significantly from the norms or customs of the concerned sector.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as the attractiveness of the shape is concerned, this may be taken into account among other things, in that it can serve to prove that such shape does indeed diverge significantly from the norms or customs of the concerned sector because it produces an objective and unusual visual effect in the eyes of the relevant public.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The General Court then reviewed the part of the (contradictory, according to the Court) Board's decision relating to the “norms and customs of the sector”: sure, said the Court, cylindrical shapes might be the most common ones, but they are not the only ones. It follows that the norms and customs of the sector cannot be reduced to what is statistically most widespread, but must instead include all the shapes that the consumer is accustomed to see on the market. All this said, the fact that a certain sector is characterized by the presence of different shapes does not mean that a new possible shape should be regarded as a mere variation thereof.</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6FqH5_yYFmAVoB5Lm5jwpGa03k2F5nwKsnO21jJdpUUNd-ZkpqJscvJeBUnJikzXg8e-B64WLHQA0qvvwkRvyJ1aJASGKf0z9Jv3GqiaYWuiPSOME6EKrV6jelhCsPKmszy1KItW4C_6R/s478/Screenshot+2021-07-14+at+17.56.58.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="392" data-original-width="478" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6FqH5_yYFmAVoB5Lm5jwpGa03k2F5nwKsnO21jJdpUUNd-ZkpqJscvJeBUnJikzXg8e-B64WLHQA0qvvwkRvyJ1aJASGKf0z9Jv3GqiaYWuiPSOME6EKrV6jelhCsPKmszy1KItW4C_6R/s320/Screenshot+2021-07-14+at+17.56.58.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div style="text-align: justify;">Taking into account the images considered by the Board (above), the Court concluded that the applicant’s shape is unusual for a lipstick in that it reminds one of a boat hull or a baby carriage. As such, it differs from any other shape on the market. The relevant public with a level of attention ranging from medium to high will be surprised by Guerlain’s easily memorized shape and will perceive it as significantly deviating from the norms and customs of the lipstick sector. As such, the Board was incorrect in denying that such shape would possess distinctive character.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">If we consider the fashion sector in the past 2-3 years alone, things have been rather gloomy for trade mark applications relating to less conventional signs. For instance: the Court of Justice of the European Union has held Birkenstock's surface pattern mark devoid of distinctiveness (<b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=205668&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1513226">C-26/17 P</a></b>); LVMH has not yet been able to secure registration of its <i>Damier Azur </i>pattern (though things may look up now; <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&td=ALL&num=T-105/19">T-105/19</a></b>); the shape of Moon Boots may be protected by copyright (in Italy) but it has so far been unsuccessful on the trade mark registration front (<b><a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/copla/trademark/data/010168441/download/CLW/APL/2020/EN/20200518_R1093_2019-1.pdf?app=caselaw&casenum=R1093/2019-1&trTypeDoc=NA">1093/2019-1</a>)</b>; and the Buffalo position mark has not been considered registrable yet (<b><a href="https://euipo.europa.eu/copla/trademark/data/017951376/download/CLW/APL/2020/DE/20200525_R2167_2019-1.pdf?app=caselaw&casenum=R2167/2019-1&trTypeDoc=NA">2167/2019-1</a></b>).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Today's decision represents a sensible outcome and brings about some welcome and refreshing news to trade mark applicants seeking to register shape or less conventional marks. Will distinctiveness findings be more <i>en vogue</i> also for these trade mark applications from now on?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 14 July 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-38484187792829238132021-06-24T11:54:00.002+01:002021-06-24T11:54:29.699+01:00CJEU rules on platform liability under copyright law, safe harbours, and injunctions<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Do platforms like YouTube and cyberlocker Uploaded directly perform copyright-restricted acts under Article 3 of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:en:HTML" style="text-align: justify;"><b>InfoSoc Directive</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">? At what conditions is the hosting safe harbour under Article 14(1) of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031">Ecommerce Directive</a> </b><span style="text-align: justify;">available? What may be the requirements for injunctions under Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive?</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhqTnQ87ARo9Oj9ENUSxKZxsXUAQ0lBQaiOS3FBaiLuUj0z9xjKlcktF5KRdvINS-Xr-v8f4U9OtUUUZiD4X5ONehvodMFzBmXvhqrHQRdhrzQXjEh7ceT8UA93jxJsySYNb7fivmO2Uxs0/s1200/youtube.jpeg" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhqTnQ87ARo9Oj9ENUSxKZxsXUAQ0lBQaiOS3FBaiLuUj0z9xjKlcktF5KRdvINS-Xr-v8f4U9OtUUUZiD4X5ONehvodMFzBmXvhqrHQRdhrzQXjEh7ceT8UA93jxJsySYNb7fivmO2Uxs0/s320/youtube.jpeg" width="320" /></a></div>These are some of the questions that the German Federal Court of Justice had referred to the Court of<br />Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in two separate cases, which were subsequently joined: <i>YouTube</i>, C-682/18 and <i>Cyando</i>, C-683/18.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228712&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11351260"><b>Opinion</b></a> of the Advocate General (AG) Øe was issued a little less than a year ago <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-ag-opinion-in-youtubecyando.html">here</a>]</span></b>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This morning, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU delivered <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243241&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3516716"><b>its much-awaited ruling</b></a>. Here are a couple of immediate impressions:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>First, unlike the AG, the CJEU was cautious not to venture into any analysis of the regime under Article 17 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a> </b>vis-à-vis the InfoSoc Directive. Instead, it was adamant that “[t]he interpretations provided by the Court in answer to those questions do not concern the set of rules established by Article 17”;</li><li>Secondly, it diverged from the AG Opinion in relation to some crucial points, including the issue of communication to the public (in respect of which the AG had been much more trenchant than the Court) and safe harbour availability.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Let’s see more in detail how the Court reasoned.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Communication to the public: need for an indispensable and deliberate intervention</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The Grand Chamber began its analysis by reviewing its earlier (and consolidated) case law on Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. It also highlighted the importance of both striking a fair balance between different rights and interest and conducting an individual(ized) assessment which considers several complementary criteria. Such criteria inter alia include a consideration of the indispensable role played by the platform operator and the deliberate nature of its intervention, in a context in which – as it is the case here - the initial uploads of unlawful content are initiated by users of the platform acting autonomously.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While the Court considered it evident that users in such cases do perform acts of communication to the public if their uploads can be accessed by an indeterminate number of persons, whether the same could be stated in relation to the platform operator was less clear.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All this said, the Court considered that, in line with <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&T,F&num=c-610-15"><b><i>Ziggo</i></b></a>, the role of the platform operator in such a case qualifies as indispensable. However, the indispensability of one’s own intervention is not the only criterion to consider. In other wrods: it is necessary but not sufficient. In a situation like the one at hand another key consideration is whether the platform operator acts <i>deliberately</i>, that is with full knowledge of the consequences of such an intervention.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To determine if that is the case, the Court provided a (non-exhaustive and non-cumulative) number of factors for national courts, including the referring court, to consider when making a determination to this effect. It is necessary to consider whether the platform operator:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>Refrains from implementing appropriate technological measures that can be expected from a diligent operator in the specific circumstances at issue to “counter credibly and effectively copyright infringements on that platform”;</li><li>Participates in selecting protected content illegally communicated to the public;</li><li>Provides tools specifically intended for the illegal sharing of protected content or that it knowingly promotes such sharing, which may be attested by the fact that that operator has adopted a financial model that encourages users of its platform illegally to communicate protected content to the public via that platform.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The mere circumstance that a platform operator has abstract knowledge that illegal content may be shared by its users is insufficient, and so is the circumstance that it operates on a for-profit basis. However, in either case, the assessment leads to a different outcome if a rightholder has provided a specific notification and the platform operator has refrained from acting expeditiously to remove or disable access to that content. In relation to the for-profit intention, the Court refused to consider the <b><i><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-160/15">GS Media</a> </i></b>presumption as having general applicability.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As expected, the CJEU did refrain from providing a definite answer as regards the question whether YouTube and/or Uploaded perform directly copyright-restricted acts. However, it appeared inclined to consider that the former might not fall within the scope of application of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive while, depending on the resolution of some factual circumstances that are disputed between the parties to the national proceedings, things might be different for the latter. It will be for the referring court of make a determination in both cases.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><b>Safe harbour availability</b></h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the questions on safe harbours, in line with <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-236/08"><b><i>Google France</i></b></a> and <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-324/09"><b><i>L’Oréal</i></b></a>, the Grand Chamber noted the safe harbours are only available to <i>intermediary</i> service providers. Unlike what the AG stated (as well as some scholars and the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:825:FIN"><b>European Commission</b></a> seem to think), this means that the safe harbours do <i>not</i> apply irrespective of the type of liability at hand: if the referring court, for instance, found the platform operators at issue in the background proceedings directly liable for copyright infringement, these would be automatically disqualified from the hosting safe harbour.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All this said, if a platform took proactive steps to avoid that infringing activities are performed by users of its service, this should not automatically exclude the application of the hosting safe harbour. This conclusion is in line with earlier case law and the approach proposed under the Good Samaritan approach in the draft Digital Services Act (DSA; Article 6).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the notion of ‘actual knowledge’ in Article 14(1)(a) and also considering Article 15 of the Ecommerce Directive, the CJEU found that “the illegality of the activity or information must be a matter of actual knowledge or must be apparent, that is to say, it must be specifically established or readily identifiable”. In this respect and among other things, the circumstance that a platform has implemented an automatic indexing system does not automatically entail that it has also specific knowledge of illegal activities.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Considering the (thorny) issue of content of notices, the Court recalled the principles expressed in <i>L’Oréal</i> and considered that a notice should contain “sufficient information to enable the operator of that platform to satisfy itself, without a detailed legal examination, that that communication is illegal and that removing that content is compatible with freedom of expression”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Injunctions under Article 8(3) and German ‘interferer liability’</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The final issue concerned a question of compatibility of the German ‘interferer liability’ with EU law. In other words: does Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive preclude a situation in which the rightholder is not able to obtain an injunction against an intermediary whose services are used by a third party to infringe the rights of that rightholder unless that infringement has previously been notified to that intermediary and that infringement is repeated?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To this, the Court answered in the negative.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It noted that the InfoSoc Directive itself leaves the conditions for and modalities of injunctions to national legislatures. At the same time, national rules must comply with the InfoSoc Directive itself and the system established in Articles 12 to 15 of the Ecommerce Directive.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRqwquV-Ac7e-dnjjYVxmZ07_wvrW1O1FDGVO4BeKaKl5YmiamB0Z3LwfId3N-c5I4VX1fSszoK2UjKroid63wAXoPOqz5W3Wx96vkNLVYKZ3kIRP5Su6ItOxAq-kCL2u8eUAZSEXIsmiM/s2048/istock_000020293157_small_0.jpeg" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1151" data-original-width="2048" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgRqwquV-Ac7e-dnjjYVxmZ07_wvrW1O1FDGVO4BeKaKl5YmiamB0Z3LwfId3N-c5I4VX1fSszoK2UjKroid63wAXoPOqz5W3Wx96vkNLVYKZ3kIRP5Su6ItOxAq-kCL2u8eUAZSEXIsmiM/s320/istock_000020293157_small_0.jpeg" width="320" /></a></div>At a first sight, today’s judgment appears rather inscrutable, if not altogether sphinx-like. The early reactions I have seen, likely supported by the rather misleading title of the <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7052/"><b>press release</b></a>, have been in the sense that the CJEU has ruled that platforms like YouTube and Uploaded do not communicate to the public under Article 3. In turn, this would mean that Article 17 of the DSM Directive is a novel regime that does not at all ‘clarify’ the law (recital 64 of the DSM Directive), but rather changes it.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This interpretation is, in my view, incorrect.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">First of all, the CJEU considered that, unlike what some commentators thought in the aftermath of <i>Ziggo</i>, it is not just ‘rogue’, piracy-focused platforms that perform copyright-restricted acts. In this sense, the operators of any online platform may be considered eligible to be caught within the application of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, depending on the circumstances at issue and the individual assessment mandated by the Grand Chamber.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, unlike what happened during the hearing and the AG discussed in his Opinion, the Court refrained from engaging with the DSM Directive’s Article 17. However, it follows from the point above that Articles 3 of the InfoSoc Directive and 17 of the DSM Directive are not per se antithetic.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Thirdly, in line with Article 17, the Court concluded – correctly – that if a platform does directly perform copyright-restricted acts, then it is ineligible for the hosting safe harbour.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It is likely that today’s ruling will have far reaching implications, including for the application of Article 17 of the DSM Directive, the Ecommerce Directive and, once adopted, the DSA. It is also likely that AG Øe will engage with it when he delivers his Opinion in the Polish challenge to Article 17 (<a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-401/19"><b>C-401/19</b></a>) next month.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the meantime, The IPKat – alongside IFIM and BLACA – is organizing a rapid response webinar NEXT WEEK to discuss the implication of today’s ruling. You can sign up <a href="https://www.eventbrite.se/e/joint-ipkat-blaca-ifim-rapid-response-event-on-cjeu-youtubecyando-ruling-tickets-154552694269"><b>here</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 22 June 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-77145503872699222412021-06-20T13:53:00.002+01:002021-06-20T13:53:33.229+01:00CJEU rules on seeding, trolls, and interplay between copyright enforcement and data protection rules<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Back in 2019, The IPKat</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/09/new-cjeu-referral-on-right-of.html" style="text-align: justify;"><b>reported</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">on a referral from Belgium –</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><i style="text-align: justify;">Mircom</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, C-597/19 – asking the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to clarify the treatment of (i)</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seeding_(computing)" style="text-align: justify;"><b>seeding</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">under the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:en:HTML" style="text-align: justify;"><b>InfoSoc Directive</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">and (ii) ‘trolls’ under the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R(01)&from=EN" style="text-align: justify;"><b>Enforcement Directive</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">, as well as the interplay between copyright enforcement and data protection law (</span><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN" style="text-align: justify;"><b>GDPR</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">).</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Earlier this week, the Court issued its <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243102&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2687613"><b>ruling</b></a>, substantially endorsing the earlier <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=235730&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2687613">Opinion</a> </b>of Advocate General (AG) Szpunar.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiAA4pYVWXayxf-VCrFrXuWjmwmXEqrJJ5QwzlYI5lQl3mQtNdYLqD-Z2_94hsGGWnM5vsBymX359nYHopSKt11_ypLuCmg0x7baLvAepl-2bZ_RZoGxtSUIOf20_XpbuD7JwawE69YTgAW/s740/Screenshot+2021-06-20+at+13.25.59.png" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="388" data-original-width="740" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiAA4pYVWXayxf-VCrFrXuWjmwmXEqrJJ5QwzlYI5lQl3mQtNdYLqD-Z2_94hsGGWnM5vsBymX359nYHopSKt11_ypLuCmg0x7baLvAepl-2bZ_RZoGxtSUIOf20_XpbuD7JwawE69YTgAW/s320/Screenshot+2021-06-20+at+13.25.59.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Also Bluebell received a worrying<br />request for damages in connection<br />with some suspicious online activities ...</i></td></tr></tbody></table>Mircom is a Cypriot company holding rights (as an assignee) to several pornographic films. It is seeking an order from the Antwerp Companies Court against Belgian ISP Telenet that would allow it to identify the latter’s customers whose internet connections have been used to share illegal copies of Mircom’s films through seeding. Via other companies, Mircom has collected thousands of dynamic IP addresses used to infringe its rights. Supported by two other Belgian ISPs, Telenet is opposing Mircom’s action.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Belgian court was uncertain as regards the points below and thus decided to refer the case to the CJEU for guidance:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>First, is it an act of communication/making available to the public under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive to download pieces (unusable in themselves) of a digital file containing protected content while simultaneously making them available for automatic uploading and downloading by others?</li><li>Secondly, do the provisions of the Enforcement Directive apply to someone which does not exploit the rights in protected materials, but merely claim damages from alleged infringers? In other words: can a ‘copyright troll’ like Mircom be entitled to protection?</li><li>Thirdly, is the collection of IP addresses made on behalf of Mircom compatible with Article 6(1)(f) GDPR?</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The judgment</h3><h4 style="text-align: justify;">No <i>de minimis </i>threshold to the application of the right of communication to the public</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">In relation to the first question, the CJEU endorsed the considerations that AG Szpunar had undertaken in his Opinion, also reasoning by analogy with how the World Wide Web functions: the pieces that are downloaded and re-uploaded are not of the films themselves; instead, they are pieces of the files containing the films. The circumstance that such pieces are unusable per se is irrelevant, considering that what is made available is the file containing the protected content. Indeed, users have ultimately access to the complete file containing the film.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">From the above it follows that there is no minimum threshold to the number of pieces downloaded (and automatically re-uploaded) by individual users: what matters is whether protected content has been made available in such a way that the persons comprising that public may access it, from wherever and whenever they individually choose, irrespective of whether or not they avail themselves of that opportunity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In the present case, if the users have consented to the automatic re-uploading of the pieces that they download, it should be considered that they act in full knowledge of the consequences of their actions and, as a result, perform acts restricted by Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. It is not required that users manually initiate the re-uploading: what matters is that they have consented to the use of the relevant software after receiving information regarding its characteristics.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">Copyright trolls might be entitled to the measures, procedures and remedies under the Enforcement Directive</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the second question, the CJEU intended it as encompassing:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ol><li>The legal standing of a subject like Mircom;</li><li>Whether such a subject may have suffered a prejudice within the meaning of Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive; and</li><li>Whether it is entitled to exercise the right of information under Article 8 of that directive.</li></ol></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As regards 1., the CJEU inter alia noted that the Enforcement Directive does not require IPR holders to actually use their rights to be eligible for the application of its rules.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to 2., the referring court had considered that an IPR holder that does not use its rights is unlikely to suffer prejudice within the meaning of Article 13. To this the CJEU responded by noting that the simple circumstance that Mircom brings actions for damages as an assignee of rights/claims for damages does not rule out protection under the Enforcement Directive. Holding otherwise would run contrary to the Enforcement Directive’s objective to guarantee a high level of protection and undermine the attractiveness of outsourcing the recovery of damages to a specialized undertaking.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgzavGbCcfaYCu6amR8XEv0lrdGV5-OmfCAY0pxKU2nlAj3bJj-Hqbhpwui-YTNRpJGVwhBN_UpvDgXywjPesOmbJYnX1v2v_rPDfT9qOLgdzvoZ3z_o3NcrPC9v7K-TVxrnYXAPhuWR8Ld/s320/6340bc5ce9531f204f3e3cbe5994309b.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="320" data-original-width="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgzavGbCcfaYCu6amR8XEv0lrdGV5-OmfCAY0pxKU2nlAj3bJj-Hqbhpwui-YTNRpJGVwhBN_UpvDgXywjPesOmbJYnX1v2v_rPDfT9qOLgdzvoZ3z_o3NcrPC9v7K-TVxrnYXAPhuWR8Ld/s0/6340bc5ce9531f204f3e3cbe5994309b.jpeg" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Kat troll</i></td></tr></tbody></table>Moving on to 3., the CJEU noted that the right of information under Article 8 is an expression of the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT"><b>EU Charter</b></a>. A request for information during a pre-litigation phase is not per se inadmissible, insofar as it is also justified and proportionate. Unlike, eg, Article 13, that provision is aimed at infringements committed on a commercial scale, not the fight against individual infringers. In the present case, Mircom’s right of information is being exercised against Telenet which, according to the CJEU, provides on a commercial scale services used in infringing activities.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">All this said, the overarching limits within Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive must be complied with. This inter alia means (at [94]) that</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by that directive, including the right of information referred to in Article 8, are fair and equitable and applied in such a way as to provide for safeguards against their abuse.</blockquote></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU noted that this is an assessment for the national court to undertake.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: justify;">When copyright enforcement meets data protection</h4><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU highlighted that, in a case like that one at issue, there are two different types of personal data processing: one taking place upstream and relating to the systematic recording of IP addresses (they qualify as personal data in accordance with <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=184668&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2725655"><b><i>Breyer</i></b></a>) and one taking place downstream and concerning the matching of such addressees to Telenet users and their disclosure to Mircom. The issue here was essentially whether Article 6(1)(f) precludes both or either processing.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">That GDPR provision lays down 3 cumulative conditions for the processing of personal data:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ol><li>First, the pursuit of a legitimate interest by the data controller or by a third party;</li><li>Secondly, the need to process personal data for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued; and</li><li>Thirdly, that the interests or freedoms and fundamental rights of the person concerned by the data protection do not take precedence.</li></ol></div><div style="text-align: justify;">With regard to 1., the Court noted that the retrieval of personal information of a subject who has damaged one’s own property may qualify as a legitimate interest. Turning to 2., identification of the owner of the connection is often only possible on the basis of the IP address and information provided by the ISP. Finally, in relation to 3., the mechanisms allowing the different rights and interests to be balanced are contained in the GDPR itself. The Court referred extensively to its <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=232084&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2727862"><b><i>La Quadrature du Net</i></b></a> ruling and the need to comply with the provisions that embody users’ fundamental right to respect for private life and protection of personal data.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, the CJEU ruled that Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, read in conjunction with Article 15(1) of <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02002L0058-20091219">Directive 2002/58</a></b>, does not preclude either the upstream or downstream data processing requests, insofar they are justified, proportionate and not abusive and have their legal basis in a national legislative measure, within the meaning of Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, which limits the scope of the rules laid down in Articles 5 and 6 of that directive.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The ruling is important for and offers guidance in relation to three broader points.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as the right of communication to the public is concerned, the CJEU correctly endorsed AG Szpunar’s analysis. On a more general level, the judgment confirms a basic tenet: Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive is about making copyright works and protected content <i>available</i> to the public. The focus should be, first of all, on assessing whether that is the case, rather than how such making available is done. As AG Szpunar reasoned by analogy with the functioning of the World Wide Web (at [49]),</div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The work as an object that is perceptible to humans exists on the web only from the point at which a client computer accesses the server in question, reproduces the file and displays that work on the screen (or reproduces its sounds). However, merely placing the file containing the work on a server which can be accessed using the World Wide Web is sufficient for there to be an act of communication (making available) … The right to make works available to the public was conceived precisely for the use of works on the internet, in the first place on the World Wide Web.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">In any case, and even if this was not part of the referral, users who download illegal content from the internet would be also performing acts of reproduction and be ineligible for the application of the private copying exception in Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive, in accordance with <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-435/12"><b><i>ACI Adam</i></b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to the Enforcement Directive, the judgment – again correctly – does not premise the availability of protection upon the actual use of one’s own rights. This is also consistent with the principle, which however the Court did not expressly refer to, of copyright’s economic rights as being preventive in nature. All this said, the Court also reinstated the requirement of compliance with the overarching principles and limits found in Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive. <i>In practice</i>, this means that trolls of various types, including copyright ones, might be unable to invoke successfully protection under the Directive and its national transpositions.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, the ruling offers some concrete guidance on how to balance copyright/IPR enforcement and data protection rules. This may be also useful when applying the provisions of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a></b>, including Article 17(9). Article 28 expressly requires any processing of personal data to be carried out in compliance with Directive 2002/58 and the GDPR.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><span style="color: red;"><i>[Originally published on The IPKat on 20 June 2021]</i></span></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-85498733787307915462021-06-04T18:55:00.002+01:002021-06-04T18:55:41.950+01:00Commission unveils Article 17 Guidance: 3 highlights<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Today, after several months of waiting and with the deadline for the national transposition of the</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> being just a weekend away (it will be on Monday, 7 June), the European Commission has issued its</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/guidance-article-17-directive-2019790-copyright-digital-single-market" style="text-align: justify;"><b>Guidance on the application of Article 17</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">. </span></p><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Here are 3 key highlights:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Article 17 not a <i>sui generis</i> right of communication to the public</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwsmUCMFutsOUXpzcp9YRuorTrKXrYhDDDlTLOl71wgyQFn5dNBSECReZMbJuXnFeh4539R9y8UZxQX_eeydyhuDk64GcijPBWY4s7fDZL2NoipecVdi8MZ_MJ6Sr2CS6qOYmyzm-LRsCg/s1280/maxresdefault.jpeg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1280" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhwsmUCMFutsOUXpzcp9YRuorTrKXrYhDDDlTLOl71wgyQFn5dNBSECReZMbJuXnFeh4539R9y8UZxQX_eeydyhuDk64GcijPBWY4s7fDZL2NoipecVdi8MZ_MJ6Sr2CS6qOYmyzm-LRsCg/s320/maxresdefault.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>An actual </i><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUFjIT8N38Y&ab_channel=GettyImagesTV"><b>sui generis<i> Kat</i></b></a></td></tr></tbody></table>First, the Guidance takes a different view from the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/directive-copyright-digital-single-market-commission-seeks-views-participants-stakeholder"><b>one</b></a> provisionally expressed in September 2020.<br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">It states that Article 17 is <i>lex specialis </i>to the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029"><b>InfoSoc Directive</b></a>, but also that the provision does not create a special/<i>sui generis</i> right of communication to the public compared to the one already contained in Article 3 of the latter:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Article 17 does not affect the concept of communication to the public or of making content available to the public elsewhere under Union law, nor does it affect the possible application of Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC to other service providers using copyright-protected content.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">As readers know, the nature of the Article 17 right of communication to the public has been a long-discussed issue, and has also featured prominently in some national transposition debates, notably the German one.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">I have already expressed my view that characterizing Article 17 as a special/<i>sui generis</i> right of communication to the public is incorrect: see <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-legal-nature-of-article-17-of.html"><b>here</b></a> and <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/02/five-considerations-for-transposition.html"><b>here</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any event, we may expect to hear more about this issue when, in a few weeks (on 22 June), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issues its judgment in <i>YouTube</i>, C-682/18 and <i>Cyando</i>, C-683/18. In his <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228712&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4871844"><b>Opinion</b></a> last year <b>[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-ag-opinion-in-youtubecyando.html">here</a>]</b>, Advocate General Øe opined that platforms like YouTube and Uploaded could be liable under Article 17 lacking a licence, but the same would not be true under the InfoSoc Directive alone.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The structure of Article 17 is inflexible!</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDDHjl_l6VklHT6hufAhNmwnHMW4BRl4TPLBBtp9rlIQdkhhhGXmSR6TpVwBjelKHpfaIccIXhQznz1gQopbbIFjrWOs3my1ZTF0SbiXkBUUrL07XGx6I0dQaKyV8-6Bl9dY4QztZe_4Ca/s728/b72f4d55828ed3c23db5894095.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="721" data-original-width="728" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDDHjl_l6VklHT6hufAhNmwnHMW4BRl4TPLBBtp9rlIQdkhhhGXmSR6TpVwBjelKHpfaIccIXhQznz1gQopbbIFjrWOs3my1ZTF0SbiXkBUUrL07XGx6I0dQaKyV8-6Bl9dY4QztZe_4Ca/s320/b72f4d55828ed3c23db5894095.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Flexible Kat</i></td></tr></tbody></table>The second major point is in line with CJEU copyright case law over the past several years: unless a directive leaves it to Member States to fine-tune the content of a provision, Member States are not allowed to alter the scope thereof.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The same goes for Article 17 too.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Commission Guidance confirms that Member States: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ol><li>cannot alter the notion of ‘online content sharing service provider’ (OCSSP), </li><li>the concept of ‘best efforts’ is an autonomous concept of EU law, which must be applied uniformly across the EU, and </li><li>Member States cannot set quantitative thresholds in connection with ‘large amount’ in the definition of OCSSP.</li></ol></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The latter is a key point: in practice, it means that Member States cannot introduce <i>de minimis</i> statutory exemptions to the application of Article 17. It is for national courts, not legislatures, to determine whether the amount of content in question is to be regarded as ‘large’ or not, based on all circumstances at issue.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Again, this is something that featured in the German Article 17 transposition debate, but is also relevant to the transposition of other provisions in the DSM Directive. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">For instance, Italy is preparing to transpose Article 15 (the press publishers’ right): the <a href="https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2021;53"><b>relevant delegation law</b></a> mandates to define the notion of ‘very short extracts’ (Article 9(1)(i)). In light of the (correct) interpretation provided by the Commission, such an approach would be both inappropriate and contrary to EU law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><i>Ex ante</i>/<i>ex post</i> blocking</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to user uploads, Article 17(7) does not expressly state that ‘legitimate uses’ – by that meaning uses that qualify for the application of an exception or limitation, but also uses that are not infringing because, e.g., undertaken in relation to public domain materials – should be allowed <i>ex ante</i>, rather than just <i>ex post</i> by relying on the redress and complaint mechanism.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">While the draft Guidelines spoke of only 'likely infringing uploads' to be blocked <i>ex ante</i>, the Commission Guidance recommends limiting automated <i>ex ante</i> blocking of content identified by rightholders to ‘manifestly infringing uploads’, by that meaning - for instance - exact or merely technically altered matches of entire works or significant proportions thereof.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><i>Vice versa</i>, uploads which are not manifestly infringing should in principle be allowed and may be subject to an <i>ex post</i> human review when rightholders oppose by sending a notice. Such uploads may include short extracts of a longer work or transformative uses of a work or part thereof.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">What is the legal value of the Commission Guidance?</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">In all this, one may wonder what the legal status of today's Communication is. Well, the Guidance is not binding on the CJEU since it is non-binding or ‘soft law’. The Court has the authority - in accordance with Article 267 TFEU - to give preliminary rulings concerning the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the European Union. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as national authorities and courts are concerned, however, these shall take the Commission’s guidance into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them, because of the indirect effect that non-binding law has. This said, in accordance with settled case law, the Commission’s Article 17 Guidelines cannot be regarded as conferring rights on individuals, which the latter may rely upon before such courts and authorities. As a result, the Guidance shall not be enforceable per se before national courts and authorities, though it may form the object of a request for a preliminary ruling</div><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Although Article 17(10) does not specify whether the Commission’s guidance on the application of Article 17 should be updated or only issued <i>una tantum</i>, the former appears preferable as an interpretation, also considering the rationale of the stakeholder dialogue, the continuously changing state of the art, and the review obligation on the Commission, The Commission Guidance itself acknowledges it, albeit in specific connection with the outcome of the pending CJEU decision in the <b><a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-401/19">Polish challenge</a></b> to Article 17. AG Øe’s Opinion in this case is due on 15 July. So ... stay tuned!</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 4 June 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-28694734652786567312021-05-08T13:22:00.000+01:002021-05-08T13:22:46.654+01:00Can Amazon be directly liable for trade mark infringement? A new CJEU referral<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Is it a trade mark infringement to, e.g., advertise, offer, stock and ship goods carrying a sign identical or</span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">similar to a registered sign? The answer is not a difficult one to provide: Articles 10 <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015L2436&from=EN">TMD</a> </b>and 9 <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017R1001&from=EN"><b>EUTMR</b></a> clearly indicate that these activities amount to <i>prima facie</i> infringement.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Things, however, get more complicated when the same question is asked with reference to an online marketplace, e.g., Amazon. Can such a platform be regarded as playing an active role and be directly liable for trade mark infringement if what is being promoted, sold, stocked and shipped through it is a counterfeit item?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIRqxCfvWlukz5y6SXQTlelmeHV0Kz5w_3RNwRnJyHKDuXUS8dqOJ_PqU6B8sNBOxf_gK3fbr8poaw6dksHoZGMNecpDFmFwNzp2ey0hM6YhH3VYcfVzKF1BLrdBBqvbZ6aE3Uz3M9Uz3X/s1197/Christian-Louboutin.jpeg" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1197" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiIRqxCfvWlukz5y6SXQTlelmeHV0Kz5w_3RNwRnJyHKDuXUS8dqOJ_PqU6B8sNBOxf_gK3fbr8poaw6dksHoZGMNecpDFmFwNzp2ey0hM6YhH3VYcfVzKF1BLrdBBqvbZ6aE3Uz3M9Uz3X/w400-h225/Christian-Louboutin.jpeg" width="400" /></a></div>This, in a nutshell, is the key issue at the heart of the very interesting referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in <a href="https://ipcuria.eu/case?reference=C-148/21"><b><i>Louboutin</i>, C-148/21</b></a> (there is also another trade mark case concerning Louboutin, <a href="https://ipcuria.eu/case?reference=C-184/21"><b>C-184/21</b></a>, but the relevant questions are not yet available). This referral from Belgium was made in the context of proceedings that the famous red sole trade mark owner had initiated against Amazon over third-party listings of counterfeit shoes on the latter’s platform and their stocking and delivery by Amazon through its <a href="https://sell.amazon.com/fulfillment-by-amazon.html"><b>Fulfilment by Amazon</b></a> (FBA) programme.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The referral is important for two main reasons:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>First, because national litigation has given contrasting answers to the question of whether an online marketplace may bear direct liability for trade mark infringement in relation to third-party listings;</li><li>Secondly, because so far the CJEU has not explicitly gone as far as holding that the operators of an online platform may be directly liable for trade mark infringement together with users of its services. The situation, in this respect, appears different from copyright, where the direct liability of platform operators for copyright infringing-activities has been established, first, by the CJEU in its <b><i><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&T,F&num=c-610-15">Pirate Bay</a> </i></b>decision <b><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=ziggo">here</a>] </span></b>and is now ‘codified’ (but, on this, we’ll know more when the CJEU releases its <i>YouTube/Cyando</i> judgment next month; on the AG Opinion, see <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-ag-opinion-in-youtubecyando.html">here</a></b>) in Article 17 of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj"><b>DSM Directive</b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=value+gap">here</a>]</span></b>.</li></ul></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><br /></h3><h3 style="text-align: justify;">National litigation: again … Louboutin</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Back in 2019, The IPKat <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/08/brussels-court-grants-louboutin.html"><b>reported</b></a> on what looked like a ground-breaking <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=2ahUKEwj7jdb_n6XkAhXC6aQKHY28DQEQFjAEegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ie-forum.be%2Fdocuments%2Fecli%2F5d551adc-d2f4-43e5-8b06-2d65c35ff8c2.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2Qmup1lXjvv6vMm84MT-tK"><b>decision</b></a> issued in Belgium in the context of separate proceedings from those at the basis of the present referral. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">A Brussels first instance court ruled that Amazon was directly liable for the infringement of the trade mark rights in Louboutin’s red sole mark (also at the centre of the CJEU referral in <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-163/16"><b>C-163/16</b></a>; <b><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=c-163%2F16">here</a>]</span></b>). Specifically, the court considered that use of the mark in third-party ads displayed on Amazon’s marketplace relating to counterfeit goods and the subsequent shipment of such items by Amazon through its own FBA programme constituted direct infringement by the platform itself.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The decision was partly reversed on appeal last year (Court of Appeal of Brussels (9th Chamber), <i>Amazon Europe Core sàrl, Amazon EU sàrl and Amazon Services Europe sàrl v Mr. C. Louboutin</i>, 25 June 2020, published in Ing. Cons. 2020/2, p. 509).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Brussels Court of Appeal ruled that Amazon was not liable for third-party ads, though it would be for ads relating to its own products. In relation to Amazon’s stocking and shipping programme, the court applied the teachings of the CJEU in a number of cases – including the then most recent judgment: <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-567/18"><b><i>Coty</i></b></a> (also concerning FBA) – and ruled out any direct liability of the platform.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The (non-)liability of online marketplaces (yet)</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">In the already mentioned <i>Coty</i> judgment, the CJEU limited itself to answering – in the negative – the question referred by Germany’s Federal Court of Justice:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>Does a person who, on behalf of a third party, stores goods which infringe trade mark rights, without having knowledge of that infringement, stock those goods for the purpose of offering them or putting them on the market, if it is not that person himself but rather the third party alone which intends to offer the goods or put them on the market?</blockquote></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In that case, what is (way) more interesting than the ruling is the <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=221117&pageIndex=0&doclang=IT&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5894444"><b>Opinion</b></a> of Advocate General (AG) Campos <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/12/ag-campos-advises-cjeu-to-rule-that.html">here</a>]</span></b>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG considered that, if a platform actively contributes to the distribution of infringing goods, then it should be concluded that such platform (at least) stocks those goods within the meaning of Article 9(3)(b) EUTMR. In this respect, it would be irrelevant whether the platform has knowledge of or awareness of the infringing nature of the goods sold by its users, as long as it could be reasonably expected from it to act to detect the infringing activity.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_xvO6uAn9QoeQ5YaQJakFNpdfL4xAId6tmw9pzw8PTs7gH33LVHh3FYLdT5tlDKXI2gTwtY5Filfg1QXtssEejWbfUClma9A1CEGiHTosPfW0EjVv8L4atW1XA1coA2DTcH-YKrT9yRvO/s409/unnamed.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="293" data-original-width="409" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_xvO6uAn9QoeQ5YaQJakFNpdfL4xAId6tmw9pzw8PTs7gH33LVHh3FYLdT5tlDKXI2gTwtY5Filfg1QXtssEejWbfUClma9A1CEGiHTosPfW0EjVv8L4atW1XA1coA2DTcH-YKrT9yRvO/s320/unnamed.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The IPKat's <a href="http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/columns/sophie-warburton/TMG8884626/Blake-Lively-and-SJP-go-wild-for-Louboutins-Alex-shoes.html"><b>favourite Louboutin model</b></a></i></td></tr></tbody></table>The AG lamented the lack of information regarding the relevant factual scenario in the background proceedings: in a context like the one <i>described</i> by the referring court, Amazon would not stock goods for sale within the meaning of Article 9(3)(b) EUTMR. However, based on the parties’ observations and the hearing, it might be that FBA is actually more complex than how the referring court indicated: the model could actually be that of an ‘integrated store’ in which Amazon plays an active role in the selling process. The corollary would be that Amazon has an absolute control over said process.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Within FBA, the companies which are part of the Amazon group do not just stock and transport the goods in a neutral fashion: rather, they undertake a much broader range of activities. These include the preparation of the goods for delivery and their delivery, advertising and promotional activities, information to customers, and the refund of the price of faulty goods. Amazon also receives payment for the goods sold, which it then transfers to the seller’s bank account.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The AG concluded that in such a context Amazon would be playing an active role and be directly liable for infringing activities, having satisfied the requirements under the proviso. Importantly (and correctly), the AG also noted that, in the event that Amazon was found directly liable for trade mark infringement under that provision, the hosting safe harbour in Article 14 of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0031"><b>E-commerce Directive</b></a> would not apply. This is nothing new, pointed out the AG: it was clarified by the CJEU as early as in <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-324/09"><i><b>L’Oréal</b></i></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Final remarks</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Considering the discussion above, the new CJEU <i>Louboutin</i> referral is one to watch attentively. The resulting judgment may help shed further light on the (thorny) question of how far the degree of sophistication of the services provided to sellers by an online marketplace can go without amounting to own infringing activities of the platform.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Even if no specific question is asked on this point, it would be also a welcome clarification on the side of the CJEU to address whether a platform that does directly undertake trade mark-restricted acts may remain nonetheless eligible for the hosting safe harbour. This is particularly important, also considering the ongoing discussion around the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608117147218&uri=COM%3A2020%3A825%3AFIN"><b>proposed DSA</b></a>, which has been also presented as a 'crystallization' of CJEU case law: on the one hand, the Proposal refers the safe harbour protection to “any type of liability” (recital 17); on the other hand, it excludes the applicability thereof to “any service that is not an intermediary service” (Article 1(4)). How to reconcile these two? Can a platform perform restricted acts itself and be still regarded as an intermediary (a host service)?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Readers interested in providing comments on the <i>Louboutin</i> case to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/references-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union/references-to-the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-2021"><b>UK Intellectual Property Office</b></a>, can email <a href="mailto:policy@ipo.gov.uk"><b>policy@ipo.gov.uk</b></a> by 18 May 2021.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 8 May 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-56045251227561600192021-03-16T10:02:00.004+00:002021-03-16T19:36:09.197+00:00Linking after VG Bild-Kunst ... in a table<p> <span style="text-align: justify;">A week ago, The IPKat</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/03/cjeu-rules-that-linking-can-be.html">reported and commented</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">on the important</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=238661&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4182944">decision</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><span style="text-align: justify;">of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in</span><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><i style="text-align: justify;">VG Bild-Kunst</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, C-392/19. </span></p><p style="text-align: justify;">In that judgment, the CJEU admitted the possibility for rightholders to restrict linking <u><i>by contract</i></u>, provided that any such restrictions are imposed and/or implemented through the adoption of effective technological measures, in accordance with Article 6(1) and (3) of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029">InfoSoc Directive</a></b>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">According to the CJEU, this requirement - which, as I wrote, might raise questions of compatibility with the no formalities rule in the <b><a href="https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/">Berne Convention</a></b> - is prompted by the need to "ensure legal certainty and the smooth functioning of the internet".</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Readers may be aware that, over the past few years, I have developed IP and study aid materials (they can all be accessed <b><a href="http://www.elawnora.com/ip-materials">here</a></b>) primarily aimed at my students. Among them, there was a table - first published on The IPKat <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2016/09/linking-after-gs-media-in-table.html">here</a></b> - summarising the treatment of linking after the seminal CJEU decision in <i><b><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-160/15">GS Media</a></b></i> <span style="color: red; font-weight: bold;">[Katposts <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=gs+media">here</a>]</span>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I have now updated that table so to include the findings in <i>VG Bild-Kunst</i>. To this end, I have added a column on contractual restrictions on linking. The table is obviously a <i>simplified</i> summary of CJEU decisions on linking, but hopefully will serve to give an introductory and easily understandable picture of what the law on linking is under EU copyright.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The new table, which is licensed under a CC-BY-NC Creative Commons licence, can be downloaded from <b><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bTanqOzKar0sA0Cn4FCFWsIMLl2Ag6UV/view?usp=sharing">here</a></b> and is also reproduced below.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">I hope that readers will find it useful. </p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhO4qbFk7nQMIniRFwPIH1RPsp2ALOdEadVHtoCMJyLuqFSpdUkGWS9UCmaNV8-NW3JnQQnfsyfDDcEgKsasCklrJmwocUguYn0ouVcGY-XmsfYCrAQE7qZh_C0vJ0IvKQJw4Ezas9_onoE/s1136/Screenshot+2021-03-16+at+10.39.41.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="623" data-original-width="1136" height="351" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhO4qbFk7nQMIniRFwPIH1RPsp2ALOdEadVHtoCMJyLuqFSpdUkGWS9UCmaNV8-NW3JnQQnfsyfDDcEgKsasCklrJmwocUguYn0ouVcGY-XmsfYCrAQE7qZh_C0vJ0IvKQJw4Ezas9_onoE/w640-h351/Screenshot+2021-03-16+at+10.39.41.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: justify;"><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 16 March 2021] </span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-50493757104250832982021-03-11T16:54:00.000+00:002021-03-11T16:54:52.274+00:00Jeff Koons loses (again) in France: his Fait d'Hiver found to infringe copyright in Franck Davidovici's own Fait d'Hiver<p> A little over a year ago, The IPKat <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/12/paris-court-of-appeal-confirms-that.html">reported</a> </b>on the then fresh decision of the Paris Court of Appeal, which had upheld the decision at first instance in a copyright infringement case originally brought by the estate of photographer <b><a href="http://jfbauret.free.fr/jf.html">Jean-François Bauret</a></b> against the well-known (also to copyright litigators) US artist <b><a href="http://www.jeffkoons.com/">Jeff Koons</a></b> and the <b><a href="https://www.centrepompidou.fr/en/">Centre Pompidou</a></b>.</p><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;">The news has reached this blog that </span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/124B_7GtlyAiYq8vhp70l2dmWDbkfmK-7/view?usp=sharing" style="text-align: justify;"><b>another copyright decision</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> has recently been rendered against Koons.</span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><h3><span style="text-align: justify;">Background</span></h3><div><span style="text-align: justify;">The case is once again one of copyright infringement. It was originally brought by artist and photographer Franck Davidovici and concerned the alleged reproduction of his work </span><i style="text-align: justify;">Fait d’Hiver</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, which he realized as a freelance artist for a 1984 Naf Naf advertisement, in Koons’s 1988 porcelain work, also titled </span><i style="text-align: justify;">Fait d'Hiver</i><span style="text-align: justify;">.</span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgL_zJpVn7pXFNHZRBLZ4M__vfkM79dixsVgRCnSYy2HP8OuXcneNn4U2I9UaJ1DU01Svp-mps1xaycp3e11fCOZRuoxF04PpivV9dZHZOuL9yp0VgKlakJt2xsYwYb24YwAi6D6HU1yjoG/s1200/pub_naf_naf-.jpeg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="675" data-original-width="1200" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgL_zJpVn7pXFNHZRBLZ4M__vfkM79dixsVgRCnSYy2HP8OuXcneNn4U2I9UaJ1DU01Svp-mps1xaycp3e11fCOZRuoxF04PpivV9dZHZOuL9yp0VgKlakJt2xsYwYb24YwAi6D6HU1yjoG/w400-h225/pub_naf_naf-.jpeg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Davidovici's </i>Fait d'Hiver</td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjE5ri7UovrOiavb978x7GJMLHkzc79u71yPy-neYfhAFXqlc7w7ONYWl1ikwkt8xhdUczpfOC39skMKBgQAp34hjCMFQc19rUVKAxNr2QxgS31wZTO4Z-I0R9HVFtCnhTdvYUjZ4PfGpBd/s786/jeff_skulp-5-984412600-1542364636601.jpeg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="527" data-original-width="786" height="269" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjE5ri7UovrOiavb978x7GJMLHkzc79u71yPy-neYfhAFXqlc7w7ONYWl1ikwkt8xhdUczpfOC39skMKBgQAp34hjCMFQc19rUVKAxNr2QxgS31wZTO4Z-I0R9HVFtCnhTdvYUjZ4PfGpBd/w400-h269/jeff_skulp-5-984412600-1542364636601.jpeg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Koons's </i>Fait d'Hiver</td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;">Koons’s work, which is part of the </span><b style="text-align: justify;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banality_(sculpture_series)"><i>Banality</i> series</a></b><span style="text-align: justify;"> (one which copyright lawyers are well acquainted with) had been <i>inter alia </i>on display at the Centre Pompidou in Paris in 2014.</span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;">Davidovici’s action was directed at Koons, the Centre Pompidou, the <b><a href="http://www.fondazioneprada.org/?lang=en">Fondazione Prada</a></b> (this owns the artwork) and <b><a href="https://editions.flammarion.com/">Flammarion</a></b> (publisher of a book reproducing the sculpture).</span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;">At first instance, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris sided with the claimant, and rejected Koons’s argument that his work would be protected as a parody of Davidovici’s photograph.</span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="text-align: justify;">Following an appeal, last month, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld (</span><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/124B_7GtlyAiYq8vhp70l2dmWDbkfmK-7/view?usp=sharing" style="text-align: justify;"><b>decision 34/2021</b></a><span style="text-align: justify;">) the decision at first instance and found Koons liable of copyright infringement.</span></div><div><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Applicable law</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Koons had argued that US law, not French law, would be applicable to the dispute at hand by means of Article 8(1) of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32007R0864">Rome II Regulation</a></b>. This would be so because: (1) his own work had been realized in the US; (2) it had been on display for the first time at the <b><a href="https://whitney.org/?catype=general&catword=whitney%20museum&creativeid=495830236233&gclid=Cj0KCQiAnKeCBhDPARIsAFDTLTKKM-v2ApoBmqep_5R49DEIN7_lOXFUB-kfMLkVd1-g-nlyKKrryIwaAtf3EALw_wcB">Whitney Museum</a></b> in Manhattan; and (3) his internet website jeffkoons.com, it being in English, is primarily intended for the American public.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The court (correctly in my view) rejected this argument, reasoning that the action concerned: (a) the Parisian exhibition of the sculpture; (b) the reproduction thereof in a book jointly published by Flammarion and the Centre Pompidou and sold in France; and (c) the accessibility of Koons’s website from France.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Originality of Davidovici’s photograph</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The court also reviewed the claim that Davidovici’s photograph would lack originality in that it would consist of ideas or clichés (the pig was already present in the NAF NAF brand) or commonplace concepts (eg, the representation of a young woman in a <i>prêt-à-porter</i> advertisement).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The court rejected it and noted that Davidovici had illustrated the ‘free and creative choices’ that he had made when realizing his photograph so that his ‘personal touch’ was visible in the creative result. Such choices did include:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>The representation of a young woman lying down in the snow, whereas such a position is <i>per se</i> uncomfortable due to the feeling of cold that it provides;</li><li>The representation of a pig in the snow: this animal breeding is usually represented in hay, liquid manure or mud;</li><li>The addition of a Saint Bernard keg, which is typically used for dogs of the eponymous breed;</li><li>The specific positions of the body, hands, face and hair of the young woman, as well as her make-up, which evokes in the viewer a feeling of languor or distress;</li><li>The choice of the work’s title, which evokes an accident occurred due to an avalanche;</li><li>The unusual confrontation between an elegant woman and a pig.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As a result, it rejected the appellants’ claim.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><i>Prima facie</i> infringement</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">With a line of argument that was also used in the past, the appellants had submitted that the first instance court had unduly overlooked to consider the differences between Davidovici’s photograph and Koons’s sculpture, including the difference in the message conveyed by them.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The court rejected this argument, noting that – despite the differences between the two works – Koons’s work had incorporated original elements of Davidovici’s photograph, as identified above.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As such, it amounted to a reproduction in part of Davidovici’s photograph, in accordance with Article L 122-4 <b><a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/id/LEGITEXT000006069414/">CPI</a></b>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Parody and freedom of artistic expression</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">As it was also done in the <i>Bauret</i> case, Koons and his co-defendants had argued that no infringement could be established, due to the applicability of the parody defence under Article L 122-5 CPI and the need to safeguard freedom of artistic expression pursuant to Article 10 <b><a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf">ECHR</a></b> (one wonders: was quotation considered at all as a possible defence?).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As it happened in the past, the court rejected these arguments.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Starting with parody, the court referred to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in <b><i><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-201/13">Deckmyn</a></i></b> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/search/max-results=7?q=deckmyn">here</a>]</span></b>. Assuming that Koons’s work could be regarded as an “expression of humour or mockery” (which, according to the court, was not a given), it failed in any case to satisfy the second prong of the <i>Deckmyn</i> test, that is the requirement to “evoke an existing work while being noticeably different from it”.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to freedom of expression, the court recalled that such freedom is not absolute (see Article 10(2) ECHR) and that it must be balanced against third-party rights, including copyright, in accordance with Article 27 of the <b><a href="https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a></b>. In the present case, freedom of expression was restricted by Article L 122-4 CPI. According to the court, such restriction was proportionate and necessary.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ2WmkkXZlDrXAnZZMzT4GDyDeIu7E8wUJu9kmBOdi4-nTFIC9fe9t239KDcYhnAuoLiYEsE5BtHkPDRo5FxydFOHefZpG3yFYwr6rh2BiSNld-I9wB95G1ZmZj_ErFs2y5oTIqc3w01SO/s225/download.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="225" data-original-width="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZ2WmkkXZlDrXAnZZMzT4GDyDeIu7E8wUJu9kmBOdi4-nTFIC9fe9t239KDcYhnAuoLiYEsE5BtHkPDRo5FxydFOHefZpG3yFYwr6rh2BiSNld-I9wB95G1ZmZj_ErFs2y5oTIqc3w01SO/s0/download.jpeg" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The IPKat's own </i>Fait d'Hiver</td></tr></tbody></table>The reasoning of the Paris Court of Appeal is very similar to that developed in the <i>Bauret</i> case, also considering the similar factual background and the defensive strategy adopted by Koons and his co-defendants. Koons lost then and lost again now.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Besides the private international law angle, the broader relevance of the decision lies in 3 key aspects.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">First, the standard of infringement. In case there was still any doubt, the test to be applied is the one that the CJEU set forth in <i><b><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=c-5/08">Infopaq</a></b></i> (an infringement case, before being an originality case) <b><span style="color: red;">[Kat-anniversary post <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/07/todays-10-year-anniversary-of-cjeu.html">here</a>]</span></b>: there is reproduction in part of a work when what has been reproduced is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation, the result of free and creative choices and something that displays their personal touch. The French court did not expressly referred to <i>Infopaq</i>, but substantially applied its guidance correctly.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, the requirements for a successful parody defence. The French court referred to <i>Deckmyn</i>, but intended the requirement that evocation is such that the parodist’s work is noticeably different from the parodied work as akin to lack of a risk of confusion. This is incorrect. In his <b><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152656&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4665764">Opinion</a></b> in <i>Deckmyn </i><b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2014/05/breaking-ag-cruz-villalon-says-that.html">here</a>]</span></b>, Advocate General Cruz Villalón had indeed proposed to have a no confusion requirement under Article 5(3)(k) of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:en:HTML">InfoSoc Directive</a></b>. However, the CJEU did not endorse this part of the Opinion. The requirement of evocation and being noticeably different is not about confusion: it’s about the own contribution of the parodist, which must be an expression of humour or mockery (not necessarily of the parodied work).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Thirdly, the fundamental rights angle. The French court was required to reason along the lines of Article 10 ECHR, probably because of the defensive strategy chosen by Koons and his co-defendants. However, it could and probably should have also considered the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT">EU Charter of Fundamental Rights</a></b>. This would have led the court to review the 2019 CJEU Grand Chamber rulings in <i><b><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-469/17">Funke Medien</a></b></i> and <b><i><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-516/17">Spiegel Online</a></i></b> and come to the conclusion that it is not possible to invoke directly the application of the Charter rights outside the system of EU copyright exceptions and limitations.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 11 March 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-79940815931604099512021-03-09T12:52:00.006+00:002021-03-09T17:08:18.744+00:00CJEU rules that linking can be restricted by contract, though only by using effective technological measures <p> <span style="text-align: justify;">Can a rightholder restrict linking by contract, eg by imposing the adoption of technological measures? </span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">This, in a nutshell, is the core issue at the heart of the referral to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in <i>VG Bild-Kunst</i>, C-392/19, which was <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=238661&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4182944"><b>decided</b></a> this morning. The Court answered in the affirmative.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The referred question was:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Does the embedding of a work – which is available on a freely accessible website with the consent of the rightholder – in the website of a third party by way of framing constitute communication to the public of that work within the meaning of Article 3(1) of [the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32001L0029"><b>InfoSoc] Directive 2001/29/EC</b></a> where it occurs through circumvention of protection measures against framing taken or instigated by the rightholder?</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The ruling is important because it addresses an issue that was left outstanding after a string of CJEU decisions, starting as early as the 2014 ruling in <b><i><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-466/12">Svensson</a> </i></b>and then continuing with <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-348/13"><b><i>BestWater</i></b></a>, <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-160/15"><b><i>GS Media</i></b></a>, <i><b><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-527/15">Filmspeler</a> </b></i>and <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&T,F&num=c-610-15"><b><i>Ziggo</i></b></a>. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEimqsxJC-RU_R5GjjkRb0x-2Yu7Ho3r63eSI6BsPjuvIJB3e8gdxYHDFQiNBd-28hq3d81CmiJadrgs2N6FzVj4e3X29mwI6i_gQv2C1y0eLF0_y8y_VrbVyWwsGDDJvth3OpacdC6K1AsW/s1102/Screenshot+2021-03-09+at+12.17.11.png" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="647" data-original-width="1102" height="235" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEimqsxJC-RU_R5GjjkRb0x-2Yu7Ho3r63eSI6BsPjuvIJB3e8gdxYHDFQiNBd-28hq3d81CmiJadrgs2N6FzVj4e3X29mwI6i_gQv2C1y0eLF0_y8y_VrbVyWwsGDDJvth3OpacdC6K1AsW/w400-h235/Screenshot+2021-03-09+at+12.17.11.png" width="400" /></a></div></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Until <i>VG Bild-Kunst</i>, the attention – and, thus, the analysis – of the Court had been focused on (1) the status of the subject matter linked to (authorized/unauthorized publication on the third-party website) and on (2) whether the link at issue would circumvent technical restrictions on access.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The question whether also contractual, and not also merely technical, restrictions on access could be imposed was not explicitly addressed, though – in my view – it has implicitly featured in the understanding of the Court as early as <i>Svensson</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Court has consistently stated that there is an act of communication to the public under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive when a link communicates protected subject matter to a new public, by that meaning a public not taken into account when the rightholder authorized the initial publication of their work/protected subject matter. It seems logical to think that the public that the rightholder has in mind can be defined and identified either by adopting technical restrictions (e.g., a paywall) or by envisaging contractual restrictions on linking, or both.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This morning the CJEU finally provided explicit guidance.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The background proceedings relate to a dispute arisen in Germany between collecting society VG Bild-Kunst and SPK, the latter being the operator of digital library devoted to culture and knowledge <a href="https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/"><b>DDB</b></a>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The DDB website displays links to digitized content stored on the internet portals of participating institutions. In itself, DDB only stores – with the authorization of relevant rightholders – thumbnails of the original images, which can be however enlarged by the user upon clicking on them. That website also contains links redirecting users to the website of the institution in possession of the original object.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The licensing agreement between VG Bild-Kunst and SPK included a clause, which required the latter to apply effective technological measures against the framing by third parties of the thumbnails displayed on the DDB website.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">According to SPK, such clause would be unreasonable. Hence, it decided to seek a judicial declaration that the collecting society would be required to grant the licence in question without such a clause.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Further to mixed outcomes at the level of lower courts, the dispute reached Germany’s Federal Court of Justice, which decided to refer the question above to the CJEU.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">The AG Opinion</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In his <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=230872&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3997649"><b>Opinion</b></a> last Autumn, Advocate General (AG) Szpunar proposed to answer the referred question by distinguishing between ‘automatic’ and ‘clickable’ links:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>If the embedding of protected content, which is lawfully and freely available on the internet, is such that such content is automatically displayed on the link provider’s page as soon as it is opened (through inline linking or hotlinking technique), without the need for any further action, then there is a communication to a new public;</li><li>If, instead, the embedding is such that the viewer needs to click on the link to view the framed content, then there is no communication to a new public.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">To reach this conclusion, what was key was a re-assessment and -calibration of what ‘public’ and ‘new public’ mean. Notably, the public taken into account by the rightholder when they authorize the publication of their work online is not and should not be the generality of internet users, but rather “the public, including the potential public, of the website on which the work was initially made available.” (at [84]).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As it frequently happens with AG Szpunar, his Opinion is a very thoughtful one, which meaningfully elaborates on existing case law. It also serves to break a(n ideological) taboo in EU copyright law, that is that all links should be treated the same.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In his view, the answer to the referred question could only in part be inferred from existing case law on linking. It would be thus necessary to look at other case law, notably <i><b><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-161/17">Renckhoff</a> </b></i><b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2018/08/cjeu-rules-that-unauthorized-re-posting.html">here</a>]</span></b>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any case, the AG stated – based on existing CJEU case law on linking – that questions may arise in relation to 3 issues:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ol><li>The classification of links as ‘acts of communication’ <b><span style="color: red;">[this being something which, eg, AG Wathelet firmly objected to in his <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=175626&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8975230">Opinion</a> in <i>GS Media</i>, on which see Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2016/04/ag-wathelet-linking-to-unlicensed.html">here</a>]</span></b>;</li><li>The consideration of subjective criteria (knowledge, but also profit-making intention); and</li><li>The application to the internet of the ‘new public’ criterion <b><span style="color: red;">[on the use of the ‘new public’, see also <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3640493">this</a>]</span></b>.</li></ol><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1uTCCOxD_KVjs9CNOPuxIjSododDxP2BqKgzr9_IPx2sq1cn9OoUn_a_8ZC7zTG26H9lzNer4y3PtU4XroY5mWxKWGXTU64meQdgnrkZx31FjsuoP5JjuvxoAReCsBQoNVDoJDqGIThRP/s256/Screenshot+2021-03-09+at+12.19.47.png" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="256" data-original-width="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1uTCCOxD_KVjs9CNOPuxIjSododDxP2BqKgzr9_IPx2sq1cn9OoUn_a_8ZC7zTG26H9lzNer4y3PtU4XroY5mWxKWGXTU64meQdgnrkZx31FjsuoP5JjuvxoAReCsBQoNVDoJDqGIThRP/s0/Screenshot+2021-03-09+at+12.19.47.png" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Would this contractual restriction<br />satisfy the CJEU judges?</i></td></tr></tbody></table>In relation to 1., the AG stated that it may not be “self-evident” that a link qualifies as an act of communication, though he rejected the view that an act of communication requires (re-)transmission of a work. He concluded that it is the “technological capability of giving direct access to a work specified by its URL address (or the address of the webpage containing that work) which justifies … the classification of hyperlinks as ‘acts of communication’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.” (at [51])</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Turning to 2., the AG acknowledged that the treatment of linking to unlicensed content in CJEU case law might be “unorthodox from the point of view of general copyright rules” (at [54]), but is necessary to preserve the balance between copyright protection and third-party rights and interests.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Finally, as regards 3., the AG noted that – when it comes to the internet – the ‘new public’ is based on a “legal fiction”, ie that (at [56])</div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">a work, as soon as it is made freely available to the public on the World Wide Web, can be viewed by any internet users and that all those users must therefore be regarded as having been taken into account by the copyright holder as a public when the work was initially made available. I call this a legal fiction because that assertion, while true in theory, overlooks the fact that the cyberspace formed by the World Wide Web is quite simply too vast for anyone to be able to know about, let alone access, all its resources.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Not only is this assumption “based on an artificially constructed and fictitious premiss but, taken to its logical conclusion, results in exhaustion of the right of communication to the public” (at [57]). Nonetheless, its role in linking case law has been that of leading, like 2., to “a reduction of liability” (at [61]-[63]).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Today’s judgment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR4ERsQ-4QKtIc5DFYTe84C6e9gPOLoahOdbRbRaGkTfO7EYZJ0yNS-JQ5I91xvWN1Ir6j0I8phzrMNdKSclwtVg8L34srumwXuS3AYcHZhP6ZAzo34fnfzWNwenorApiEScAJmRHoaK2h/s640/IMG_3469.JPG" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="480" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiR4ERsQ-4QKtIc5DFYTe84C6e9gPOLoahOdbRbRaGkTfO7EYZJ0yNS-JQ5I91xvWN1Ir6j0I8phzrMNdKSclwtVg8L34srumwXuS3AYcHZhP6ZAzo34fnfzWNwenorApiEScAJmRHoaK2h/s320/IMG_3469.JPG" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Yoko is also getting ready<br />to study the ruling<br />(photo by Magda Voltolini)</i></td></tr></tbody></table>In its 56-paragraph judgment, the Grand Chamber recalled its own case law on Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, notably by referring to the preventive character thereof and the need to establish a high level of protection for authors, as well as the prohibition of exhaustion as per Article 3(3) of that directive. The Court also noted the need for an individualized assessment of whether the doing a certain act qualifies as communication to the public, by taking into account non-autonomous, interdependent criteria.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The Court did not adopt the differential treatment of links, as proposed by AG Szpunar, nor did it offer any re-calibration of the 'new public' criterion. To reach its conclusion, the CJEU focused not on what a link does, but rather on what the rightholder did:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>if the rightholder did authorize the publication of their work explicitly and without reservations or without otherwise resorting to technological measures limiting access/use of their work, then a link to such work would not fall under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive;</li><li>if, instead, the rightholder imposed or set up technological measures restricting access to/use of their work, a link that circumvents such measures would fall within the scope of application of Article 3.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The latter would be the situation in the background proceedings: the rightholder consented to the communication of their works, subject to implementing certain technological measures. A link, in a situation like this, would be a separate, self-standing communication to the public, subject to separate authorization.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In any case (at [46]):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>in order to ensure legal certainty and the smooth functioning of the internet, the copyright holder cannot be allowed to limit his or her consent by means other than effective technological measures, within the meaning of Article 6(1) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 (see, in that regard, judgment of 23 January 2014, <i>Nintendo and Others</i>, C‑355/12, EU:C:2014:25, paragraphs 24, 25 and 27). In the absence of such measures, it might prove difficult, particularly for individual users, to ascertain whether that right holder intended to oppose the framing of his or her works. To do so might prove even more difficult when that work is subject to sub-licences</blockquote></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Comment</h3><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Today’s ruling is an important one that substantially adds to the construction of the (not-always-idyllic) relationship between linking and the right of communication to the public.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The CJEU endorsed the AG’s recommendation to revisit existing case law and focus on the prohibition of exhaustion under Article 3(3) of the directive. However, it did not adopt his proposed differential treatment between different types of links, nor did it offer to revisit the 'new public' criterion. After today, it appears - first of all - that different links might have to be (still) treated alike. Whilst this may serve to avoid the risk of technological obsolescence of CJEU case law, it may also lead to outcomes that are not necessarily balanced. Secondly, the 'new public' will likely continue raising interpretative doubts and very concrete questions of application.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The key aspect of the ruling is the conditions at which contractual restrictions to linking can be imposed. The CJEU was explicit in saying that consent can be only limited by adopting technological measures. This is functional to ensuring legal certainty and the proper functioning of the internet. One may however wonder whether a potential conflict could subsist with the no formalities rule of the <b><a href="https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/">Berne Convention</a></b>. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">This part of the judgment is important also from a broader perspective: for instance: Article 4 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a></b> allows rightholders to reserve the doing of text and data mining activities in relation to their content. The <i>VG Bild-Kunst </i>judgment may serve to clarify further, beyond the language of that directive, how such reservation is to be done.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 9 March 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-29948939632567007082021-03-06T10:10:00.001+00:002021-03-06T13:09:17.446+00:00Spanish Supreme Court applies Cofemel and rules that bullfighting cannot be protected by copyright<p></p><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkwiR0uBpI8mcWeEo9MieTJrTIMnWPXUeWtw9VKipMLDY9Rapv5WZRzBnnNbU6Y3VzH-BPhXyijBBr6K583T5MufEfatUtPZ0CY1y63jKlBeDtI8zS5T8NEGD7VFDiN5A3YghnEc5SLQsa/s1200/perera_1-2456403_20210225150856.jpeg" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="597" data-original-width="1200" height="199" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkwiR0uBpI8mcWeEo9MieTJrTIMnWPXUeWtw9VKipMLDY9Rapv5WZRzBnnNbU6Y3VzH-BPhXyijBBr6K583T5MufEfatUtPZ0CY1y63jKlBeDtI8zS5T8NEGD7VFDiN5A3YghnEc5SLQsa/w400-h199/perera_1-2456403_20210225150856.jpeg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Miguel Ángel Perera Díaz in a </i>faena</td></tr></tbody></table><span style="text-align: justify;"></span><p></p><div style="text-align: left;">A bullfight (in Spanish: <i>corrida</i>; the final stages are called <i>faena</i>) is a contest that involves a bullfighter (a <i>matador</i>) and a bull, in which the former seeks to subdue, immobilize or kill the animal in accordance with a set of rules. The best-known type of bullfighting is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish-style_bullfighting"><b>Spanish-style one</b></a>, which has been traditionally regarded as both a sport and performance art.</div><p></p><div style="text-align: left;">In relation to the latter qualification of bullfighting, a question that has recently arisen is whether a bullfight might be regarded as a work protectable under copyright law.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Spanish Supreme Court <b><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1F6aKNSo9BB9Nz8-0hOpAWw6DCkwCJQ3X/view?usp=sharing">answered this question in the negative</a></b> last month, when it delivered its judgment in a longstanding copyright saga, which had first begun after a well-known Spanish matador, <a href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_%C3%81ngel_Perera"><b>Miguel Ángel Perera Díaz</b></a>, was refused registration – by the Extremadura Copyright Registry – of a <i>faena</i> of his.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Background</h3><div style="text-align: left;">The bullfight in question was one which had taken place in 2014 at <b><a href="https://www.turismoextremadura.com/en/explora/Badajoz-Bullring/">Badajoz bullring</a></b>, featuring Perera Díaz and a bull named Curioso. The application filed with the Copyright Registry consisted of an audiovisual recording of the <i>faena</i> and a description thereof.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Following the refusal of the Copyright Registry to register his ‘work’, Perera Díaz appealed to the Badajoz Commercial Court No 1. In dismissing the appeal, that court reasoned that a bullfight would not qualify for protection. It reached this conclusion by drawing an analogy with the treatment of football matches and, more generally, sporting events, as considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=c-403/08&language=en"><b><i>FAPL</i></b></a>. In that case, the CJEU held (at [98]) that:</div><blockquote><div style="text-align: left;">sporting events cannot be regarded as intellectual creations classifiable as works within the meaning of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029">Copyright Directive</a></b>. That applies in particular to football matches, which are subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for the purposes of copyright.</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: left;">The court stated that a bullfight is subject to several rules of the game, including: </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li style="text-align: left;">those concerning the characteristics of the bull, its weight, its antlers; </li><li style="text-align: left;">the size of the bullring; </li><li style="text-align: left;">the tools that can be used; </li><li style="text-align: left;">the various phases and duration thereof, as well as the subjects that intervene in each of these. </li></ul><div style="text-align: left;">In the context of a bullfight, a <i>matador</i> is not capable of exercising any free and creative choices, as it is instead required under copyright law.</div></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">Perera Díaz filed a further appeal, again without success. A final appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court followed, claiming <i>inter alia</i> breach of Article 10 of the <a href="https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1996-8930"><b>Spanish Intellectual Property Law</b></a> (this provision sets forth an open-ended catalogue of protectable works under Spanish copyright law) and a misapplication of the originality standard.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLAYLaKpzT1CR61FQI94KZCXxbEMtyuBxAEXKEh6SQAIntdOWSzGIxO72qWlF5SgH6vfbJmSIaHrvHh8vYkBlcvDP8_0XeJ3pCmK1mo78GJNDLMPSF9iNVKh4cedJs4S2kO0Wpn2Sikh0x/s700/19390843_303.jpeg" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="394" data-original-width="700" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhLAYLaKpzT1CR61FQI94KZCXxbEMtyuBxAEXKEh6SQAIntdOWSzGIxO72qWlF5SgH6vfbJmSIaHrvHh8vYkBlcvDP8_0XeJ3pCmK1mo78GJNDLMPSF9iNVKh4cedJs4S2kO0Wpn2Sikh0x/s320/19390843_303.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br /></td></tr></tbody></table><div style="text-align: left;">The Supreme Court decision</div></h3><div style="text-align: left;">The Supreme Court considered it necessary to undertake a joint assessment of whether the object in question could be regarded as a <i>work</i> that is <i>original</i>.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Supreme Court reviewed the <i>FAPL</i> judgment and considered that, whilst relevant, it would not serve to exhaust the analysis, since a bullfight is not just a sporting event. Besides the physical performance and the athletic ability of the <i>matador</i>, there is something more in a bullfight: the artistic dimension thereof.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Court thus deemed it more helpful to look at another CJEU decision for guidance: <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&td=ALL&num=C-683/17"><b><i>Cofemel</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/09/the-cofemel-decision-well-beyond-simple.html">here</a>]</span></b>. In that 2019 ruling, the CJEU consolidated its settled case law, starting as early as <b style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=c-5/08">Infopaq</a> </b><b><span style="color: red;">[Kat-anniversary post <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/07/todays-10-year-anniversary-of-cjeu.html">here</a>]</span></b>, and clarified – once and for all – that, under EU law, copyright protection arises when there is (1) a work, which is (2) original. Nothing further is required.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">With regard to the notion of work, guidance is found in <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-310/17"><b><i>Levola Hengelo</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2018/11/the-levola-hengelo-cjeu-decision.html">here</a>]</span></b>. There, the CJEU defined this concept as follows (at [40]):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote style="text-align: left;">for there to be a ‘work’ as referred to in Directive 2001/29, the subject matter protected by copyright must be expressed in a manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity, even though that expression is not necessarily in permanent form.</blockquote></div><div style="text-align: left;">Turning to originality, this notion requires (<i>Cofemel</i>, at [30]-[31]) that the subject matter at hand “reflects the personality of its author, as an expression of his free and creative choices”. In turn, this means that “when the realisation of a subject matter has been dictated by technical considerations, rules or other constraints, which have left no room for creative freedom, that subject matter cannot be regarded as possessing the originality required for it to constitute a work”.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Spanish Supreme Court accepted that a bullfight may be original (it also provided references to poets and artists who described the feelings that these events evoke), but considered that it would not qualify as a work.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">It is true that each bullfight consists of a set sequence of acts. However, there are also key elements that escape this structure, notably the technique and skills of each bullfighter. The ‘free and creative’ choices of a bullfighter would consist of understanding the bull in order to decide what moves should be performed next. However, for them to be regarded as a work, they should also be expressed in such a way that they are identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity. According to the Supreme Court, this would not be possible in the case of a bullfight.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;">The Court also addressed the question whether a bullfight could be regarded as a choreographic work. The answer would be in the negative. A choreographic work satisfies the <i>Levola Hengelo</i> test, including because a choreography – it being identifiable with sufficient objectivity and precision – can be reproduced. Each bullfight, instead, is unique and cannot be replicated.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Comment<br /></h3><div style="text-align: left;">This is a very interesting judgment, not only because it adds to the catalogue of national applications of <i>Cofemel</i> (after <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/01/uk-court-applies-cjeu-cofemel-decision.html">UK</a></b>, <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/05/italian-supreme-court-applies-cjeu.html">Italy</a></b>, <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/06/guest-post-these-boots-are-made-for.html">Denmark</a></b>, etc), but also because it seeks to break down the requirements developed in over a decade of CJEU decisions on the key question of when copyright protection does arise.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: center;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkkltKJEC7-49ZOgCvGsk_FIImmchPibmUugf3O0vfQ8RoJieM3K9vPQkMQbxiDvrJgNCYiVQXcMlKEz2A0-ER2aZI44pVb30S6IprTdLGSLyJAmtLttosaM6qF0NERzBb6Dov7RKUOtsN/s598/Schermafbeelding-2016-01-20-om-13.47.54.png" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="540" data-original-width="598" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkkltKJEC7-49ZOgCvGsk_FIImmchPibmUugf3O0vfQ8RoJieM3K9vPQkMQbxiDvrJgNCYiVQXcMlKEz2A0-ER2aZI44pVb30S6IprTdLGSLyJAmtLttosaM6qF0NERzBb6Dov7RKUOtsN/s320/Schermafbeelding-2016-01-20-om-13.47.54.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>The cheese at issue in </i>Levola Hengelo</td></tr></tbody></table><div style="text-align: left;">It seems that the broader teaching of this Spanish decision is the following. For copyright protection to arise, it is both necessary and sufficient that the subject matter at hand qualifies as an original work. You cannot have copyright protection in something that is original but is not a work and vice versa. In the case of a bullfight:</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li style="text-align: left;">The parts thereof that are sufficiently delineated in the sense that they are identifiable with precision and objectivity may be a work. However, they are not original, if anything because the set sequence in a bullfight is something that is dictated by technical rules, choices and constraints.</li><li style="text-align: left;">The parts thereof that are sufficiently original and display the personal touch of the <i>matador</i> are not a work because they cannot be identified with sufficient precision and objectivity.</li></ul></div><div style="text-align: left;">Considering the case of choreographic works, the Spanish court also suggested that the precision and objectivity that is needed to qualify as a work under <i>Levola Hengelo</i> is one that allows the ‘object’ to be reproduced. This, however, is a requirement that has never featured in CJEU case law and, in my view, should be rejected: the taste of the cheese at hand in, eg, <i>Levola Hengelo</i> is something that can well be reproduced (all Heks'nkaas boxes taste the same), yet it is not something that can be delineated with sufficient precision and objectivity, at least for the time being (see <i>Levola Hengelo</i>, at [43]). The test should thus be only one of precision and objectivity, not also replicability. There is and there should be room for improvisation in copyright law, including with regard to choreographic works, performance art, and similar 'objects'.</div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 6 March 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4615576852082971128.post-50222239855234556632021-02-27T13:08:00.000+00:002021-02-27T13:08:02.385+00:00 High Court grants, for the first time, website blocking orders targeting cyberlocker and streamripping sites/app and considers that CJEU won’t follow AG Opinion in YouTube/Cyando<p><span style="text-align: justify;"><table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyDO6zhyphenhyphena5t4-geCdpJowQajab9a5k3ZW2iP3lIurBZNS6TASmDoqoaCqp55DmjgfdFyxjBLazQM09I5QqBXCI3UvqSaGADoJ_eTkvgbfoubV_IZVMFK5ccdQkMwh6cGKVMGm41Dsg3_Da/s881/tpkshhnpfr111.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="881" data-original-width="720" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgyDO6zhyphenhyphena5t4-geCdpJowQajab9a5k3ZW2iP3lIurBZNS6TASmDoqoaCqp55DmjgfdFyxjBLazQM09I5QqBXCI3UvqSaGADoJ_eTkvgbfoubV_IZVMFK5ccdQkMwh6cGKVMGm41Dsg3_Da/s320/tpkshhnpfr111.jpg" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Kat blocking</i></td></tr></tbody></table>Earlier this week, the High Court of England and Wales issued two website blocking orders, which set new precedent and are the expression of a further development in the rich UK website blocking jurisprudence. </span></p><div style="text-align: justify;">The orders, which were issued by Miles J further to applications made by record labels that are members of <a href="https://www.bpi.co.uk/"><b>BPI</b></a>, are the first orders ever granted in the UK to block access to, respectively, a cyberlocker and a number of streamripping sites/app.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The decisions are also interesting from a broader, EU perspective, in that the judge considered that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is unlikely to follow the position adopted by Advocate General (AG) Saugmandsgaard Øe in his 2020 <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228712&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11351260"><b>Opinion</b></a>, when it decides <i>YouTube/Cyando</i>, C-682/18 and C-683/18 <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-ag-opinion-in-youtubecyando.html">here</a>].</span></b></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><i>Capitol Records and Others v BT and Others</i>: cyberlocker operators</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2021/409.html"><b>first order</b></a> was made further to an application by record companies, which are members of BPI and <a href="https://www.ppluk.com/"><b>PPL</b></a>. BPI, which coordinated the proceedings on behalf of the Claimants, explained that its members hold the UK rights to approximately 99% of all sound recordings legally consumed in this country.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The application sought an order pursuant to <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/97A"><b>s97A CDPA</b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[the provision by which the UK transposed Article 8(3) of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML">InfoSoc Directive</a> into its own law]</span></b> against the 6 largest UK ISPs (between them, they share 91% of the fixed broadband market) to block access to nitroflare.com, a cyberlocker which – according to the Claimants – is used to infringe their copyrights on a large scale.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">As mentioned, this was the first time in the UK that an application of this kind, ie an application targeting a cyberlocker, was made.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Miles J reviewed the threshold conditions for granting website blocking orders, as developed over a consistent body of case law.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB_o5RKVVTN9cTjULlItCRZOhos7LLCPbVGD-tyVQkzHqPCpF2mVKZJAjOVrNT418tok6DJxJ7sZoMFDP1Pc9ZQjuGlrCQyD-zg20X7g5JEoUlKC8VB3X__0CKD-JU4y3lwWLfEZJPpBEs/s300/buy-nitroflare-premium-michael-vix.jpg" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="300" data-original-width="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjB_o5RKVVTN9cTjULlItCRZOhos7LLCPbVGD-tyVQkzHqPCpF2mVKZJAjOVrNT418tok6DJxJ7sZoMFDP1Pc9ZQjuGlrCQyD-zg20X7g5JEoUlKC8VB3X__0CKD-JU4y3lwWLfEZJPpBEs/s0/buy-nitroflare-premium-michael-vix.jpg" /></a></div>What is particularly interesting here is the conclusion by the judge that the operators of the cyberlocker at issue DO directly infringe copyright by performing unauthorized acts of communication to the public under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/20"><b>s20 CDPA</b></a>, that is the UK equivalent of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. This is in contrast with the position of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, who concluded that neither YouTube nor cyberlocker Uploaded would be directly performing acts of communication to the public under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Miles J, instead, considered that the CJEU conclusion in <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&T,F&num=c-610-15"><b><i>Ziggo</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katposts <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/06/breaking-cjeu-says-that-site-like.html">here</a> and <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/07/what-can-possible-implications-of-cjeu.html">here</a>] </span></b>would be applicable in the case at hand: the operators of NitroFlare pursue a profit-making intention and perform an indispensable intervention; they are therefore directly liable for the doing of acts of communication to the public. Miles J also went further than that and explicitly suggested that the AG Opinion in <i>YouTube/Cyando</i> is “unlikely to be followed” by the CJEU (at [26]):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>I accept the Claimants’ submission that the CJEU’s present position (illustrated by [Ziggo]) is that deliberate facilitation of a communication is sufficient to establish an act of communication and that this is shown if the operator had an intention when providing the service to facilitate infringements. I am satisfied that this requirement has been established here (at [27])</blockquote><p>The judge concluded that infringements were committed by:</p><div><ul><li>users of the site, in accordance with <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/17"><b>ss17 CDPA</b></a>, that is the UK equivalent of Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive, and 20 CDPA; </li><li>the operators of the site by authorizing users' infringements in accordance with <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/16"><b>s16(2) CDPA</b></a>; </li><li>the operators of the site as joint tortfeasors with the users;</li><li>the operators of the site, in accordance with s20 CDPA. </li></ul></div></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><i>Young Turks Recordings and Others v BT and Others</i>: streamripping sites/app operators</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">The <a href="https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2021/410.html"><b>second order</b></a> followed an application targeting a number of stream ripping sites, including Flvto, and app. As readers may know, stream ripping is <a href="https://www.prsformusic.com/press/2020/usage-of-stream-ripping-services-increases-1390-percent-in-three-years"><b>regarded</b></a> as “responsible for a mammoth proportion of the overall piracy problem”. As Miles J explained (at [4]):</div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Stream ripping is a process whereby streamed audio content is converted into permanent audio downloads which can be stored for future consumption and/or shared with others. The Claimants’ evidence explains that this is one of the fastest <a name="para4">growing forms of online infringement of copyright in sound recordings and the most prevalent.</a></div><div style="text-align: justify;"></div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">The application was also made by BPI on behalf of its members, which hold approximately 99% of all sound recordings legally consumed in the UK, as well as rights in the videos which are streamripped.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The request – also the first of this kind in the UK – was based on ss 97A CDPA and <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/54/section/37"><b>37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981</b></a> (the latter was the one also used in, e.g., <a href="https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2003/3354.html"><b><i>Cartier</i></b></a> <b><span style="color: red;">[Katpost <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2014/10/online-enforcement-has-colour-and-name.html">here</a>]</span></b>) and sought an order against the major UK ISPs to block access to the aforementioned sites and app.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Miles J reviewed the threshold conditions for granting the requested order and considered that they were satisfied in the present case.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as copyright infringement is concerned, the judge accepted that infringements were committed by:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><ul><li>users of the sites and app, in accordance with s17 CDPA;</li><li>the operators of the sites and app by authorizing users' infringements in accordance with <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/16"><b>s16(2) CDPA</b></a>; </li><li>the operators of the sites and app as joint tortfeasors with the users;</li><li>the operators of the sites and app, in accordance with s20 CDPA. </li></ul>With regard to the latter, Miles J considered the CJEU holdings in <i>Ziggo</i> and <a href="http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-527/15"><i><b>Filmspeler</b></i></a> applicable to the case at hand. Again, he considered that the CJEU is unlikely follow the AG Opinion in <i>YouTube/Cyando</i>:</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><blockquote>[T]he CJEU’s present position (illustrated by [<i>Ziggo</i>]) is that deliberate facilitation of a communication is sufficient to establish an act of communication and that this is shown if the operator had an intention when providing the service to facilitate infringements (at [80])</blockquote></div><div style="text-align: justify;">The judge also accepted the Claimant’s submission that the sites’ terms of use, which contain a prohibition on infringing copyright, was to be regarded as “window dressing”:</div><div><blockquote>The whole purpose of the technology offered by the Infringing Sites is to circumvent the TPMs [technological protection measures] on streaming sites like YouTube. The TPMs are designed to protect copyright. It is an overwhelming inference that (despite these terms of use) the site operators know that the users are using their services to infringe copyright. (at [37])</blockquote><h2>Comment </h2><div style="text-align: justify;">As mentioned, these very recent orders are important from two perspectives: first, because they signal a further evolution of website blocking jurisprudence; secondly, because they provide an authoritative view of what the CJEU might do when it decides <i>YouTube/Cyando</i>.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;">Relevance to website blocking jurisprudence</h3><div style="text-align: justify;">Insofar as the first point is concerned, website blocking orders have gained centrality in the online IP enforcement landscape over the past few years. The reason for involving innocent ISPs and other intermediaries in the enforcement process by means of injunctions against them is encapsulated in recital 59 in the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive:</div><blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">In the digital environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by third parties for infringing activities. In many cases such intermediaries are <i><u>best placed</u></i> to bring such infringing activities to an end. (emphasis added)</div></blockquote><div style="text-align: justify;">Injunctions can consist of orders by courts or administrative authorities that require intermediaries to terminate or prevent any infringement, “including the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it” (recital 45 of <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031">Ecommerce Directive</a></b>).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Over time, courts in different jurisdictions have been imposing different types of injunctions against intermediaries, including de-indexing, payment freezing, disclosure obligations, and website blocking orders. The latter is <a href="https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf"><b>considered</b></a>, in a number of countries around the world, as an enforcement method that can effectively target specific digital piracy (and counterfeiting) sites. However, the availability of this remedy, which is granted against non-party internet access providers, remains limited: whilst some jurisdictions have recently introduced it (for instance, the first website blocking order of this kind in Canada was only issued in 2019), in others it remains unavailable (an instance being the US).</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">In Europe, things are different: website blocking orders have been granted by courts and authorities for several years and have been regarded as important enforcement tools. Website blocking orders have also undergone an evolution over time.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">First, competent authorities in a number of jurisdictions have been granting, alongside traditional website blocking orders, also dynamic blocking orders <b><span style="color: red;">[e.g. in the <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/03/first-live-blocking-order-granted-in-uk.html">UK</a>, <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2018/08/milan-court-issues-dynamic-blocking.html">Italy</a>, <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/swedish-patent-and-market-court-upholds.html">Sweden</a>, <a href="https://mediawrites.law/first-dynamic-site-blocking-injunction-granted-in-singapore/">Singapore</a>, <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/07/indias-first-dynamic-injunction-issued.html">India</a>] </span></b>which specify, not only the domain name and IP address of the website(s) to block access to, but also any further domain names under which infringements relating to the same rights are committed.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, orders have been granted against major ISPs in a given country to block access, not just to websites directly engaging with piracy and counterfeiting, but also to block access to websites providing the tools and/or aiding piracy and counterfeiting. A recent instance, <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/11/tpm-circumvention-and-website-blocking.html">analyzed on The IPKat</a></b>, is indeed orders aimed at blocking websites providing tools to circumvent TPMs.</div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><h3 style="text-align: justify;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhmraTVHcpKJ7b-FTfpLm_8wR22Kvm0yS1x_WU04qPQxo0GLdnkvrDaAKKA-nDS_PfAWB3q2v7UVnWP5xlYSAHyc_nFG9-6V6K0QkL3LoFSG6tcL8vTM4P5fPgbvo8SX2Ww30rne4mKFlEm/s512/unnamed.jpg" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="270" data-original-width="512" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhmraTVHcpKJ7b-FTfpLm_8wR22Kvm0yS1x_WU04qPQxo0GLdnkvrDaAKKA-nDS_PfAWB3q2v7UVnWP5xlYSAHyc_nFG9-6V6K0QkL3LoFSG6tcL8vTM4P5fPgbvo8SX2Ww30rne4mKFlEm/s320/unnamed.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>The position with regard to communication to the public<br /></h3><div style="text-align: justify;">I have already <b><a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-ag-opinion-in-youtubecyando.html">discussed</a> </b>the AG Opinion in <i>YouTube/Cyando</i> and considered it one which adopts a ‘regressive’ reading of CJEU case law on the right of communication to the public. The CJEU decision in this case is keenly awaited, though there is no information as to when it might be released. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Besides its relevance to the construction of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, the position that the CJEU will adopt in this case is likely to also have an impact insofar as the construction of Article 17 of the <b><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj">DSM Directive</a></b> is concerned (the UK will not transpose it). Although the referrals are obviously not based on Article 17, a discussion of the regime introduced by this provision featured at the hearing and in the parties’ submissions and was also directly dealt with by the AG in his Opinion. </div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: justify;">Ultimately, the AG’s position is that Article 17 would be a change in the law, not a clarification thereof. Miles J did not endorse this reading <b><span style="color: red;">[for my analysis, see <a href="https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/02/five-considerations-for-transposition.html">here</a>] </span></b>and considered that the CJEU will not do that either.</div></div><div style="text-align: justify;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: right;"><i><span style="color: red;">[Originally published on The IPKat on 27 February 2021]</span></i></div>Eleonora Rosatihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05629420303968805446noreply@blogger.com0