©-LAW

Miami to Ibiza ? Better: Karlsruhe ... Via Katfriend  Mathias Schindler  (Office of  MEP Julia Reda )  comes the news that today Germany's Federal Court of Justice ( Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) has referred a new copyright case to the Court of Justice of the European Union:  I ZR 228/15 -  Reformistischer Aufbruch . This is the third copyright reference from the BGH in less than two months: last month, in fact, this court referred the (long-running)  Metall auf Metall  case, and the  Afghanistan Papiere  case  [both reported  here ] . According to the relevant press release (and its Google Translate translation), similarly to the two other references mentioned above, also this new case seeks guidance on – among other things – the interplay between copyright protection and the protection of third-party rights and freedoms (including freedom of the press), as well as the proper interpretation of relevant exceptions in the InfoSoc Directive – in this case, news reporting an

Yesterday Advocate General (AG) Wahl issued his  Opinion  in  Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH , C ‑ 230/16  [the Opinion has already received a thorough and interesting  commentary  by leading competition law blog Chillin’Competition] . This is a reference for a preliminary ruling from the  Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main (Germany), seeking guidance from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on how to interpret relevation competition law provisions  [ Article 101(1) TFEU  and of Article 4(b) and (c) of  Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 ]  in the context of selective distribution agreements. This case is linked to, on the one hand, the increasing popularity of electronic marketplaces over which producers have no influence  [eg Amazon, eBay]  and, on the other hand, the question whether  a supplier may prohibit authorized resellers from making use of non-authorized third undertakings over fear that the relevant products would otherwise lose or risk

Right of communication to the public?! The right of communication to the public under Article 3(1) of the  InfoSoc Directive  has been subject to several  (nearly 20)  references for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Over time, this exclusive right has become increasingly complex, and yet absolutely topical to online exploitation of works and enforcement of relevant copyrights. Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive does not define the concept of ‘communication to the public’. This provision, in fact, only states that EU “Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”  Lacking a definition of the notion of ‘communication to the public’, the CJEU has sought

As this blog  reported , on 14 June last the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) issued its much-awaited  judgment  in  Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV , C- 610/15 (the  ‘ Pirate Bay ’ case). There, the Court developed further its construction of the right of communication to the public within Article 3(1) of the  InfoSoc Directive , and clarified under what conditions the operators of an unlicensed online file-sharing platform are liable for copyright infringement. The CJEU judgment builds upon the earlier Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Szpunar in the same case  [reported  here ] , yet goes beyond it. This is notably so with regard to the consideration of the subjective element (knowledge) of the operators of an online platform making available copyright content. Unlike AG Szpunar, the Court did not refer liability only to situations in which the operators of an online platform have acquired  actual  knowledge of third-party infringements, but

Yes, at last the question that has been daunting copyright enthusiasts for a long time - at least since the 2012 decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in  UsedSoft , C-128/11   [Katposts  here ]  - is going to be asked: Is there such thing as digital exhaustion under the  InfoSoc Directive ? This is a topic that this blog has followed for a while  [latest installment  here ] ; the practical implications relate to the possibility of having second-hand markets for digital copies of copyright content, e.g. e-books, videogames, audiobooks, etc. The law As far as the law is concerned, the relevant provision is Article 4(2) of the InfoSocDirective, which concerns exhaustion of the right of distribution: "The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or w